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EFFECTS BASED WARFARE:
THE SUM OF PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE?
ABSTRACT
Effects Based Warfare (EBW) describes a novel Western conceptual approach to 
warfare within which the effects that accrue during war are consistent with, and 
limited to, those effects envisaged during the planning process. EBW covers action at 
every level o f warfare. It embraces any activity that seeks to influence allies, 
adversaries, and neutrals, and it demands coherent aftermath planning. Further, it 
demands inputs from all government departments rather than solely from military 
sources. EBW is therefore an holistic, pan-governmental construct.
The aim of this thesis is to determine whether EBW is an original model o f warfare or 
merely the sum of previous experiences. To resolve this matter the dissertation covers 
five broad areas: Understanding EBW^ which outlines the context for EBW and 
describes the contemporary Effects Paradigm from first principles; American Origins, 
which looks at US inputs to the model, combining detailed historical approach with 
recent doctrinal developments; UK Origins, the UK input to EBW, which analyses a 
series o f groundbreaking governmental papers issued between 1999 and 2004; 
Operational Case Studies, a set o f four discrete historical case studies which from an 
EBW perspective involve increasing levels o f complexity (this adds substance to the 
conceptual elements o f the thesis); and Time fo r  Change? The Early 2E ' Century 
which analyses the strategic tapestry o f the early 2U^ Century, delving into matters 
ranging from the impact o f globalisation upon the wider security environment to 
increasing influence o f the media and the re-emergence of humanitarianism.
In support of the above aim this thesis seeks to prove three fundamental contentions. 
First, the extant Western approach to warfare is the product o f a previous era - the 
Cold War and its immediate aftermath - which has failed to develop sufficiently to 
meet the unique demands o f the 2U* Century. Hence it is ill-equipped to deliver 
enduring international security today. Second, an alternative approach began to 
coalesce shortly after the collapse o f the Berlin Wall. This was due initially to the 
efforts o f various US doctrinal theorists, but after their initial mark was made, the 
baton subsequently picked up by the UK. Indeed within 5 years o f this happening, a 
viable if immature effects paradigm had emerged. Third, whilst the mantra that ‘wars 
have always been conducted for effect’ may true, at least at the strategic level, within 
the context of EBW it is irrelevant; because as this thesis will show, the issue at stake 
is not whether effects occur per se - which is a given - but the degree to which cause 
and effect are considered by planners throughout the full depth of warfare.
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INTRODUCTION
This introduction comprises 6 sections: Aims and Objectives: Methodology; Literature 
and Source Review; Definitions; and, to set the scene for the opening chapter, a brief 
discussion o f the Origins o f EBW.
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES
The aim of this thesis is to assess whether EBW merits recognition as an original model 
o f warfare, or whether it is the sum o f previous experience. Its critics believe it to be the 
latter and they suspect that although it promises much, in practise it will deliver no more 
than the current paradigm. Naturally its supporters take an opposing stance, believing 
that EBW has both codified and formalised the best o f the current model o f warfare, and 
that it has also added a new dimension to warfare: that o f delivering physical and 
cognitive effects across the full spectrum o f conflict including the aftermath. In seeking 
to resolve this debate, the aim o f this thesis is supported by the following objectives:
1 ) Describe The W est’s Extant Approach To Warfare.
a) Highlight changing threats since the collapse o f the Berlin Wall.
b) Discuss the suitability o f W est’s extant model of warfare to meet the new 
challenges.
2) Describe The Contemporary EBW  Paradigm.
a) Outline Foucaulf s contention that that each new era produces its own unique 
mindset o f thought.
b) Discuss differences in interpretation regarding the politics / war dynamic.
c) Explain ‘effects and outcomes’.
d) Explain the centrality o f ‘winning the peace’ within the EBW Paradigm.
3 ) Assess The US Input To The Modern EBW Paradigm.
a) Discuss the roots o f modern US operational level doctrine.
b) Explain the significance o f Am erica’s remote strategic roots.
c) Explain the significance o f the Vietnam Experience.
d) Establish how early TRADOC work led to a subsequent reappraisal of doctrine.
e) Discuss America’s wider approach to warfare / battle.
4) Assess The UK Input To The Modern EBW Paradigm.
a) Explain the significance o f these inputs and outline the timescale involved.
b) Test the UK model for completeness.
5) Analyse Four Unrelated Case Studies O f Differing Complexity And From 
Different Periods.
a) Use historical evidence to add to the conceptual elements o f this thesis.
b) Use studies as frameworks for analysis to allow pertinent EBW themes to be 
identified.
6) Describe the Strategic Realities o f the Early 21** Centm-y.
a) Discuss the rise o f globalisation; the media; and the resurgence of 
humanitarianism.
b) Discuss the cultural dimension, including rationality and the cognitive domain.
c) Discuss the 21** Century aftermath.
e) Discuss the utility o f planning warfighting and post-warfighting activities
separately (current model o f warfare) or together (EBW aspiration).
Finally, it is neither desirable nor indeed feasible to cover every aspect o f warfare within 
this thesis, hence three sets o f factors fall outside its scope. First. pre-Manoeuvre Warfare 
does not feature other than to illustrate specific EBW themes. So, for example. Operation 
Chastise was selected as an Case Study because it shows how even a straightforward 
* one-off operation can generate second and third order strategic, operational, tactical and  
psychological effects. Similarly, Counter-Insurgency does not feature as such, yet two 
examples (the British experience in Malaya, and M agsaysay's methodology for 
countering the Hukbalahaps) are included because they illustrate perfectly the EBW 
mindset. Second, the tone and approach o f this thesis are unashamedly Anglo-American. 
This is deliberate, and it reflects the incontrovertible fact that the modern EBW paradigm 
is an Anglo-American construct. O f course, in time its use might permeate throughout 
NATO, the EU and perhaps even the UN; but if  this happens it will be because NATO 
procedures generally mirror those o f the US, and the EU follows NATO. It will not be 
because each participating nation inputted to its development. Third, the thesis makes no 
attempt to compare the American ‘way o f w ar’ with that o f the British. Such a 
comparison is certainly possible, and it would no doubt make for a worthy dissertation in 
its own right. But it would be inappropriate within this thesis because it would widen the 
focus Linacceptably, and thus risk the thesis being pulled in two directions. Moreover, 
comparing American and British ‘w ays’ has little to do with EBW per se. Both countries 
played their role in EBW ’s development, but as we shall see. they did so at different times 
and in different ways. With this in mind, this thesis seeks to unearth what the EBW 
paradigm comprises, who contributed what, and when the key events occurred.
METHODOLOGY
The study opens with an explanation o f the W est’s current approach to warfare, which for 
want o f an official title the author has termed ‘the Manoeuvrist Paradigm’. Covering this 
ground is necessary in order that like may be compared with like; the current model with 
EBW. That said, much of the old model is subsumed within EBW. Therefore attention 
focuses on key differences, such as the current model’s quest for speedy results versus 
EBW 's desire for holistic aftermath planning. This section is followed by an appraisal of 
the context for EBW, which - on the back o f Foucault’s claim that each new era produces 
its own unique mindset o f thought, its ‘episteme’ ' - suggests that not all military 
developments are evolutionary. This opens the possibility that EBW could be an original 
construct, or at least contain sufficient original elements to merit accreditation as one.
The focus then shifts to a brief discussion o f the politics / war dynamic. This shows that 
there is more than one way to view this rather intricate relationship: either as associated 
or disassociated activities. This is a key area o f discussion, and the thesis contends that 
EBW supports the former view whilst the current model supports the latter. Indeed so 
central is this theme to the topic in general that it recurs throughout much of this thesis. 
The first chapter finishes by outlining the Effects Paradigm from first principles, in an 
attempt to demystify the model and to clarify any fundamental misunderstandings.
Chapter 2 analyses American inputs to the model. It takes a broad historical approach, 
and it contends that whilst the early high visibility inputs to EBW date from around the 
1991 Gulf War, America’s past is as relevant as more recent developments. Beginning 
with America’s catharsis in the wake o f Vietnam, this chapter establishes that significant 
doctrinal changes occurred within a short period o f time, and that these changes were 
both deliberate and fundamental. This adds credibility to Foucault’s epistemic model, 
and in doing so it reaffirms the possibility that EBW could indeed encapsulate more than 
previous experience. This vital background provides the context to undertake a 
meaningful assessment o f how EBW evolved out o f Manoeuvre Warfare. Next, the focus 
shifts to whether there is ‘A Uniquely American Way o f War’. Using Russell W eigley’s 
The American Way o f  War as its anchor, this section considers America’s wider approach 
to warfare. It asks whether current US doctrine is governed as much by America's 
remote past as by more recent developments. This analysis prompts a key question: does 
an American way of war exist, or does America instead have a way of battle - a less 
mature (and hence less effective) paradigm for addressing conflict? The chapter 
concludes with an overview of American input to the modern effects paradigm. Using 
Colin S Gray’s Strategy in the Nuclear Age: The United States 1945-1991 as a counter to 
W eigley’s work, this section analyses the roots o f America’s wider strategic culture.
It then considers the impact o f highly influential US doctrinal theorists - John Boyd, John 
Warden and Dave Deptula -  before ending with a brief overview of how Network Centric 
Warfare (NCW), the US variant o f Network Enabled Capability (NEC), links to EBW.
Chapter 3 assesses the UK input to EBW. It achieves this by analysing a series of 
governmental papers. This approach reveals that EBW development increased with each 
successive paper and that by the time the final paper was written - just five years after the 
original one - EBW had coalesced around the concept o f EBA, an holistic approach to 
warfare unique to the UK. Analysis begins with ‘The Origins o f EBA’, which assesses 
through an effects lens the 1999 UK Government White Paper Modernising Government. 
This made explicit the government’s aspiration that departments should work more
Chapter I, page 20.
closely together, which - although not known at the time - was a precondition for EBA. 
Next is a review o f the New Chapter to the 1998 Sti^ategic Defence RevicM>, an important 
work as it stated that future military options would henceforth be framed in terms o f 
desired effects. The next section, ‘Network Centric Capability (NCC)’, shows how an 
effects model was predicated with a robust network at its core. Focus then shifts to 'EBA 
Consolidation’, which started in July 2002 with the issue of a supporting adjunct to the 
New Chapter. This added detail to five previously identified strategic effects. Next is a 
brief review Delivering Security in a Changing World, which used the term 'effects 
based operations and planning’ for the first time. By way of concluding, the chapter 
seeks evidence to demonstrate the completeness or otherwise of the UK model today. 
Surprisingly, it discovers that the UK government has yet to develop an overarching 
national philosophy applicable to all government departments.
Chapter 4 adds substance to the conceptual elements o f the thesis by analysing four 
discrete historical case studies: Operation Chastise, the Dam busters raid o f 16/17 May 
1943; Operation Black Buck, the Vulcan bombing raids conducted against Port Stanley 
airfield from 1 May to 12 June 1982; Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, NATO’s final 
act o f warfare in the 20**^  Century; and Operation Phantom Fury, the coalition forces'
2004 assault on Fallujah. These studies are viewed retrospectively, mindful that some 
details that are known know today were not known at the time, and that attitudes and 
culture change constantly, hence today’s interpretation of events may differ significantly 
from those in the past. The studies are scrutinised in increasing detail, with each one 
serving as a springboard for analysing the next study. The purpose o f the chapter is to use 
these studies as frameworks for analysis so that pertinent EBW themes may be identified.
Chapter 5 is entitled ‘Time for Change: The early 2U* Century*. This appraisal is the 
raison d ’etre o f the thesis, as it contends that whilst threats have changed significantly 
since the collapse o f the Berlin Wall, the W est’s model o f warfare has failed to adapt 
accordingly. Rather than focusing on purely military issues, it analyses the broad 
strategic tapestry o f the early 21*‘ Century, considering matters such as the impact o f 
globalisation on the wider security environment and the influence of the media.
Noting that in some cases today’s military challenges are markedly different from their 
predecessors, it accepts that the W est’s armed forces have adapted with great skill and no 
small amount o f effort, but it asks whether this accomplishment fully addresses the wider 
security concerns. Having determined that the answer is ‘no’ it suggests that in this new 
era, several traditional factors need to be better understood, such as understanding culture 
and rationality - both o f which feature within EBW in a way that is sought within the 
current model of warfare. It concludes with a brief discussion on 'The 2U* Century 
Aftermath'. This builds on previous discussions, noting that in the wake o f Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the aftermath o f warfare now needs to be considered as never before.
This matter is analysed in some detail, together with the related issue o f whether 
warfighting and post-warfighting activities should be planned separately (as happens at 
present) or together (an EBW requirement).
Two further considerations apply regarding methodology. First, the thesis covers the 
period up to and including July 2005. No new material has been added since that time 
due to the extraordinarily rapid pace o f  change in the wake o f the Iraq and Afghanistan 
conflicts. Second, although this thesis makes no attempt to 'se ll' EBW, nonetheless it 
delves into areas which in the normal manner o f historical research might ordinarily 
remain undisturbed. This approach is deliberate; indeed given the context within which 
EBW emerged, it is essential. Understanding the new strategic realities is as important as
understanding the extant American approach. In similar vein, understanding America’s 
remote past is no less important than analysing the UK. Government’s early White Papers, 
even though they make no mention o f EBW per se.
LITERATURE AND SOURCE REVIEW
Most of the literature and sources referred to throughout this thesis have been drawn from 
the following pools: governmental, academic, military, media, the internet, and some 
highly influential individuals. Equal weight has been given to all. Those featuring in the 
bibliography have informed this work in some way, but not all have been drawn upon for 
direct attribution. Sources mentioned below were particularly relevant. They are 
presented here in abridged form. Full details are in the bibliography.
Chapter 1 "Understanding EBW ’ focuses on the Manoeuvrist Paradigm, Manoeuvre 
Warfare and the Manoeuvrist Approach. Literature ranges from the UK’s high level ,loint 
Doctrine Publication 0-01, Edition 6, UK Glossary o f  Joint and Multinational Terms and  
Definitions, to the operational level Joint Warfare Publications 0-01 and 5-00, British 
Defence Doctrine (SecondEdition) and Joint Operations Planning respectively. US 
Army Field Manual 100-5, F M 100-5 Operations, adds a useful American perspective. 
Section Two, "The Context for EBW ’, is predicated upon Foucault’s epistemes as 
outlined in The Order o f  Things: A n  Archaeology o f  the Human Science. Given the aim 
o f the thesis, knowledge o f this is essential albeit Foucault’s book plays no role after 
introducing the concept. The ‘Politics / War Dynamic’ draws upon Sun Tzu’s The Art o f  
War, the Selected M ilitary Writings o f  Mao Tse-Tung and Clausewitz’s On War in equal 
measure, together with interpretation o f the latter by Christopher Bassford in John 
Keegan and the Grand Tradition o f  Trashing Clausewitz, and by Michael Flandel in 
Masters o f  War: Classical Strategic Thought. Much of the 'Contemporary Effects 
Paradigm' material came from the author, who informed manuals on the subject during its 
earliest stages while serving as a campaigning specialist at the UK’s Fligher Command 
and Staff Course, Shrivenham. For ‘Effects and Outcomes’ three primary sources were 
indispensable: Donald Lowe and Simon N g’s Effects-Based Operations: Language. 
Meaning And The Effects-Based Approach, Ed Smith’s Effects Based Operations: 
Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War, and US Joint Forces 
Command White Paper Version 1.0, A Concept Framework fo r  Effects Based Operations. 
For matters relating to the aftermath, Barry Posen’s The War fo r  Kosovo: Serbia 
Political-Military Strategy proved extremely helpful. ‘Winning the Peace’ was compiled 
from several media reports. Whilst all o f  the sources mentioned above provided useful 
collateral, the gist o f the much of chapter flowed from discussions and interviews held 
with several influential military officers at Shrivenham, and in particular General Rupert 
Smith.
Chapter 2, American Origins, owes much to Russell F W eigley’s The American Way o f  
War: A History o f  United States M ilitary Strategy and Policy. This set the tone for 
examining America’s remote past to see how it might have infiuenced modern American 
military strategists. W eigley’s work was counterbalanced by Colin S Gray’s Strategy in 
(he Nuclear age: the United States, 1945-1991 and by Martin H Halperin’s Contemporary 
Military Strategy. Robert M Citino’s excellent Blitzkrieg To Desert Storm: The Evolution 
o f  Operational Warfare supported Halperin’s work, and was unrivalled as a source for 
considering "The Roots o f Modern US Operational Level Doctrine’. Regarding 
America’s period o f introspection following Vietnam, Dr Henry Kissinger’s personal 
insights during two informal discussions were irreplaceable. The Vietnamese perspective
was provided by Ngo Vinh Long in the form of two essays: Vietnam’s Revolutionary 
Tradition and The Franco-Vietnamese War 1945-1954: Origins o f  US Involvement, 
which together with General Vo Nguyen Giap’s The Political and M ilitaty Line o f  Our 
Party, featured in Vietnam and America: The Most Comprehensive Documented History 
o f  the Vietnam War. Indeed this large collection o f primary source essays proved to be 
invaluable. Mao Tse-Tung’s Yu Chi Chan, Guerrilla Warfare shed further light on this 
matter, as (unexpectedly, given its title) did Major-General .lohn Kiszely’s The British 
Army and Approaches to Warfare since 1945. This was particularly useful in considering 
the role and influence o f Robert S. McNamara. Reflecting on this very aspect many years 
later, McNamara and Brian Vandemar’s In Retrospect: The Tragedy And Lessons O f 
Vietnam amplified numerous areas pertinent to EBW. William Lind’s Some Doctrinal 
Questions for the US Arm y  was another key work; this, together with Major Paul 11. 
Herbert’s Deciding what has to he done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition 
o fF M  100-5, Operations proYidQd much useful background. Turning to the ‘US Input to 
The Modern Effects Paradigm’, David Fadok’s John Boyd and John Warden: Air 
Power's Quest fo r  Strategic Paralysis provided in-depth analysis of the enduring 
influence those two airmen. M ajor General David Deptula’s first hand accounts Effects- 
Based Operations: A US Perspective and Effects Based Operations: Change in the 
Nature o f  Warfare were used extensively, both to clarify points o f detail regarding 
Operation Desert Storm, and to make sense o f some of the earliest inputs to EBW.
Numerous HM Government or government-derived primary sources underpinned 
Chapter 3, UK Origins. In addition to those outlined under ‘M ethodology’, the .luly 2004 
pamphlet Delivering Security in a Changing World - Future Capabilities was
another key source, particularly regarding Network Enabled Capability (NEC).
Primary sources for Chapter 4, the Operational Case Studies, included several 
retrospective discussions with General Rupert Smith regarding Kosovo. The author 
served as an Air Force Advisor to General Smith in Bosnia, and in this capacity he 
worked alongside Major Milos Strankovic, the principal UN translator for General Rose 
and later General Smith. Stankovic’s written account^ proved invaluable. So too did 
Kosovo Lessons From the Crisis,^ an official UK Government publication listing the 
factors most likely to have been influential in securing M ilosevic's capitulation. Turning 
to Fallujah, numerous first hand media reports were used - indeed these were the only 
relevant primary sources o f significance available at the time. The Falklands example 
was informed at the tactical level by discussions with numerous veterans, most notably 
Major General Sir Julian Thompson, the former commander o f Task Group 317.1, who 
on two occasions co-chaired with the author formal discussions on this subject amongst 
military officers. His unique perspective was supplemented by Admiral Sandy 
W oodward's excellent personal account o f the campaign.'* For Operation Chastise the 
internet provided the necessary facts and figures. In this capacity it was no less 
authoritative than the sources mentioned above.
Chapter 5 ‘Warfare in the Early 21** Century’ is largely conceptual. Here the primary 
sources range from a Hans Blix presentation and subsequent ‘fireside chat’ at Oxford
“ Stankovic, M ilos, Trusted M ole: A S o ld ie r ’s Journey into B o sn ia ’s  H eart o f  D arkness, London. Harper 
C ollins, 2000, p 275.
K osovo l,essons From the C risis, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary o f  State for D efen ce by 
Command o f  Her M ajesty, U K  M O D , June 20 0 0 , Cm 4724.
* One Hundred Days: The Memoir's o f  the F alklands B attle  G roup C om m ander, London, Harper Collins.
1992.
University in 2004 on the subject o f Iraq, to Ludendorff s The Coming War and Mao Tse- 
Tung’s Unrehearsed Talks and Letters: 1956-71,^ The latter added weight to key 
observations made by David G Marr, the first Vietnamese-speaking US Marine sent to 
Vietnam /’ on the utility o f cultural awareness, and to Paul K Davis’s analysis o f human 
behaviour during the Cuban Missile C risis / Interviews with Dr Karen Carr, Director of 
Future Systems at BAe Human Resources, proved invaluable in making this section 
relevant for the 21** Century. Secondary sources were similarly fruitful; for example 
M ilosevic's claim, widely reported in the media, that NATO was “not willing to sacrifice 
lives to achieve our surrender. But we are willing to die to defend our rights as an 
independent sovereign nation”  ^provided a unique and highly pertinent insight regarding 
his mindset - and therefore to his cognitive domain - at that time, and. During the 
analysis o f the aftermath o f war in the 21** Century, the internet had no peer; the 
testimony of those involved in Iraq’s aftermath planning proved crucial in understanding 
how this complex matter is currently addressed.
DEFINITIONS
EBW
There is no commonly agreed definition o f EBW. This is surprising, and in common with 
many matters concerning EBW, it seems to mean different things to different people.
In essence it covers action at every level o f  warfare, and it embraces any aciivify that 
seeks to influence allies, adversaries, and neutrals? Rudimentary though this explanation 
might be, as a working definition it fulfils the requirements o f this thesis. In fact it covers 
three broad areas. First, there is action at every level o f  warfare. This makes EBW most 
unusual. Indeed apart from Total War - wherein all national assets may be called upon in 
the pursuit of strategic survival - other models o f warfare tend to focus on battle rather 
than on warfare in its wider sense. Consequently defeating the enemy’s military, 
normally as swiftly as possible, routinely assumes primacy over setting the conditions for 
enduring peace; a difficult enough task in itself, but all the more so when it is undertaken 
mindful o f cultural and religious sensitivities.
All models of warfare accept that actions at one level can, on occasion, affect the other 
levels. However, EBW does not allow any single level o f warfare to become 
marginalised within the wider planning process. So whereas the focus in Manoeuvre 
Warfare is at the joint operational level - and during the warfighting stage it shifts largely 
between this and the tactical level - EBW establishes linkages across the full spectrum of 
warfare.
The second thread within the definition is that EBW embraces any activity. Because 
other models focus on the fighting phase, activity is usually directed against the sources 
from which the enemy derives its strength: normally its military forces. Yet EBW 
embraces all activities, be they economic, diplomatic, governmental (or even non­
 ^ Mao Tse-Tung, U n rehearsed  Taltcs a n d  Letters: 1956-71, Ed Stuart R. Schram, London, 1974. p 128.
David G Marr, The R ise and Fall o f  “Counterinsurgency” : 1961-1964, in Vietnam and America: The M ost 
Com prehensive Docum ented H istoiy  o f  the Vietnam  War, Gettleman, Marvin E; Franklin, Jane; Young, 
Vlariiyn B; and Franklin, Bruce (Eds), G rove Press, N ew  York, 1995.
’ Paul K Davis. E ffects-B ased O perations, A G ra n d  C haltenge for the A n a ly tica l Com m unity. RAND,
Santa M onica, California, 2001.
® Interview with M ilosevic, U nited  P ress  International, April 30, 1999.
Author’s definition.
governmental) and it places considerable importance on harmonising these different 
strands. Consequently EBW requires all organs o f government to work together, with a 
common understanding, in pursuit o f  identical objectives.
T he third thread concerns the target audience: to influence allies, adversaries, and 
neutrals. Most paradigms focus on the enemy at the expense of considering the 
consequences o f their actions on allies and neutrals. These effects may be positive or 
negative, temporary or permanent, physical or psychological - the list o f permutations is 
vast. However, if any o f these effects are marginalised, the victor’s status within the 
international community can be damaged long after the war is over. EBW seeks to 
minimise, if not eradicate, this marginalisation.
There is much within this working definition to suggest that some elements of EBW are 
original and therefore unique. Nonetheless, EBW does not claim to encompass 
everything pre-EBW. However, as might naturally be expected, it does take into account 
the enduring lessons o f warfare that have been gleaned by previous generations.
EBA
In most EBW literature - and in almost all non-UK literature - the term EBA normally 
exists only in the title, and in this capacity it serves primarily to introduce EBO (see 
below) to the reader. The UK’s stance is unique, however. According to Air Vice- 
Marshal lain MacNicoll, Director General o f the UK’s Joint Doctrine and Concepts 
Centre, EBA is “the co-ordinated application o f capabilities, drawn from the three 
instruments of Power in order to achieve a desired strategic aim".'** The three instruments 
o f Power are diplomatic, economic and military means. The UK is unusual in defining 
EBA, and even more unusual in declaring that EBA, a subset of EBW, covers activity at 
the pan-governmental level. Within the UK paradigm, the level below EBA is EBO.
EBAO
The US paradigm differs from that o f the UK, with the term ‘Effects Based Approach to 
Operations' (EBAO) beginning to gain currency. This is not a universally accepted term, 
even within the US, probably because the paradigm is still immature. Nonetheless, it is 
included here for completeness. According to the United States Joint Forces Command, 
EBAO comprises “actions designed to bring about a desired result by integrating military 
actions with those o f other instruments o f national power”.' ' it adds that “ EBAO is an 
evolving idea that has been characterized as ‘an effects-based approach to joint 
operations' and as ‘effects-based thinking’ in the application of operational art and 
design” .'^ Within EBAO, the planning and conduct o f operations move away from a 
predominantly “force-oriented, mi 1 itary-on-miIitary approach to one that facilitates the 
application o f all elements o f national power (Diplomatic, Information, Military and 
Economic, or DIME) against the interdependent systems (Political, Military, Economic. 
Social, Information and Infrastructure, or PMESII) that comprise the operational
The UK A pproach  to the Planning, Execution a n d  A ssessm en t o f  E ffects-B ased O pera tions. .loint 
Doctrine and Concepts Centre presentation given  by Air Vice-M arshal lain M acN icoll, undated. Available  
in full at h ttp://w w w .defence.gov.au/strategy/fw c/docum ents/ebo_m cnicoil.pdf 
' ' Effects B a sed  A pproach  to  O pera tions, United States Joint Forces Command w ebsite, undated, 
http://w w w .j fcom .m il/about/fact ebo.htm  
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environment” .'^ It may thus be seen that EBAO is similar to EBA - in that it integrates 
all instruments o f national power (albeit the US recognizes four instruments whereas the 
UIC only recognizes three) - but it differs from EBA in that it is concerned solely with the 
operational environment. For the purposes o f this thesis EBAO may be assumed to be 
broadly equivalent to EBO, Consequently, in the interests o f clarity it is not considered 
further as a stand-alone strand within this work.
EBO
In contrast to EBW and EBA, there is no shortage o f definitions for EBO. The US Joint 
Forces Command Glossary defines it as “a process o f obtaining a desired strategic 
outcome or ‘effect’ on the enemy, through the synergistic, multiplicative, and cumulative 
application o f the wide range o f military and non-military capabilities at the tactical, 
operational and strategic levels”.''* The UK JDCC’s more prosaic definition is: “the co­
ordinated application o f military and non-military agents to acknowledge specific effects 
on adversaries, allies and neutrals to obtain a desired objective”.'^ Unlike the US 
definition, the UK version does not view EBO as a process, but rather as a mindset. 
Moreover, whereas the US definition focuses exclusively on the enemy, the UK version 
includes friendly forces and neutral players. These are significant differences, and if left 
unharmonised they could potentially interfere with coalition planning. These are not the 
only definitions that exist, however. Indeed there are many others. For balance, a further 
three are included below. They broaden the concept, albeit at a risk o f introducing yet 
more confusion; because they too do not fully support each other. They are:
Paul K Davis, in Effects-Based Operations, A Grand Challenge fo r  the Analytical 
Community. ‘‘Operations conceived and planned in a systems framework that considers 
the full range o f direct, indirect and cascading effects - effects that may, with different 
degrees o f probability, be achieved by the application of military, diplomatic, 
psychological, and economic instruments”.'^
Ed Smith, in Effects Based Operations, Applying Net^vork Centric Warfare in Peace, 
Crisis and War: “Effects Based Operations are coordinated sets of actions directed at 
shaping the behaviour o f friends, foes, and neutrals in peace, crisis and war”.'^
Mann, Enderby and Searle, in Thinking Effects, Effects Based Methodology fo r  Joint 
Operations'. “Actions taken against enemy systems designed to achieve specific effects 
that contribute directly to desired military and political outcomes” .'®
There can be no doubt that from a definitional perspective, confusion abounds. In fact 
this very observation was made in July 2003 by the US Defence Science Board Task 
Force on Discriminate Use o f Force, which noted that EBO definitions were generally
Ibid.
http://ww w.ifcom .m i1/about/glossary.htm #E  
May 2004  definition.
Paul K Davis, E ffects-B ased O perations, A G ra n d  C hattenge f o r  the A naly tica l Comnninify. R A N D . 
Santa M onica, California, 2001 , p xiii.
”  Edward R Smith, Effects B a sed  O perations: A pp ly in g  NetM’ork C entric W arfare in Peace. C risis a n d  
War, CCRP Information A ge Transformation Series, N o v  2002 , p xiv.
C olonel Edward C M ann, Lieutenant C olonel Gary Endersby, and Thom as R Searle, Thinking Effects: 
E ffects-B ased M ethodology f o r  Join t O pera tion s, Air U niversity Press, M axwell A PB , Alabama. Oct 2002, 
p 96.
underpinned by three factors: efficiency, comprehensiveness or speed. After considerable 
deliberation, in an effort to bring clarity to the topic they produced their own definition: 
“ the systematic and explicit attempt (in planning and executing a campaign with 
competing objectives) to assess for and adapt to the effects from kinetic and other actions. 
This includes military and non-military effects, desired and undesired effects, and 
expected and unanticipated effects”.19
When the above definitions are tabulated, the differences between them become readily 
apparent:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
us Joint
Forces
Command
y y y
JDCC y y y
Davis y y y
Smith y y
Mann et al y y
US DSB TF 
on
Discriminate 
Use o f Force
y y y y
Figure 1 - Table o f EBO Definitions
1. Seek Strategic Outcomes or Objectives.
2. Occur at the Strategic, Tactical and Operational Levels.
3. Use Military and non-Military Means.
4. Within a Systems Framework.
5. Shape Behaviour / Influence Will.
6. Include adversaries, neutrals, friendly forces.
7. Different levels o f effect included.
8. Different types o f effect included.
9. Unanticipated or negative effects included.
This table highlights not only EBO’s relative immaturity, but the fact that whilst it has 
many facets, no single definition captures it perfectly. Moreover, each o f the above 
definitions could also apply to EBW - and this is a surprising and potentially confusing
R eport o f  the D efence Science B o a rd  Task F orce  on D iscrim inate Use o f lo r c e ,  July 2003 , O ffice o f  the 
Under Secretary o f  D efen ce For A cquisition, T echnology, and L ogistics. W ashington, D .C. 20301-3140 .
p 2.
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revelation. With this in mind, for the purposes o f this thesis EBW and EBO are treated as 
two halves o f the same coin.
Effects
For US Joint Forces Command an effect is “the physical, functional, or psychological 
outcome, event, or consequence that results from specific military or non-military 
actions” .^ *' JDCC defines effects as “the physical or cognitive consequence(s) at any level 
within the Strategic Environment o f one or more military or non-military actions"."
Smith believes that “an effect is a result or impact created by the application o f military or 
other p o w e r " w h ils t  Mann, Enderby and Searle deem effects to be “a full range of 
outcomes, events, or consequences that result from a specific action".^^ Clearly there is 
some confusion here too, although in this case the confusion is limited to points of detail.
The key conclusion from all o f the above is that neither EBW nor EBO focus exclusively 
on the enemy, or on their military forces, or on physical results alone. The cognitive 
dimension also looms large. At times it can be the dominant dimension, at least in 
planning terms. Note that the words ‘physical damage’ and ‘kinetic effect’ are absent 
from all of the above definitions. This makes EBW very different from the W est's 
current model o f warfare, the Manoeuvrist Paradigm.
The Manoeuvrist Paradigm
The term ‘Manoeuvrist Paradigm’ exists only in this thesis. It has been coined by the 
author to describe the W est’s wider approach to warfare follow ing the collapse o f  the 
Warsaw Pact. Therefore it describes a construct that already exists. The name is almost 
an irrelevance, and it should not be allowed to detract from the overall thrust o f this 
thesis. However, it was chosen because it reflects the profound influence o f the 
Manoeuvrist Approach - an operational level legacy o f the 1970s, still in vogue today - 
upon the W est’s extant model o f warfare. This point is important because a fundamental 
contention within this thesis is that the W est’s extant approach to warfare is outmoded, 
and consequently ill-suited to meet the unique demands of the 21 Century.
It is difficult to define precisely what the Western approach is. Nowhere is the current 
model (named or otherwise) articulated in any meaningful sense in modern doctrine. 
Occasionally it is possible to stumble across some points o f detail concerning its inner 
workings, but these are usually viewed from the perspective o f strategy and / or politics. 
Consequently those who seek a more complete picture must look elsewhere. However, 
when they do so they soon realise that the Western model o f warfare, poorly defined 
though it is. would appear not to have changed significantly since the 1980s. O f course 
individual forces have reconfigured in recognition that the world is no longer balanced by 
two superpowers, hence capabilities have changed, as have platforms, technology, force 
ratios, and the like. It is also true that the West is now/ configured for expeditionary 
warfare, unlike the static forces o f just two decades ago. But \he fiindamenial model o f  
warfare remains much the same now as it was then. In other words, the Western 
approach to warfare - as opposed to battle - has ossified.
w w w .jtfcom .
■' JDCC Paper The U K  M ilitary  View o f  Effects - D efin itions a n d  R elationships, undated. 
Smith, Op Cit. p 111.
Mann, Endersby, and Searle, Op Cit, p 96.
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At the operational level, Manoeuvre W arfare (“the application o f Manoeuvrist thinking to 
warfighting")^'* remains the favoured model for winning battles. But it is not a true way 
o f warfare. Rather, it is a way of battle that seeks to shock and paralyse the enemy, 
destroying his cohesion and leaving him puzzled as well as defeated in the process. It 
takes no heed of the aftermath. Indeed it is not required to do so within the wider model 
o f warfare. Were this not the case, it is unlikely that Western soldiers would be in Iraq 
today - for far longer than those in power thought would be the case - yet the end is still 
not in sight. Ipso facto  the W est’s approach to warfare (as opposed to winning battles) 
cannot possibly be optimised to meet current conditions, specifically the unique needs of 
the 21** Century.
The Manoeuvrist Paradigm builds upon the current operational model and adds to it the 
UK’s three instruments o f power: diplomatic, economic and military. This amalgam is 
naturally subservient to the political and strategic dimensions, thus acknowledging that 
Western militaries carry out Manoeuvre Warfare under the guidance o f their political 
masters (who also oversee the diplomatic and economic strands). This, then, is the 
'M anoeuvrist Paradigm’. One important additional point o f note, however, is that whilst 
it purports to be an holistic approach to warfare (recently evidenced by the W est's 
justification for its involvement in Kosovo in 1999^^ and in Iraq in 2003),^*’ the author 
contends that this is not the case. This assertion underpins this thesis.
ORIGINS OF EBW
The evolution o f EBW as a coherent, holistic model o f warfare occurred over several 
years, and it would therefore be foolhardy to attempt to tie its origin to a particular date. 
Certainly the paradigm did not exist prior to 1991 Gulf War, yet by July 2002 the UK 
Government's New Chapter to the 1998 Strategic Defence Review  spoke o f framing 
military options as desired effects, rather than defining them in capability or platform- 
centric terms. This watershed document initiated considerable intellectual effort in the 
UK, and this - in combination with pivotal precursor work by a small number o f US Gulf 
War planners just over a decade earlier - resulted in the current paradigm.
.loint Warfare Publication 0-01, B ritish D efence D octrine  (Second  Edition), O ctober 2 0 0 1.
Speaking at the Chicago E conom ic Club in April 1999, Blair unveiled his “ Doctrine o f  the International 
Com m unity” which included how  and w hen and whether to intervene in the affairs o f  othci- nations, l ie 
oiTered the follow ing: ‘i  think w e need to bear in mind liv e  major considerations. First, are we sure o f  our 
case? War is an imperfect instrument for righting humanitarian distress: but armed force is som etim es the 
only means o f  dealing with dictators. Second, have w e exhausted all diplom atic options? W e should always 
g ive peace every chance, as w e  have in the case o f  K osovo. Third, on the basis o f  a practical assessm ent o f  
the situation, are there military operations w e can sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth, are we 
prepared for the long term? In the past w e talked too much o f  exit strategies. BiU having made a 
com m itm ent we cannot sim ply walk away once the fight is over: better to stay with moderate numbers o f  
troops than return for repeat perform ances with large numbers. And finally, do w e have national interests 
involved? 1 lie mass expulsion o f  ethnic Albanians from K osovo demanded the notice o f  the rest o f  the 
World. But it does make a difference that this is taking place in such a com bustible part o f  Europe. I am not 
suggesting that these are absolute tests. But they are the kind o f  issues we need to think about in deciding in 
tlic future w hen and whether w e w ill Intervene’'. This captures the essence o f  Blair’s wider approach to 
warfare and hence the M anoeuvrist Paradigm. For a com plete text o f  the speech see  
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/jan-June99/blair_doctrine4-23.htm l 
Bush declared that any action against Iraq w ould be “consistent” with “necessary actions” against 
terrorists fo llow in g  the Septem ber 1 1, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. H is linkage o f  Iraq 
to international terrorism (and v ice  versa) dem onstrates an holistic approach to warfare.
See http://w w w .cnn.com /2003/A L L PO L IT IC S/03/I9/spij.irq .bush/index.httnl
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Yet even this simplistic explanation warrants caution, as many of the underlying concepts 
have been around for generations. But successive models do not mirror their 
predecessors - indeed if they did, warfare would stagnate and clearly this is not the case. 
Some changes are swift and obvious, particularly if they are driven by technological 
improvements such as the English longbow or the Maxim machine gun. At other times, 
however, warfare evolves slowly and barely perceptibly. Evolution can be so slow on 
occasions that hindsight might be needed to make sense o f the minutiae. One such 
example was the British response to insurgency in Malaya between 1948 and 1960, and it 
is widely acknowledged that the operational mindset at the end of the campaign bore little 
resemblance to that at the beginning. The question remains as to whether EBW falls into 
this mould.
It is important to note that those involved in the early stages o f EBW were seeking merely 
to fine-tune various operational level points o f detail. It was never their intention to 
contribute to a new model o f warfare; indeed the very notion would have appeared absurd 
at the time, as it was almost universally believed by the military that the model in use 
delivered all that was required o f it - and moreover, it achieved this remarkably swiftly. 
This perception was demonstrably bolstered by the speed with which Kuwait was 
liberated. At some point, however, this fine-tuning reached critical mass in terms of the 
number of practitioners who were articulating deliverables in terms o f desired effects 
rather than capabilities. Once this happened the die was cast. Momentum for embracing 
the lexicon o f effects increased commensurately, and the stage was set for the effects 
model to be lie shed out and formalised.
It is also important to note that whilst the early work o f US practitioners predated this 
event, the same applies (albeit to a lesser extent) in the UK. The lead unquestionably lay 
with the US, with the UK tentatively exploring the nascent effects ideology some years 
later. However, it was inevitable that the UK would follow, as its military relationship 
with the US was - and indeed remains - particularly close. This is due in equal measure 
to the high number o f exchange appointments between these two countries, their close 
collaboration in all matters o f doctrine, and the fact that the US and UK routinely fight 
together against common enemies - and hence share as common an approach to 
warfighting as their size and relative capabilities allow.^'^ Against this background, the 
migration o f ‘effects thinking’ from the US to the UK was simply a matter o f time.
In seeking to identify the key personalities behind EBW, the work o f John Warden and 
Dave Deptula (both o f whom were involved in planning the air element o f the 1991 Gulf 
War) was hugely influential. To give an indication o f the pre-effects mentality o f the 
time, in February 1991 the Iraq Target Planning Cell received a report from the Central 
Command Intelligence Staff on the progress o f the air campaign against electricity 
targets. This stated that not all the individual targets had been destroyed or damaged to 
the specific percentage, hence the objective had not been met. Yet - as Deptula pithily 
observed at the time - the electrical system w’as not operating in Baghdad. Hence the 
effect that the planners sought had been delivered. Nonetheless, the prevailing culture 
demanded that those targets be attacked repeatedly until the extant damage criteria had 
been met. The difference in approach between these two mindsets is vast. And whereas
During the G ulf War the author se ived  on an Exchange Programme with the US N avy and US Marines 
Corps. These com m ents are based on observations made by the autiior and many exchatige personal 
serving at the time.
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the pre-Deptula model had humanitarian implications after the warfighting stage was 
over, Deptula’s vision preserved the capability to generate power after the event - and 
thus save lives in the immediate aftermath o f the war. This example captures the essence 
o f EBW. Those who opine that wars have always been conducted for effect would do 
well to study it.
But it would also be wrong to credit Deptula with ownership of the modern effects 
paradigm. He capitalised on the work o f others, most obviously John Warden, the 
originator of a concentric model o f warfare, and John Boyd, the originator o f the ‘OODA’ 
loop. Yet each o f these airmen benefited from the unbroken tradition o f a uniquely 
American approach to warfare, and their heritage - which inevitably shaped them - had its 
role to play. Further, significant though these airmen were, they did not create the current 
EBW model. Indeed it took over a decade for the model to be formalised, and during this 
period the UK contribution was significant. Indeed the language o f effects first appeared 
in the July 2002 New Chapter to the 1998 Strategic Defence Review>, and subsequent 
publications developed and refined the model at a rapid rate. Much of the work behind 
the Newr Chapter is still classified - it was, after all, formulated in response to the terrorist 
attacks o f 9/11 - so it is difficult to know exactly when the UK embraced the effects 
model. But what is incontrovertible is that the UK government had been working hard 
since 1999 to promote an atmosphere in which outcomes as opposed to process would 
form a central pillar o f pan-governmental business. And whilst this early work did not 
lead instantly to a UK effects model, it was highly influential as it demanded that all 
departments, working closely together, should consider how best to articulate outcomes. 
One of the key by-products o f this work was the emergence o f a mindset which, 
fortuitously or otherwise, dovetailed neatly with the work on effects that was taking place 
in the US.
In sum, EBW ’s origin cannot be tied to a specific date. The model took at least a decade 
to develop, and consequently no a single point o f origin is identified within this thesis. 
Instead, acknowledgement is made o f the diverse influences which together resulted in 
the model.
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CHAPTER 1:
UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEMPORARY EBW PARADIGM
'‘Shallow men believe in luck.
Strong men believe in cause and effect
Ralph Waldo Emerson
INTRODUCTION
This thesis contends that the Manoeuvrist Paradigm is outmoded and consequently ill- 
suited to meet the unique demands o f the 21** Century. With this in mind, the first section 
outlines 'The Manoeuvrist Paradigm’, the W est’s current approach to warfare.
A working understanding o f the current model is necessary because it provides a point of 
departure which allows the reader to understand firstly, the context within which EBW 
emerged, and secondly, specific points o f detail which EBW seeks to address. This 
describes in outline the M anoeuvrist Approach, and notes that whilst the model has to 
date served the West reasonable well, it is unlikely to do so in the future. One of the 
reasons for this is the Manoeuvrist Imperative o f the ‘here and now’, which places undue 
emphasis on resolving the warfighting phase as swiftly as possible. This approach has 
lead to a mindset wherein planners are seduced by the imperative o f near-term gains, 
hence planning routinely focuses on the near-term rather than on the aftermath. The 
consequences o f this mindset are self-evident, and to comprehend them one need look no 
further than contemporary events on Iraq and Afghanistan, the opening wars of the new 
century. Hence the need for a brief overview o f the Manoeuvrist Paradigm - because 
there is little point in winning wars quickly if the outcome involves many years of 
winning the aftermath slowly.
Attention then shifts to understanding ‘The Context for EBW '. This begins by 
questioning whether the new paradigm is revolutionary or evolutionary - an epistemic or a 
doctrinal development. This is vital ground given that the aim of the thesis is to assess 
whether EBW merits recognition as an original model o f warfare, or whether it is the sum 
o f previous experiences. This is followed by a brief but necessary discussion on the 
politics/ war dynamic, which compares the linear model o f warfare (wherein peace and 
war are disassociated activities) with the holistic approach (wherein war is continuation of 
political intercourse). EBW favours the latter approach, whereas the Manoeuvrist 
Paradigm favours the former. This is a significant difference, and understanding it is vital 
if one is to comprehend the mindset that underpins EBW.
The next section focuses on ‘The Contemporary Effects Paradigm’. This describes the 
process of envisaging first, second and third order effects, and notes the importance of 
considering all o f these from the perspectives o f the friend, the foe and the neutral alike. 
Exploring the notion that wars have always been done for effect, it asks whether the 
effects that accrue during war have always been consistent with, and limited to, the 
effects that were envisaged during the planning process - this being the central core of 
EBW. The focus then shifts to a discussion o f effects and outcomes, noting that the 
positive primary effect o f an action can, at times, be negated by the subsequent second 
and third order effects, which - paradoxically - may endure for far longer than the original
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efFect. The section concludes with a discussion on the importance or otherwise of 
'winning the peace’.
THE MANQEUVRIST PARADIGM
There is no such term as the Manoeuvrist Paradigm, at least in official circles. The author 
has coined the term in order to describe the W est’s wider approach to warfare following 
the collapse o f  the Warsaw Pact. The construct clearly exists, as is evidenced today by 
ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it appears never to have been named - 
hence the need for the author to proffer one. The name itself is almost an irrelevance, and 
it should not detract from the overall thrust o f this thesis, which is to assess whether EB W 
is an original model o f warfare, or merely the sum of previous experiences. The name 
reflects the profound influence o f the Manoeuvrist Approach (an operational legacy o f the 
1970s) upon the W est’s extant model o f warfare. This is significant, because one of the 
contentions within the thesis is that the W est’s current approach to warfare is outmoded 
and therefore ill-suited to meet the unique demands o f the Century. Further, the term 
'M anoeuvrist Paradigm’ covers not just the W est’s military approach at the operational 
level - Manoeuvre Warfare and its attendant technological bells and whistles - but also the 
W est's political input to that approach. Together these two strands make up the 
Manoeuvrist Paradigm.
Three premises underpin this section. First, warfare is not just military business. Second, 
it should never be divorced from the wider strategic environment. And third, at all times 
the Western model is subservient to political requirements. These topics are detailed 
elsewhere in this thesis^^ so they are not recounted here. Nonetheless, they provide a lens 
for analysing the Manoeuvrist Paradigm in detail, and assessing its relationship to the 
wider strategic environment.
Two further points also need to be considered, however. First, the UK and US 
approaches to warfare differ occasionally in points o f detail. This does not affect the 
current model o f warfare but as we shall see, it could affect the efficacy of EBW.
Second, during coalition operations the bigger player invariably provides the framework 
that the smaller players follow.^^ This has certainly been the case in recent US / UK 
operations. However, for the purposes o f this thesis the Manoeuvrist Paradigm may be 
considered to be a combination o f US and UK doctrine rather than the product o f one 
country.
Manoeuvre Warfare and the M anoeuvrist Approach
The Manoeuvrist model is a relatively new form of warfare. It was devised to counter a 
grossly disproportionate threat from the Warsaw Pact, Consequently it was a product o f a 
bi-polar world in which the weight o f numbers stood firmly against the West^^ and
“'^The politics / war dynam ic has been explained previously. The U K ’s answer to tightening the politics / 
war relationship, EBA, is in the next chapter.
O ne obvious exception to this w as the U N PR O FO R  / N A T O  partnership in Bosnia. N A T O  provided the 
airpower, and this included U S aircraft, but there w ere no US soldiers on the ground. It w as som etim es the 
case that N A TO  com manders w ished to do som ething over Bosnia that UNPROFO R would not sanction. 
Source: author / UNPRO FO R Air Operations Co-Ordination Centre, Sarajevo, 1994-95).
For exam ple, in the m id-1980s the W arsaw Pact had 42  500 Main Battle Tanks whereas N A T O  had only  
13 000. Similar im balances were evident in Armoured Personnel Carriers and Infantry Fighting Vehicles 
(78 800 against 30 000); anti-tank guided w eapon launchers (24  300 against 8100); tactical aircraft (7240
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Mutual Assured Destruction was a distinct, if unlikely, possibility. Manoeuvrist thinking 
was the logical response to the strategic realities o f the period.
Manoeuvre Warfare is defined as “the application o f Manoeuvrist thinking to 
warfighting".^' This thinking - the Manoeuvrist Approach - seeks to shatter “the enem y's 
overall cohesion and will to fight, rather than his materiel” . I t  achieves this through a 
“warfighting philosophy...to defeat the enemy by shattering his moral and physical 
cohesion".^^ Thus it shifts the focus away from attrition, albeit attrition always remains a 
factor; indeed depending upon the situation it may even be the predominant factor, but it 
does not set the overall tone o f the campaign.
From the UK perspective four key elements fall out of the Manoeuvrist Approach. They 
are: to shape the environment; to attackÛ\o, enemy’s will and cohesion; to protect the 
cohesion o f the force; and to exploit the situation, either by direct or indirect means.
These tasks are achieved by applying strength against vulnerability. Within the overall 
operational design process, tempo, momentum, surprise, simultaneity and deception 
complement each other to generate a picture o f defeat within the enemy’s mind. The US 
perspective is similar to the above, with commanders aspiring to “ ...strike the enemy with 
powerful blows from unexpected directions or dimensions, and to press the fight to the 
end. Deception, special operations, manipulation o f the electromagnetic spectrum, 
firepower, and maneuver [sic] all converge to confuse, demoralize, and destroy the 
opponenf'.^^
What is clear from this is that the emphasis is firmly on the enemy. Often, effects on 
friendly and neutral players do not enter the equation. And whilst destruction might or 
might not be a key element - or at least, it is no more important than the UK 's remaining 
elements - the aftermath barely gets a mention. Thus the commander has free rein (more 
or less) to do as he sees fit to win the M>arfighting stage.
O f course he might be required to ‘set the conditions for peace' or achieve some other 
similarly worded but equally nebulous task, but there again he might not. As ever, his 
mission will focus on the warfighting stage, and if his actions result in outcomes that later 
impact on the aftermath, so be it; this will be a problem for someone else. Having said 
that, if the commander does his job correctly and renders ineffective the enemy's military 
force, it is difficult to conceive o f an outcome that will be unsatisfactory to the victor; 
trying second guess or pre-empt outcomes that occur after the war is outwith the 
commander's terms o f reference. Winning the warfighting stage is what he is paid to do. 
This in essence is the M anoeuvrist Paradigm.
against 2975); and artillery and mortars (31 500 against 10 750). See Cilino. Robert M, B/itzl<rieg lo  D esert 
Storm : 't he IS’ohition o f  O pera tion a t W arfare, U niversity Press o f  Kansas, Kansas, 2004 , p 233 - 235.
.loint Warfare Publication 0-01 , B ritish D efence D o c tiin e  (Seco tid  Edition). O ctober 2001.
I'K  G to ssa ry  o f  Joint a n d  M u ltina tional Term s a n d  D efinitions. Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 , Edition 
6, May 2004  
Ibid.
Annihilation, although seldom  m entioned these days, is another factor. Attrition and annihilation differ 
not in the ends that are desired, but in the w ay in w hich they are delivered. The former takes a gradual 
approach (Verdun during W orld War O ne) w h ilst the latter seeks rapid victory (the Battle o f  M idway). Add 
to these the strategy o f  exhaustion, in w hich a foe  is worn down psychologically  as w ell as materially, and 
the dangers o f  oversim plifying these factors becom es evident.
See Joint Warfare Publication 5-00 , Join t O pera tion s Planning, March 2004 Edition, p 2-1, and Joint 
Warfare Publication O-Ol, Op Cit, p 3-5.
V S Arm y IJ e id  M anual 100-5 ( F M 100-5 O perations), Department o f  the Army, June 1993. p 2-2.
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To date it has served the US and the UK remarkably well, and indeed it, more than any 
other conceptual approach, has largely been responsible for the W est’s operational 
successes o f the late 20^ '^  Century. Bolstered by robust Operational Design and the 
Estimate Process - the military methodology for planning campaigns at the operational 
and tactical levels - it forms the backbone o f the W est’s extant warfighting mindset.
But this does not o f itself guarantee its suitability to meet the unique demands of the 21 
Century. Times have changed significantly since the model first appeared. There are no 
longer two superpowers. Moreover, in most potential warfighting scenarios, military 
capability now favours the W est And whereas during the Cold War the aftermath 
counted for little, these days it matters a great deal. Indeed during the last decade and a 
half the currency o f warfare has changed significantly, yet the Manoeuvrist Paradigm has 
stagnated. This is because it is generally believed to be flexible enough to meet all 
exigencies. In many cases it is - but there are exceptions. For example, setting the 
conditions for an aftermath acceptable to the international community can conflict with 
the Manoeuvrist requirement to conduct the war as quickly as possible. At times these 
two objectives are clearly incompatible.
An equivalent example from the world o f business might be a takeover bid. In war, one 
country takes over another. In business, one company takes over another. This process 
involves many negotiations, with each one setting the conditions for the next. The 
imperative for speed during war is equivalent to reducing the number o f meetings 
between opposing factions during a business takeover. The end result will be that the 
company is taken over regardless - but a swift, poorly negotiated takeover is unlikely to 
be as successful as one that is more carefully balanced. The end result o f the takeover is a 
given, and the means are known in advance. But what is important in this context is the 
‘how’ ~ the way in which the takeover is conducted. In the business world, if a company 
wishes to do a second, or a third, or a fourth takeover, the ways of the previous takeovers 
will be at the forefront o f other companies’ minds - and not just that o f the company 
being taken over. Companies that do ‘good’ takeovers are invariably regarded better by 
their peers than companies that do ‘poor’ takeovers. The same applies to war and to its 
protagonists.
Returning to the Manoeuvrist Paradigm, the problem of balancing speed on the battlefield 
against eventual outcome is invariably resolved by sacrificing aftermath planning for 
swift success. However, by its very nature this approach is not a way o f warfare. It is a 
way of battle. It follows, therefore, that the Manoeuvrist Paradigm is a way of battle 
rather than a way of warfare.
The Manoeuvrist Imperative o f the ‘Here and Now’.
Time compression is a feature o f modern war. As noted above, the Manoeuvrist 
Paradigm aspires towards instant answers, even when there is no obvious imperative to do 
so. One of the by-products o f this relentless quest for speed is the desire to achieve 
results as quickly as possible. This point is worth developing further, because the quest 
for speed underpins the model. Indeed US Army Field Manual 100-5 (FM 100-5) states 
that “The Army must be capable o f achieving decisive victory” . ’^  Implicit within this
”  i'h t 100-5, p 1-5.
definition is the requirement to win q u i c k l y T h e  UK takes a different approach, 
stressing tempo rather than speed.^^ It defines tempo as “ ...the rhythm or rate o f activity 
of operations relative to the adversary”."*^ What matters within the UK’s approach is not 
speed per se, but acting quicker than the enemy can act. This is fundamentally different 
from the US approach, but this is o f little consequence, because - as was previously 
mentioned - by dint o f its size the UK approach plays second fiddle to that o f the 
Americans during coalition operations.
Consequently the West expects to win wars quickly. Yet winning quickly does not 
necessarily equate to winning optimally. Indeed there is little point in winning wars 
quickly if the outcome involves many years o f winning the aftermath slowly.
Momentum, speed and tempo are the levers that commanders use to deliver swift success 
on the battlefield. Planners select targets that deliver swift, high impact results. Thus the 
targeting process drifts towards a physical focus, because it is a lot easier to assess results 
achieved against physical targets than it is to assess them against conceptual or cognitive 
targets. The fact that destruction o f bridges, radar sites, and tanks are typical images of 
the modern battlefield is no accident, because they can be measured with relative ease, 
and within this model visible results carry considerable weighting. Clearly, measuring 
the will of an enemy leader or population is an altogether slower and more complex 
matter.
One by-product o f the current approach is that planners are routinely seduced by the 
desire to secure near-term gains, even though they know that operational effects are rarely 
immediate, and indeed that strategic effects can take significantly longer to achieve. The 
effects o f attacking a bridge or a radar site are usually quantified in terms o f the level of 
physical damage that accrues. Were they destroyed or not? Were the key nodes 
associated with them damaged or not? If the answers are ‘no' then they will be revisited 
later that day if the targeting cycle allows it, or possibly on the next day - or perhaps even 
the day after that - until the required levels o f damage have been attained. This was a 
classic features o f 20^ '^  Century warfare.
Yet within this mindset a key part o f the warfighting equation is absent - because effects 
are never limited to the physical dimension. Blowing up bridges and radar sites 
invariably generates wider effects within the cognitive domain, and at times these 
secondary effects can outweigh the plusses associated with the initial physical effects. 
Moreover, secondary and tertiary effects influence different people in different ways. 
Downstream effects may make little difference to the winning side but they can 
drastically impact upon the losing side. Further, they can place intolerable constraints on 
agencies concerned with post-conflict rebuilding, engaged in activities such as the 
delivery o f food or medical aid.
When this happens, the affected agencies are quick to query the military’s warfighting 
methodology. They ask why bridges that were so vital to post-conflict reconstruction 
needed to be blown up. If there was no alternative, so be it. But if a different solution 
could have achieved the effects that the military sought, they will be far from satisfied. 
The military's reaction to this is usually to dismiss it as an irrelevance, as the military had
Ibid.
.Joint W arfare P ublication  5-00, Op Cit, p 2-3. 
Ibid.
a job to do and the clock was ticking. Every hour squandered was an hour that could 
have been used to better advantage on the battlefield.
Yet these agencies have the legitimate right to pose these questions - indeed it is their 
moral duty to do so. The Human Rights Watch, for example, seeks “ ...to prevent 
discrimination, to uphold political freedom, to protect people from inhumane conduct in 
wartime [author’s emphasis] and to bring offenders to justice”.”^' This dimension of 
warfare, wherein external agencies draw attention to acts that can appear difficult to 
justify depending on one’s perspective, is likely to expand. Consequently the military 
will need to take it into account in the future. For reasons previously mentioned, the 
Manoeuvrist Paradigm is not well placed to do this.
THE CONTEXT FOR EBW  
Enisteine or Doctrine?
In 1966, in a controversial best seller entitled The Order o f  T h i n g s , post-modern 
philosopher Michel Foucault challenged conventional wisdom regarding evolution.
He opined that life did not always evolve predictably and logically, but rather that on 
occasion, sudden and unexpected changes also took place. Delving deeper into the 
theoretical aspects o f human knowledge, he concluded that each new era produced its 
own unique mindset o f thought. This he labelled its episteme. Foucault’s work split the 
academic community. Ultimately, however, he was never able to prove his findings.'^’ 
Nonetheless, despite many attempts to disprove him, he was never debunked 
conclusively. With this caveat in mind, it is appropriate to consider whether EBW is an 
original model of warfare - an episteme - or merely part o f ongoing evolution.
No historian or soldier would doubt that the episteme of Napoleonic warfare has passed. 
During the last 200 years or so, warfare has changed fundamentally; even if the defining 
hallmarks of exceptional field commanders have generally remained the same. Warfare 
has become mechanised in almost every form. Soldiers no longer march to their 
objectives in columns. These days they would rather kill their opponents well beyond 
visual range - and ideally when they least expect it - than invite them to take the first shot 
face-to-face as famously happened at Fontenoy in 1745. In short, warfare has progressed 
immeasurably since that time. But the same is also true of more recent epistemes: that of 
trench warfare in 1914-1918; America’s experience in Vietnam; the Cold War; and, 
perhaps surprisingly, even the recent immediate post-Cold War period. These individual 
models o f warfare, which were so highly valued at the time, are possibly less relevant to 
today’s commanders than those of, say, Thermopylae, Agincourt, or Culloden. Indeed 
from a doctrinal viewpoint they are demonstrably less relevant than the oft-quoted works 
of theorists such as Sun Tsu and Clausewitz.
Epistemes and doctrines are not the same thing. Doctrine has an enduring quality. It 
distils lessons from the past specifically so that those same lessons do not need constantly 
to be relearned. The author o f War: A M atter o f  Principles notes that doctrine is bound to 
the inescapable fact that “ in almost every endeavour there are certain rules or principles 
laid down to guide exponents o f a particular activity. Usually these rules are the result of
See http://ww w.hrw.org/about.
Foucault, M ichel, The O rd er o f  Things: An Archaeotog}> o f  the Human Science, V intage Books,
N ew  York, tr 1994.
Source: Dr Uw e Steinhoff, Oxford Leverhulm e Programme on the Changing Character o f  War, January 
2005.
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many years o f experience and observation” /"^  H alf a world away, and at a different time, 
Mao Tse-Tung echoed the same view, even though his language was somewhat more 
colourful; “All military laws and military theories which are in the nature o f principles are 
the experience o f past wars summed up by people in former days, paid for in blood, 
which are the heritage o f past wars”/^  Many doctrinal tenets - such as surprise, 
maintenance o f morale, concentration o f force, and sustainability - would have been as 
recognisable to Alexander the Great as to Henry V, to Nelson and to Montgomery. They 
apply equally today. In contrast, however, by their very nature epistemes are limited in 
time. Consequently the difference between doctrines and epistemes is a fundamental one.
The UK's current episteme is that o f the Manoeuvrist Approach. Many people believe 
this to be the UK’s doctrine, but this is demonstrably not the case. Rather, the 
Manoeuvrist Approach is a mindset, and a relatively recent one at that. Certainly it did 
not formally exist in either o f the world wars, yet it was in being in the West in the 1970s. 
Indeed in the UK’s latest doctrinal publications Jew / Warfare Publication 3-00 (Second 
Edition) and Joint Warfare Publication 5-00, both published in March 2004, it features 
almost in passing. The former document includes it in order to justify specific functions 
at the operational l e v e l w h i l s t  the latter publication affords it but one dedicated 
paragraph."*^ And British Defence Doctrine (Second Edition), the pinnacle o f the UK's 
hierarchy o f joint doctrine publications, published in October 2001, covers the 
Manoeuvrist Approach in only two brief p a ra g ra p h s .G iv e n  that countless paragraphs 
written about contemporary UK doctrine, this anomaly makes sense only if the 
Manoeuvrist Approach is recognised for what it is: a way of thinking - a subset, as it 
were, o f operational art - as opposed to a key doctrinal tenet. This explains in part why 
one commander will focus on the physical domain whilst another will attack the cognitive 
domain, even though both might have read, and put into practice, the same doctrine. 
Accordingly, it is helpful to view doctrine as one strand in the planning equation, and 
operational art as another strand. They make excellent bedfellows - but they are not 
inextricably bound to each other.
The Politics / W ar Dynamic
Before proceeding further it is necessary to ponder briefly on what is arguably the core 
requirement o f EBW: the need for common understanding o f the politics / war dynamic. 
There are many interpretations o f this complex and intricate relationship, and EBW is 
predicated upon all who participate in it subscribing to a common view. The same cannot 
be said o f the Manoeuvrist Paradigm, however; as we shall see.
For some, the relationship between politics and war is one of substitution. Politics (or 
policy, but for this illustration we may assume that they are one and the same)" '^  ^ stops, war 
takes its place, war then stops, and politics resumes - and so ad infinitum. If politics and 
war were lengths of rope, each section would be separate. They would meet only at the
‘ ' David Evans, Ed, War: A M atter o f  P rincip les, Aerospace Centre, Australia, 2000 , p 1.
M ao Tse-Tung, S e tec ted M ilita ry  W ritings, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1966, p 87.
.loint Warfare Publiction 3-00 (Second Edition), Jo//?/ O pera tions Execution. March 2004 , p 1-13 para 
125.
47 .loint Warfare Publication 5-00, Op Cit, p 2-
Joint Warfare Publication 0-01, Op Cit, p 3-5 .
Limited space prevents further discussion  o f  the politics /  policy debate, or the differentiation between  
politics and policy. For further detail see  Christopher B assford’s ‘John Keegan and the Grand Tradition o f  
Trashing C lausew itz’, War a n d  H istory, V ol 1, Num ber 3, N ovem ber 1994.
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nexus between peace and war, where they would be tied together in order to make the rope 
longer. Peace would be on one side o f the knot, and war on the other side. If one could 
place one's hand on this rope - taking care to avoid the many knots that run along its 
length “ one would grasp either a politics section or a war section. Both sections could not 
be grasped concurrently, because by definition peace and war cannot exist at the same 
time; nor indeed can they occur in the same piece o f space. Adherents o f this mindset - 
and there are many - believe that the relationship between war and politics is linear and 
sequential, much as in this illustration about the rope.
History offers many examples that support this notion. These range from the seemingly 
inconsequential - such as ritualistic tribal conflicts - to the outbreak o f both World Wars. 
Indeed it is difficult to find a war that does not appear to fit this framework. I f a doctrinal 
mentor is required to reinforce the point, Clausewitz is likely to be cited through his oft- 
misquoted: “war is merely the continuation o f politics by other means”,^  ^ Usually the 
emphasis is firmly on the word ‘other’. In this model, one means o f securing national 
objectives - politics - fails, so an alternative means - war - is used instead. The logic 
behind this argument is straightforward and appealing, and this school o f thought has 
many adherents.
But there is another way of viewing this complex relationship, using Clausewitz's same 
phrase, but this time through an alternative translation: “we see, therefore, that war is not 
merely an act o f policy but a true political instrument, a continuation o f political 
intercourse, carried on with other means”. Here the emphasis is placed not on ‘other' but 
on ‘continuation’. '^ Far from being a substitute for politics, war is now a political 
instrument or a tool; and a particularly blunt one at that. And whilst it takes its place 
alongside the other tools such as trade, diplomacy, and cultural influence, it can never 
replace them.
1 he difference between these two models is stark. Yet the second framework alone is 
consistent with C lausew itz’s claim that “war cannot be divorced from political life, and 
whenever this occurs in our thinking about war...we are left with something pointless and 
without sense” .^  ^ The first framework is simple, logical and easy to understand - but it 
lacks continuity and coherence; whereas the second model, which is equally simple, does 
not share these shortcomings. Sun Tzu famously opined that “to subdue the enemy 
without fighting is the acme o f skill” . T h i s ,  perhaps his most famous pronouncement, 
leaves no room for doubt that within his philosophy peace and war are a part o f the same 
ongoing process.^"'
In similar vein, Mao Tse-Tung opined that:
Clausew itz, Carl von. On War. Ed./trans. M ichael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1976, p 87.
There are two ways to interpret this phrase. C lausew itz is usually cited as in the first exam ple. H owever, 
his word for continuation - fo rtse tzu n g , literally ‘setting forth’ - does not imply that the nature o f  politics 
changes when it spills into war. Rather, C lausew itz believed that war is politics, but with the added elem ent 
o f  vio lence. Bassford, Op Cit.
See M ichael Handel, M asters o f  War: C la ssica l S tra teg ic  Thought, Frank Cass, London, 1992. p 35.
Sun Tzu, The A rt o f  War, p.77 , in Sawyer, Ralph D , (tr) The Seven M ilitary  C la ssics  o f  A ncient China, 
W estview  Press, Oxford, 1993.
M ichael Handel,, Op Cit, p34.
22
“Provided he is modest and willing to learn, an experienced military 
man will be able to familiarise himself with all other conditions related 
to the war, such as politics... such a military man will have a better 
grasp in directing a war or an operation and will be more likely to win 
victories”
Whilst EBW uses the non-linear model o f warfare as its baseline, the same does not hold 
true for the Manoeuvrist Paradigm, which is predicated upon linear warfare. This is a 
significant difference between these two models, and understanding this is vital if one is to 
comprehend the mindset that underpins EBW.
THE CONTEMPORARY EFFECTS PARADIGM
Effects Based Warfare is not new - indeed the reverse is true: ‘effects thinking’ has 
influenced human decisions for millennia. In the normal course o f events this occurs 
naturally and intuitively. Consciously or otherwise, pondering effects underpins every 
action we undertake, be it trivial or substantive, singular or plural, immediate or long­
term. In fact it is impossible to embark upon a course of action without considering at 
least some of the effects that will accrue as a result o f our decisions. This process applies 
at both the individual and the group level, and it is evident throughout our personal and 
professional lives.
To illustrate the point, this thesis will generate effects simply by being read. Some will be 
transitory and inconsequential; others will be more enduring. Reader A might agree with 
it completely, whilst Reader B might only agree with it in part - and Reader C might not 
agree with it at all. It might generate discussion for some people in the near term, but 
inform the work o f others in several years to come. Alternatively, none o f these things 
might happen. There is no way of knowing which effects will be generated. But effects 
of some sort will undoubtedly take place.
EBW seeks to frame this mindset within a political and military context, taking into 
account the strategic realities o f the day. Consequently it is a holistie model o f warfare. 
Further, it demands the application o f analytical rigour at levels that are not always 
evident in the W est’s current warfighting methodology. Paradoxically, it is because of 
this very characteristic that some in the military prefer not to unlock Pandora’s effects box 
until they have no choice in the matter.
The modern effects paradigm builds upon previous models o f warfare, but it differs in that 
it seeks to ensure that the effects that accrue during w>ar ore consistent MUth, and limited 
to, those effects envisaged during the planning process. Understanding this mindset and 
its rationale is relatively straightforward. Understanding the minutiae, however, takes 
time and no small amount o f dedication.
To illustrate the process let us consider the second paragraph in this section, which was 
constructed to exemplify some of the key elements within EBW. After a brief opening 
sentence it spelled out two different types o f effect: temporary and permanent. It then 
outlined some possible effects, most o f which fall within the cognitive domain. Some of 
these were positive, others were negative. However, in both cases it was apparent that
Mao Tse-Tung, Op Cit, p 87.
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further outcomes might accrue in due course. In this example none o f the eff ects were 
physical, but had they been so, they would either have been positive or negative - 
depending on one’s point o f view. The paragraph concluded with the blunt admission that 
specific effects could not be predicted. The following schematic illustrates these 
considerations.
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Figure 2
Some effects are intentional, but clearly others can only be guessed at. These have been 
omitted from the schematic in order to simplify matters at this stage. Second and third 
order effects, such as discussion with colleagues and informing work in years to come, 
might yield further outcomes in due course. O f course there is no way o f knowing 
whether these effects will be positive or negative, as context Is likely to play a role. The 
resultant product is an over-simplified diagram which details a possible ‘effects w eb’ 
which falls out o f the paragraph under consideration. Clearly if a fuller and more accurate 
diagram is needed, more linkages will be needed. Certain effects will apply to some 
readers but not to others, so additional linkages might represent these different groups of 
people. Further linkages would represent their different moods as well as the contexts 
within which they have read, and then subsequently discussed, this work. However, what 
we have no way of knowing at the moment is whether these groups will be positive 
(friendly) or negative (and therefore hostile)? Nor do we know how many individuals 
within these groups will privately be supportive or dismissive. What if  the main body of
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the group is positive, but a particularly strong character is negative - will everyone agree 
with him? Or could the rank gradient be a factor? Might the senior person impose his 
will on the remainder o f the group regardless o f their individual roles and inputs?
Not one o f these questions can be answered until the culture and ethos o f each group is 
understood. Yet even this understanding will not necessarily present the whole picture, 
because the way information is interpreted varies with changing circumstances. Therefore 
experience levels also need to be taken into account. Moreover, credence is more likely to 
be granted to those who speak with authority (which in the military means those who have 
been there, seen that, done that, and wear the medals) than those who are ignorant o f the 
subject.
It soon becomes apparent that even a very simple scenario can lead to an effects schematic 
that is too unwieldy to be o f any practical use. Add to this the fog and friction of modern 
combat, and the appeal o f such schematics diminishes by an order o f magnitude. 
Nonetheless, establishing clear linkages between cause and effect is precisely what EBW 
strives to achieve.^^
Effects and Outcomes
Few would disagree that wars have always been conducted to achieve effects of one sort 
or another. Yet paradoxically this very deduction has prompted many to dismiss the 
utility o f the contemporary effects model outright. Some sceptics consider EBW to be 
little more than an exercise in semantics. They believe that at the end o f this process the 
UK will do much as it has always done, except next time around it might adopt a new 
lexicon - the language o f effects - in order to give the illusion o f substantive progress.
Such sentiments are widespread within the military. But this does not make valid.
In fact they miss the mark by some distance, because the effects that are sought when 
wars are planned are not necessarily delivered when wars arc fought. So whilst it is true 
that wars have always been fought for effect, it is equally true that effects are not always 
delivered as originally envisaged. At times this anomaly can confer unexpected 
advantages to commanders in the field, but it is equally likely to work against them.
Indeed the more one ponders on this basic issue, the more one realises that 
conceptualising warfare in terms of delivering specific effects - and only tho.se effects - is 
anything but a semantic exercise.
To complicate this matter further, it is also true that effects generated at the tactical level 
can lead to unintended consequences at the operational and strategic levels. In the w^orst 
case these secondary effects can be the polar opposite to those originally sought. The Abu 
Ghraib prison debacle in 2004 exemplifies this p h e n o m e n o n ,a s  do all instances of
A com prehensive effects taxonom y may be found at Donald Low e and Simon N g ’s E ffecis-B ased  
O perations: l.anguage, M eaning A n d  The E ffects-B ased  A pproach , available on the internet at 
w w w .au .af.m il/au/aw c/aw cgate/ccrp /ebo_language.pdf. See also Smith, E, Effects B a sed  O perations: 
A pplying  h'etM>orti C entric  W arfare in P eace, Crisis, a n d  War, Center for Advance C oncepts and 
T echnology, D O D Command and Control Research Program, N ovem ber 2002; and US Joint Forces 
Command W hite Paper V ersion 1.0, A C oncept F ram ew oricfor Effects B ased  O pera tions, October 2 0 0 1.
The Abu Ghraib photo scandal broke in 20 0 4  and is w idely  docum ented. For an authoritative report on 
allegations o f  the alleged subsequent cover-up see  N ew sw eek  [w w w .m snbc.m sn .com /id /5092776  
/site/new sw eek]. A com prehensive description o f  routine dealings is at ww w.guardian.co.uk/lraq/Story  
/0 ,2763 , I308346,00.htm l
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collateral damage, ‘blue on blue’ engagements, acts o f barbarism and so o n /'' This has 
always been a feature o f warfare, and the following example illustrates the point.
In 1609, while mapping remote parts o f Eastern Canada, the French explorer Samuel 
Champlain befriended the Huron Indians. After a late afternoon encounter between some 
HLirons and an Iroquois party, it was agreed that these two groups would confront each 
other formally after daybreak. As the Iroquois approached, Champlain emerged 
unexpectedly from behind a tree; this was the Iroquois’ first glimpse o f a European.
As they stood dumbstruck just a few feet from him, he slowly aimed his arquebus at two 
o f the most prominent individuals and shot them, thereby killing two Iroquois chiefs. 
Consequently the Hurons won the day, and clearly Champlain delivered the primary effect 
that he had intended. However, what he really sought was the pacification o f local tribes. 
In this matter he was singularly unsuccessful; indeed this act precipitated an immediate 
and bitter outbreak o f hostilities between the Iroquois and the French that lasted for the 
next 150 years. The efficacy o f Champlain’s primary effect is beyond question. But it is 
also true that his unintended consequences yielded results that he would rather have 
avoided. In fact it is difficult to imagine him doing something more destructive in the 
longer term than he managed to achieve on that fateful day.
Returning to the present day, tanks have been used to dislodge snipers from minarets in 
Fallujah, and aircraft have bombed important buildings whose occupants refused to yield 
to troops on the ground. One is left to ponder on how future historians will judge the 
wider effects o f these tactical actions when viewed against the strategic effects that were 
originally sought. The capture o f Fallujah in 2005 by US forces offers much food for 
thought in this respect, and it is included it as a briefcase study in chapter *.
The following is also worthy o f note. Exactly one year after the US transferred 
sovereignty to the Iraqi people (28 June 2005) the Independent newspaper ran the 
following headline story entitled ‘Iraq: A Bloody M ess’:
“A year ago the supposed handover o f power by the US occupation 
authority to an Iraqi interim government led by lyad Allawi was billed 
as a turning point in the violent history of post-Saddam Iraq. It has 
turned out to be no such thing. Most o f Iraq is today a bloody no-man's 
land beset by ruthless insurgents, savage bandit gangs, trigger-happy US 
patrols and marauding government forces”.*’''
Within two weeks o f this report, Allawi warned that Iraq faced civil war: “The problem is 
that the Americans have no vision and no clear policy on how to go about in Iraq...we will 
most certainly slip into a civil war. We are practically in stage one o f a civil war as we 
speak” .'’' He has predicted dire consequences for Europe, America and the Middle East if 
the crisis in Iraq is not swiftly resolved. This was clearly not the aftermath originally 
sought when Saddam Hussein was removed from power. The aftermath of warfare in the 
early 2 P ‘ Century is considered in more detail in Chapter *.
The My Lai massacre in Vietnam  - in w hich up to 500 civilians o f  all ages are alleged to have been killed 
in cold blood by US personnel - is one o f  the m ost infam ous exam ples o f  this phenom enon.
A ccounts vary. According to som e reports he fatally wounded a third chief.
See w w w .sam ueldecham plain .com  
http://new s.independent.co.uk/w orld/m iddle_east/story.jsp?stoi7=650186 
Allawi: 'This is the Start o f  C ivil War’, The Tim es, July 10, 2005.
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An earlier footnote mentioned that George Galloway MP perhaps best exemplified the 
school o f thought which linked war in Iraq with the London bombings. Clare Short, the 
former International Development Secretary, also believed that the war in Iraq was partly 
to blame for the London bombings. This view is shared by the independent research 
organisation Chatham House, which concluded that there is ‘no doubt’ that the 
involvement of British forces in Iraq and Afghanistan enhanced propaganda, recruitment 
and fund-raising for al-Qaeda, and made Britain a more likely target for terrorists.*’^  
Former Liberal Democrat leader Charles Kennedy also supports this view.*’"^ Those who 
opine that wars have always been conducted for effects, and that there is little to be gained 
from formalising the process o f ‘effects thinking’ would do well to reflect upon this.
O f course none o f this is new. Indeed just under a quarter of a century ago. Professor 
Lawrence Martin made this very point when he stated that “beyond doubt, armed force is 
a dangerous tool, a two-edged sword, as likely to cut a careless master as his intended 
victim”.'”' Many models o f warfare take this curious phenomenon into account.
However, unlike EBW they do not acknowledge the full range o f potential outcomes that 
accompany individual actions on the battlefield. Rather, they focus on delivering first 
order effects, mindful that downstream effects might or might not occur along the way. 
Critically, they avoid teasing out the detail o f these second and third order effects - even 
though such detail can prove pivotal to the success o f the wider strategic endstate.
It used to be the case that peace, no matter how unsatisfactory, generally followed war.'”’ 
However, after the Gulf War o f 1991 the idea o f ‘finishing the job properly" came very 
visibly to the forefront o f public consciousness. What made this case particularly unusual 
was the fact that the aftermath was deemed to be unsatisfactory by the victors rather 
solely than by the vanquished. Indeed for reasons that are not immediately apparent, the 
early wars of the 21®' Century have yielded less satisfactory outcomes than their 
forebears, at least in aftermath terms. In The War fo r  Kosovo: Serbia Political-Military 
Strateg)E Barry Posen notes that/*’
“...the war with Serbia fits into a rough pattern that the Unites 
States and the rest of the world have encountered too frequently in 
the last decade. In Somalia, Rwanda, post-Desert Storm Iraq,
Bosnia, and now Kosovo, four factors, singly or in combination, 
have eroded and sometimes entirely thwarted Western aspirations” .
These factors are: first, that political movements motivated by strong national, ethnic or 
clan identities can take significant punishment. Second, such movements are morally
Ibid, 17 July.
Ibid, 13 July.
Laurence Martin, The Reith Lectures 1981, in The T w o-E dged  Sw ord, W eidenfeld and N ico lson . London, 
1982.
As ever, exceptions spring to mind, such as the Crusades and the Hundred Years’ war. But even here the 
logic applies. The Crusades began as a reaction to the fact that “a pagan race had overcom e the Christians 
and with horrible cruelty had devastated everything alm ost to the w alls o f  Constantinople” in 1074. It ended 
ignominioLisly som e tw o hundred years later w ith the realisation that the M ongol and M am eluke armies had 
by now increased to such a size that the Christian forces could not beat them. In the case o f  the Hundred 
Y ears’ War there were many truces, but the underlying hostilities continued until the war ended in 1 4 5 1. 
Sources: http://ww w.fordham .edU /halsail/sbooklk.htm l#G eneral and Bibliothèque N ationale de France 
(tr. A vailable at ww w.bnf.fr/enlum inures/texte/atx2__02.htm ).
Posen, B, ‘The War for K osovo: Serbia Political-M ilitary Strategy’, tn ie rm ilio m l S ecurity , Spring 2000. 
Vol 24 , N o  4, p 83.
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capable of great violence. Third, the leaders o f these movements, be they political or 
military, have great organisational skills that can lead to unexpected success.
Fourth, military skills abroad can be extremely well developed and can generate 
asymmetric success. Posen notes that these factors:
"...may not always permit local people to evade or overcome the sheer 
material advantages that the United States or other Western powers 
can bring to bear. They can, however, often turn the carefully crafted 
peace plans, coercive diplomacy, and limited operations o f outside 
powers into nasty back-alley fights. Political and humanitarian goals 
turn out to be much more difficult to achieve than anyone expected.
The opposition in these affairs is ruthless, resilient, and resourceful, 
and ought to be taken more seriously”.*’^
These factors can apply as much during the aftermath as they do during the warfighting 
phase itself. But several other factors are also evident. For example, in the current era o f 
quick, expeditionary wars, one side will routinely expect to suffer much more than the 
other side. It might lose its infrastructure, electricity, transportation nodes, and perhaps 
its fuel supplies for a limited time. It will certainly suffer civilian casualties, and its near- 
term viability might even be brought into question. Moreover it could face the spectre of 
a truly dismal aftermath. Yet during this same period, the opposing side might continue 
in its daily life much as it did before the war commenced. This imbalance o f suffering is 
another dominant feature o f early 21®' Century warfare.
In the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, neither aftermath unfolded as expected. Three sets of 
factors account for this. The first set - Posen’s considerations - are largely outwith the 
control o f the West. The second set concerns actions and behaviour that the West has 
some control over, such as politics, diplomacy, trade, and the conduct o f war on the 
battlefield. The third set concerns today’s strategic environment, which is dealt with in 
detail in Chapter 5.
At various times in the past the military has been set objectives by politicians and left to 
get on with the job in hand. What mattered at the time was that victory was delivered on 
the battlefield, as this would lead to the defeat o f the enemy and therefore overall victory. 
Political interference invariably occurred to a small degree, but during the warfighting 
phase military power was often disassociated from politics.
But this approach no longer works. Military power must at all times take the wider 
political and strategic situation into account. Actions on today’s battlefields shape the 
aftermath in ways not previously seen. Battlefields used to be the province o f the 
military. Today, however, they are often the province o f the military and civilians in 
equal measure; indeed the modern battlefield is as likely to be a city as countryside.
This is not to suggest that set piece battles will never be seen again, but it makes the point 
that we are more likely to see another Fallujah than another Verdun.
Winning the Peace
One of EBW’s central tenets is that war must be followed by meaningful peace. 
Consequently EBW seeks to deliver much more than winning wars on favourable terms, 
laudable though that objective is. In contrast with the Manoeuvrist Paradigm, which aims
Ibid, p 83, 84.
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lo win wars but does not necessarily plan for the aftermaths, EBW aims to win the peace 
from the outset. The warfighting element is unlikely ever to disappear, o f course, and 
consequently those who seek a utopian ideology cannot turn to EBW for succour.
Attrition and violence will routinely continue to play their part in warfare - indeed at times 
they are highly likely to be its predominant feature. That said, EBW is predicated upon 
taking the underlying causes o f conflict into account, and in so doing, planning for the 
aftermath before the first bullet is fired.
To illustrate the importance o f this, consider the recent invasion of Iraq. The endstate 
called for the removal o f Saddam Hussein, a task that was met in full. Yet the aftermath -  
insurrection, with a very real possibility o f civil war in due course - was not considered by 
the invasion planners. Within the EBW model this outcome would have been far less 
likely, because the holistic aspect o f the model demands that planning looks beyond the 
immediate objectives (such as the removal o f a dictator). It thus considers the aftermath at 
the earliest stages o f planning. By doing this it starts to deliver the preconditions for the 
aftermath long before the first bullet is fired. Mindful o f Clausewitz’s caution that “ in war 
the result is never final...the defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a 
transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later 
date’*,'’^  under EBW the warfighting and aftermath stages are viewed as two halves of the 
same coin.
To illustrate the point, it is worth considering President Bush's I May 2003 declaration of 
“mission accomplished” from the deck o f the USS Abraham Lincoln. His words left no 
doubt that strategic victory had been achieved. However, it is now very clear (and indeed 
some people suggested this at the time)*’^  that what had actually been delivered were 
tactical and operational level victories: the defeat o f Saddam Hussein’s armed forces, and 
the ousting o f Saddam Hussein from power. The real strategic prizes - an Iraq free from 
intimidation, and enhanced security in the Middle East - were nowhere to be seen.
Moreover, the international terrorist threat has in all probability broadened as a result of 
events in Iraq. In the wake o f terrorist activity in London on 7 July 2005, several UK. 
politicians suggested that these attacks were intrinsically linked to the invasion o f Iraq.™ 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, a prominent member o f A1 Qaeda, released a videotape in August 
2005 that gave precisely this impression.^' This illustration shows that the W est's current 
model o f warfare pays scant attention linking today’s end states (such as the removal o f 
Saddam Hussein) with the fulfilment o f longer term outcomes (such as international and 
regional security). However, within this context an additional and important consideration 
is that in Iraq the number o f US military killed between the end o f the warfighting stage 
(“mission accomplished”) and its second anniversary was ten times greater than occurred 
during the warfighting stage itse lf (nearly 1500 as opposed to 139 war fatalities). This
Clausew itz, Op Cit, p .80.
According to Joe N y e , dean o f  Hai'vard’s K ennedy School o f  Government, the Bush administration 
“ ...had a plan, which turned out to be a pretty good plan, for w inning the war, but they had no plan for 
winning the peace” . M oreover “...by succum bing to hubris, m ission accom plished, w e did it all ourselves, 
no problem ...yeah, w e  w on the war, but w e lost the peace” . Source: CBS News, April 30, 2004
This school o f  thought is perhaps best exem plified  by G eorge G alloway MP, but he is not alone. After 
the London bom bings he declared that “W e argued...that the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq would  
increase the threat o f  terrorist attack in Britain. Tragically Londoners have now paid the price o f  the 
governm ent ignoring such warnings”. See G allow ay: ‘B om bing Price o f  Iraq’, The Times, 8 July 2005.
Source: M ichael Evans, The Times, A ugust 5, 2005 . W hether al-Zawahiri is telling the truth is another 
matter.
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happened despite coalition forces delivering in full the endstates they had been set. 
Winning the peace matters. It always has done, o f course, but the fact that EBW considers 
matters holistically sets it apart from its predecessor.
CONCLUSION
In asking whether EBW merits recognition as an original model o f warfare, this chapter 
has revealed a number o f significant conclusions. These fall into 3 broad groups: those 
concerning the Manoeuvrist Paradigm; those concerning the wider context within which 
EBW emerged; and those relating to the EBW paradigm itself.
The current Western model o f warfare includes the military approach at the operational 
level. Manoeuvre Warfare, as well as the political input to that approach. Together these 
two strands comprise the M anoeuvrist Paradigm, a legacy o f the 1970s, in which speed 
and Hexibility on the battlefield acted as a force multiplier to offset the W est’s numerical 
disadvantage vis à vis the W arsaw Pact. To date this approach has served the West well, 
but in the early 21®' Century this is no longer be the case due to two significant Haws.
The first is that modern wars o f choice bear little resemblance to the General War 
scenario upon which the M anoeuvrist model was predicated. And whilst the political 
strand is essential in all forms o f war, in modern wars of choice it is likely to be more 
dynamic and wide-ranging than it would have been during General War - national 
survival in the face o f overwhelming odds - and one o f the potential aftermath scenarios, 
nuclear holocaust, was ever-present in this equation. However, the W est’s current wars 
o f choice bear no resemblance to the Cold War scenario. Perhaps the real surprise is not 
so much that the Manoeuvrist Paradigm is ill-suited to meet the unique demands of the 
2 1 ®' Century, but that the West has been so loyal to it since the demise o f the Warsaw 
Pact.
The second flaw stems from the fact that the M anoeuvrist Paradigm was predicated upon 
securing swift success on the battlefield, when the problem of balancing eventual 
outcome against tempo during the warfighting stage was less of a factor during the Cold 
War than at present. Today’s demand is for aftermaths that are acceptable in equal 
measure both to the victor and to the international community. This was most certainly 
not the case during the Cold War.
Turning to the wider context o f EBW ’s emergence, the debate concerning episteme or 
evolution seems likely to continue for some time. Tempting though it may be to dismiss 
its significance, the fact remains that the challenges o f today do not mirror those o f the 
past. Foucault contends that each new era produces its own unique mindset o f thought. 
This, together with the fact that although EBW shares much of its heritage with the 
Manoeuvrist Paradigm, it nonetheless has original elements, begs the following questions: 
is EBW is a sudden and unexpected change, and if so, why? These topics are dealt with 
in chapters 2 and 3.
A further conclusion that arises out o f this chapter is that whilst the modern effects 
paradigm builds upon previous models o f warfare, it differs from its predecessors in that 
it seeks to ensure that the effects that accrue during M>ar are consistent M’ith, and limited 
to, those effects envisaged during the planning process. Clearly this has not always been 
the case. And whilst it remains to be seen whether EBW ever delivers as it envisages, 
there can be no doubt that it is broader in scope and ambition than the Manoeuvrist 
Paradigm ever was.
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Regarding EBW itself, no tool or mechanism yet exists, or seems likely to exist, that will 
predict accurately the full range o f effects associated with individual actions. The span of 
possibilities is simply too great for this to become reality. Indeed the simplified effects 
schematic at Figure 2 hints at the difficulties involved in trying to meet this aspiration. 
Thus the appeal o f the paradigm needs to be balanced against the likely outcome of 
success. Against this background the possibility exists that the EBW model is flawed in 
this critical respect. One the other hand, the fact that it might not deliver at 100% 
efficiency does not mean that it should not be developed further, as presumably it is 
preferable to use a model that delivers to X% efficiency rather than one that delivers to 
X% minus, which - based on current events in Iraq and Afghanistan - is what the 
Manoeuvrist Paradigm is producing at present.
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CHAPTER 2: AMERICAN ORIGINS
“We fin d  ourselves al the gates o f  an important epoch... 
when spirit moves forw ard  in a leap, transcends its previous shape 
and takes on a new one... [those] who oppose it impotently. cling to the past
Georg Hegel ( 1770-1831) 
INTRODUCTION
ll is difficult to gauge with accuracy when EBW ’s conceptual underpinnings were first 
mooted in America. Certainly it owes much to its predecessors, and indeed many of its 
key tenets would have been as familiar to Alexander the Great or to George S Patton as 
they are to modern generals. However, some elements are relatively recent. The 
underlying theme o f this thesis is to determine whether EBW merits recognition as an 
original model o f warfare, and central to this question is America’s contribution, 
consciously or otherwise, to the effects paradigm. With this in mind, this chapter 
analyses the US input to the modern paradigm. It does this by balancing recent 
American thinking at the operational and tactical levels against America’s wider 
historical approach to warfare. This methodology was deemed most likely to unearth an 
audit trail - if indeed one existed - that linked US thinking to the contemporary EBW 
model.
The first section, an analysis o f ‘The Roots o f Modern US Operational Level Doctrine', 
fills two purposes: it establishes when modern effects thinking first coalesced within the 
US, and it provides the context necessary to undertake a meaningful assessment o f how 
EBW evolved out o f Manoeuvre Warfare. Using lessons from Vietnam as its point of 
departure, it considers the DePuy era o f the US Army’s Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC). It then analyses the quest for the alternative strategies that followed. It 
concludes with a brief analysis o f one o f Am erica's most energetic and influential 
doctrinal periods: the era o f General Don Starry. Next, the focus shifts to whether there is 
‘A Uniquely American Way of W ar’. Using Russell W eigley's The American Way o f  
War as its anchor, this section considers America’s wider approach to warfare. It asks 
whether current US doctrine is governed as much by America’s remote past as by more 
recent developments. This analysis prompts a key question: does an American way of 
war exist, or does America merely have a way of battle - a less mature (and hence less 
effective) paradigm for addressing conflict? Antulio ,1 Echevarria Il’s Towards an 
American Way o f  War helps to unlock this question by considering relevant experiences 
from Iraq and Afghanistan.
The chapter concludes with an overview o f American input to the modern effects 
paradigm. Using Colin S Gray’s Strategy in the Nuclear Age: The United States 1945- 
1991 as a counterpoint to W eigley’s work, this section analyses the roots o f America’s 
wider strategic culture. Next it considers the impact o f three recent, and highly 
influential, US doctrinal theorists: John Boyd, John Warden and Dave Deptula. It ends 
with a brief overview of how Network Centric Warfare (NCW), the US variant of 
Network Enabled Capability (NEC), links to EBW.
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THE ROOTS OF MODERN US OPERATIONAL LEVEL DOCTRINE
Today’s Western military doctrines are predicated upon ‘jointness’, wherein at least two 
branches of the Armed Forces participate together in activities, operations, and, if 
required, organisational structures. A single military commander routinely exercises 
operational command and control o f the forces that have been placed at his disposal. Yet 
this construct is a relatively recent development. For much of the Cold War it was not the 
model o f choice, although there were some exceptions. For example, in the case o f the 
UK, the joint model proved singularly effective during the Falklands Conflict of 1982.
Within the US, ‘jointness’ began to crystallise around the concept o f Air / Land battle, the 
progeny o f two land warfare developments which occurred in the second half of the 20th 
Century. The first and most visible o f these arose out o f America’s experience in 
Vietnam, and the subsequent period o f introspection. This produced many insightful 
albeit at times bittersweet lessons. The second development was largely theoretical in 
nature, but it was no less instrumental in redefining the American, and ultimately the 
NATO, approach to warfare in the 1980s. This was a radical re-evaluation o f Warsaw 
Pact options for invading Europe, and the development of counter-strategies to negate this 
threat.
Lessons from Vietnam
One of the key questions that arose out o f Vietnam asked how a world superpower with 
unprecedented resources and military capabilities could have been defeated by a Third 
World country with an apparently third-rate army. Certainly the amount o f ordnance 
expended by the Americans in Vietnam was vast. Between 1965 and 1972 the US 
dropped more than two million tons o f bombs in central Vietnam alone;™ this equates to 
the total number o f bombs dropped on all fronts in World War Two. In addition, 
hundreds o f thousands o f tons o f chemicals were dispersed, and nearly a further three 
million tons o f high explosives were delivered via artillery strikes.™ According to Robert 
M Citino, author o f Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution o f  Operational Warfare, 
there was never an army in the history o f the world that could move faster or generate 
more firepower than US forces in Vietnam.™ America lost the war for many reasons, but 
it did not lose due to a lack o f firepower.
For North Vietnamese Army (NVA) General Vo Nguyen Giap, the NVA’s leading 
military theoretician, the primary reason for America’s failure stemmed from the fact that 
neither they, nor indeed the French - whom they replaced - truly understood the nature of
The generally infertile area betw een the Red River D elta in the north and the M ekong River Della in the 
south. Source: N go  V inh Long, Vietnam 's R evolu tionary Tradition, in \ 'ie1nam a n d  A m erica: The M ost 
C om prehensive D ocum ented  H is tory  o f  the Vietnam War, Gettleman, Marvin E, Franklin, Jane,
Y oung, Marilyn B, and Franklin, Bruce (Eds), Grove Press, N ew  York, 1995.
Ibid.
Robert M Citino, Blitzlcrieg to D eser t Storm : The E volution o f  O pera tionat W arfare, University Press o f  
Kansas, 2004,p 237.
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the war in which they were engaged.™ Both countries made the same fatal error of 
believing that each time the North Vietnamese shifted to conventional warfare:
"...this somehow signalled the failure o f peoples war, which these 
foreign strategists equated with guerrilla war...[whereas] the 
appearance of large, well-equipped units engaging in conventional 
offensives does not indicate that guerrilla war has failed but just the 
opposite: it has succeeded enough to launch the next stage”. ^
By January 1975 the NVA was the fifth largest army in the world. This it achieved in 
spite o f suffering huge numbers o f casualties over many years.^'' Therefore, although 
considered third-rate by conventional Western standards, it was far from insignificant as a 
viable military force. But what is really striking about Giap's observation is that by the 
time America’s first hostile act occurred in Vietnam, Giap had been patiently explaining, 
in print, the theory and practice o f peoples’ war in Vietnam for over three decades.™ 
Moreover anyone familiar with Mao Tse-Tung’s works not need have read Giap at all, as 
Mao too had been explaining the process in some detail since the 1930’s.™ More 
recently, Che Guevara had written about the theoretical aspects o f insurgency from first 
principles, covering subjects that ranged from the need to understand strategy from the 
guerrillas' perspective, to the requirement to understand enemy manpower, mobility, 
popular support, weapons and leadership.^" Each o f these factors was a key issue in 
Vietnam.
In fact Giap's words did not go unheeded. General William C Westmoreland, the US 
four star military commander in Vietnam from June 1964 until shortly after the 1968 Tet 
offensive, read at least some of his works. He also studied the French defeat closely.®' 
Together these complementary sources informed his decision to devise a strategy of 
"...bleeding them [the NVA] until Hanoi wakes up to the fact that they have bled their 
country to the point o f natural disaster for generations”.®^ He duly presided over a build­
up o f US forces from 16 000 in 1964 to 470 000 in 1967. Speaking in New York City 
that April, he noted that “ .. .the end is not in sight...in effect we are fighting a war of
General Vo N guyen Giap, The p o lit ic a l a n d  M ilita ry  Line o f  O ur P arty, in I 'ietnam a n d  A m erica, Op Cit, 
p 193. The significance o f  the French m isunderstanding is that the Am ericans took over the model that the 
French had been using.
Ibid.
http://w w w .vietnam w ar.com /T im eline69-75.htm
Am erican involvem ent in Vietnam  began in O ctober 1945, with W ashington providing credits to Paris to 
help France purchase seventy five U S troop transports. Shortly afterwards, weaponry w as made available  
“with the understanding that a substantial part could be used for the military cam paign in Indochina”. By 
1953/54  Am erica w as financing 78%  o f  the cost o f  the French Indochina war. See N g o  Vinh Long, The 
P ranco-l'ie tn am ese W ar 1945-1954: O rig ins o f  V S  Involvem ent, in Vietnam a n d  A m erica . Op Cit. p 34 and 
35.
For example: “The strategy o f  guerrilla warfare is m anifestly unlike that em ployed in orthodox 
operation s... there is in guerrilla warfare no such thing as decisive battle; there is nothing comparable to the 
fixed, passie defence that characterizes orthodox war. In guerrilla warfare, the transformation o f  a m oving  
situation into a positional defensive situation never arises. ..it is improper to compare the tw o”. This was 
written in 1938. Mao Tse-Tung, Yu Chi Chan, G u errilla  W arfare, in G u erilla  W arfare, Cassell, London. 
1961, p 38.
Che Guevara, G uerrilla  W arfare, Ibid, p 115.
General Vo N guyen Giap, Op Cit, p 193.
M ajor-General John K iszely , The B ritish  A rm y a n d  A p p ro a ch es to W arfare since 1945, in M ilitary  
Pow er: L and W arfare in Theory a n d  P ractice , ed Brian H olden Reid, Frank Cass, London, 1977. p 189.
34
attrition”.®^ Shortly after this speech Westmoreland flew to Washington to ask for more 
reinforcements. He considered 550 500 to be the minimal essential force and 670 000 to 
be optimal, albeit even with this larger force he estimated that the war would last for a 
Further three years.
W estmoreland's strategy sought “ ...superior American force, supported by overwhelming 
air bombardment and artillery fire, not to seize or hold territory but to kill enemy soldiers 
in their jungle redoubts”.®"' This approach presaged many elements o f Manoeuvre 
Warfare - indeed all its current doctrinal elements were evident in abundance; surprise, 
tempo, shock, audacity, and a ruthless desire to succeed. That said, in Vietnam attrition 
reigned supreme, at least from the Americans’ perspective, and bodycount became their 
yardstick o f success. This did not in itself negate the Manoeuvrist elements o f the 
campaign, but it certainly undermined them.®^ Reflecting on this aspect of the war many 
years later. Robert McNamara, the then US Secretary o f Defense, stated that:
"...I had gone by the rule that it is not enough to conceive o f an 
objective and a plan to carry it out; you must monitor the plan to 
determine whether you are achieving the objective...! was 
convinced that, while we might not be able to track something as 
unambiguous as a front line, we could find variables that would 
indicate our success or failure. So we measured the targets 
destroyed in the North, the traffic down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the 
number o f captives, the weapons seized, the enemy body count, 
and so on...obviously, there are things you cannot quantify: honor 
[sic] and beauty, for example. But things you can count, you ought 
to count”.®*^
Unfortunately for the Americans, however, this highly structured linear approach suffered 
from three fundamental problems. First, and most significantly, it was inherently flawed; 
because according to every metric then in use, America was winning the war - and indeed 
it continued to do so almost until its end. Indeed even when it was apparent that America 
was losing, McNamara made the point that “Every quantitative measurement...shows that 
were winning this war” .®^ The lesson was clearly that not only did metrics need to be 
measurable, but that they needed to be meaningful as well. Clearly this did not happen in 
Vietnam.
In similar vein, Westmoreland noted that “Despite the final failure o f the South 
Vietnamese, the record o f the American military services o f never having lost a war is 
still intact''.®® Unfortunately for those concerned, however, such records do not determine 
the outcome o f wars. This provided another vital lesson: that no matter how great the 
tactical victories, unless they could be converted to strategic success they served little
See ‘W illiam  C. W estm oreland Is D ead at 91; General Led U.S. Troops in V ietnam ’, N ew  York Times. 
July 19, 2005.
Ibid.
The M anoeuvrist Paradigm recognises the potential need for attrition: w itness the em phasis on sm ashing  
the Iraqi Republican Guard during both G u lf Wars, M utla R idge in 1991. and N A T O ’s attempts to write 
down Serb armour in 1999.
Robert S. M cNamara w ith Brian Vandemar: Tn Retrospect: The Tragedy And Lessons O f V ietnam ’.
See http://Archives.O bs-Us.Com /O bs/EngIish7Books7M cnam ara/Ir236.H tm  
McNamara in K iszely, Op Cit, P 189.
N ew  York Tim es, Op Cit.
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purpose. The second problem with M cNamara’s approach was that only rarely was the 
US Army able to utilise the full power o f its combat capabilities, due to repeated attacks 
on its cohesion. In this respect the NVA was, perhaps surprisingly, more Manoeuvrist in 
its thinking than the Americans were, as time and again US forces were drawn into battles 
for which they were clearly ill-suited.®^ On 23 January 1973. US President Richard M 
Nixon announced an agreement that would end the war and bring peace with honour.'*" 
The Vietnam experience is perhaps best summed up by Lieutenant General Paul Van 
Riper, U.S. Marine Corps (retired), a veteran o f both Vietnam and Desert Storm:
"After Vietnam, the generation I represented went back and said.
'w hat did we do wrong’? Well, there were those who blamed it on 
things that weren't responsible - the media, the politicians, the fact 
we didn't have trained troops. They had a lot o f other excuses for 
what the real problems were. The real problems were we did not 
have a thorough understanding o f war, an intellectual doctrine of 
foundation for Vietnam. So that's where we went back, and we 
began to make those kinds o f repairs. The difficulty was we 
understood the tactics. We had the techniques; we had the 
equipment. W hat we didn't have was any sort of a campaign plan to 
pull all o f those battles and engagements together into some 
meaningful whole. And so you fought all o f these battles and 
engagements for nothing. They were simply single events. There 
was no campaign plan that said, ‘this is what we're aiming for’
During the subsequent period o f introspection, all o f  these factors - and indeed a great 
many more - were rigorously analysed. The following catharsis ushered in a period of 
transformation which, in the 1970s and 1980s, was to materially change America's 
approach to warfare.
The Impact of TRADOC
One of the first physical manifestations o f this catharsis took place in 1973, with the 
formation of the US Arm y’s Training and Doctrinal Command (TRADOC). Its first 
commander. General William E DePuy, had commanded the 1st Infantry Division in 
Vietnam for a year in the mid-1960s. A fierce critic o f W estmorland’s strategy, he 
believed that it led to an over-reliance on massive superiority in firepower, particularly 
from artillery, helicopters, and fighter-bombers.™ He duly sought to reconsider how best 
to utilise US firepower on the modern battlefield.
For DePuy, the contemporaneous 1973 Arab-Israeli war signified the end o f what he 
called ‘tank and aircraft blitzkrieg’.™ In July 1976 his findings crystallised into a revision 
of US Army Field Manual 100-5 (FM 100-5). This version stressed not only the new 
lethality o f battlefield weaponry, but also the importance o f the operational level of
K iszely, Op Cit.
http://w w w .vietnam w ar.com /T im eline69-75.htm
” PBS FRO NTLINE interview, 8 July 2004. See w w w .pbs.org  
Major Paul H. Herbert, ‘D ecid ing what has to be done: General W illiam  E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition 
o f  FM 100-5, O perations’, C om bat S tu dies Institu te, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1988.
Robert M Citino, Op Cit, p 255, 256.
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warfare, a construct which hitherto had received scant attention in the US.™ In addition, 
FM 100-5 posited a new military response in the event o f Warsaw Pact aggression in 
Europe: that of Active Defence. Within this model, if a land-grab occurred there would be 
little movement on the part o f NATO forces. Instead, the military would focus on key 
areas o f likely breakthrough: the North German Plain, the Fulda Gap in central Germany, 
and the Hof Gap that bordered East Germany and Czechoslovakia." There would be no 
reserve forces. Consequently, if breakthroughs occurred, forces in those regions would 
rush to the affected areas in order to stem the tide.
The Quest for Alternative Strategies
However, not everyone was convinced by DePuy. FM 100-5 proved to be highly 
divisive, not least because Soviet doctrine placed such heavy emphasis on reserves. For 
the Soviets, the role o f the first echelon forces was primarily to create gaps through which 
their second echelon forces would subsequently deploy. Critics o f FM 100-5 believed 
that DePuy's emphasis on defence emasculated the UA Army’s ability to achieve tempo 
and agility, hence these vital qualities would become the preserve o f the attackers.
Within the military, many thought that this reactive rather than proactive approach would 
inevitably lead to failure. The key issue soon became one of how quickly it would take 
to lose the next war,™ and this concern was not limited solely to the military. William 
S Lind, serving at that time as the legislative aide to Senator Gary Hart, suggested that 
FM 100-5's approach offered as many advantages to the attacker as it did to the defender. 
He believed that it indicated the acceptance o f a Maginot mentality driven primarily by 
German desire for forward defence, rather than by pragmatic considerations.
At the opposite end o f DePuy’s proposal was the option for NATO forces progressively 
to withdraw to the west until reinforcements arrived from across the Atlantic. ™ Within 
this model, once the cavalry had arrived the balance offerees in Europe would inevitably 
alter. In the interim, the key requirement was that NATO must remain viable. If this 
could be achieved, the new forces could take the battle directly to the Warsaw Pact, who 
by this time would be hampered by their extended lines o f communication. Outwardly 
there seemed to be no middle ground in this debate. In a bid to break the stalemate, Lind 
championed a compromise approach which stressed manoeuvre:
"...m anoeuvre is the ultimate tactical, operational and strategic 
goal while firepower is used primarily to create opportunities for 
manoeuvre. The primary objective is to break the spirit and will of 
the opposing high command by creating unexpected and 
unfavourable opportunities or strategic situations, not to kill enemy 
troops or destroy enemy equipment”."®
The Starry Era
This was not the case in the Soviet Arm y, w ith figures such as Tukhachevskii prom oting operational 
thinking w ell ahead o f  their W estern counterparts.
Ibid, p 233-235  
Ibid.
K iszely, Op Cit, p 190 and 191.
W illiam  S Lind, ‘Sotne Doctrinal Q uestions for the US A rm y’, M ilitary R eview , Num ber 3. March 1977, 
p 54-65.
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General Donn Starry succeeded DePuy in 1977, the same year Lind published his 
findings. Starry had commanded the Armor Centre at Fort Knox, Kentucky, between 
1973 and 1976, In this capacity he had helped inform De Puy’s revision of FM 100-5. 
Now, in a climate o f increasing (and at times heated) debate, he found himself in the 
position o f challenging this earlier work.™
S tarry’s approach was to assemble an elite corps o f military intellectuals to analyse the 
matter from first principles. His chief writer. Lieutenant Colonel Huba Wass de Czega, 
was a highly regarded thinker, as indeed were many others on his team. Starry advocated 
an ‘open book' approach within which no doctrinal stone was to be left unturned. 
Moreover, he places great emphasis on applying lessons from history to the contemporary 
European strategic panorama. This approach focussed his analysis on how best to negate 
the impact o f Soviet second and third echelon forces before they arrived on the 
battlefield,'"" this being one o f the key weaknesses o f FM 100-5. By coincidence, the 
embryonic concept o f Air/Land battle had surfaced immediately prior to Starry's 
appointment;'"' Starry's work built on this, and his solution - ‘seeing deep’ - matured 
into an interdiction model within which land and air forces would work closely together.
Building upon this premise, S tany’s focus was twofold: to concentrate on the extended 
(deeper) battlefield, and the integrated (air and land) battlefield. To avoid confusing 
terminology, he chose AirLand Battle as the title for his work, noting that:
"[The] first step is to formulate what we are trying to do - a vision, 
for it will then be necessary to assign responsibilities, develop 
operational concepts and doctrine systems, equipment systems, 
organizations, training systems and allocate resources in order to 
implement the vision”.'"^
AirLand Battle was formally published in 1981. Its principal thrust was that the US 
Army was "entering a new dimension o f battle which permits the simultaneous 
engagement o f forces throughout the corps and division areas o f influence” .
The following year saw the republication o f FM 100-5. By following four key tenets: 
initiative, agility, depth and synchronisation, Starry believed that NATO might be able to 
seize the initiative if  attacked by the Warsaw Pact. The enemy would first be checked by 
an initial assault rather than through active defence, and it would then be counter-attacked 
simultaneously, and across a wide front, rather than solely in the areas o f penetration.
A revised FM 100-5 was issued in 1986. It incorporated many campaign planning 
concepts which are still in use today.
For more depth on Starry during this period see  John L Rom jue’s ‘The Evolution o f  the Airland Battle 
C oncept’, A ir U n iversity  R eview , M ay-June 1984.
Typically within the Soviet battle plan only 20%  o f  the assault forces would be in the first echelon. The 
remaining forces would be launched at Arm y and Army Group level to strike deep into rear areas. See  
C olonel Patrick P en gelley’s A ir L and Battle: A H ollow  C harge?, D efence Attaché, Num ber 3, 1983. Soviet 
force concentration is well explained at General Sir Martin Farndale’s ‘The Operational Level o f  
Com m and’, R C S t Journal, Autumn, 1988, p 23-29 .
"" For further detail see  FM 100-5, June 1993, p v.
John L Rom joue, Op Cit.
TRA DO C Pamphlet 525-5 , M ilita ry  O perations: O pera tion a l C oncepts f o r  the A irL and  B attle an d  
C orps O peration , 25 March 1981, p 21.
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Interestingly, at the same very time the UK was addressing similar issues, and with equal 
vigour. In fact this process had begun in 1971, two years before the formation o f 
TRADOC. when a group o f academics at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst 
received government funding to form the Soviet Studies Research Centre.'™ The UK's 
change in mindset was swift. Within a decade. General Sir Nigel Bagnall was advocating 
"...a less positional, more mobile style o f warfare [and] a greater appreciation of the 
importance of speed in battle procedure”.'™ In 1985, as Chief of the General Staff, he 
oversaw the formation o f the first Army-wide doctrine.'™ In the interim, while 
commanding the NATO Northern Army Group, he instituted an Army Group plan for 
deployment based on manoeuvre, rather than one in which corps battles were conducted 
in isolation. By the time he stepped down from this post, manoeuvrist thinking had 
become a reality within Europe.
A UNIQUELY AMERICAN WAY OF WAR?
In 1973 the American historian Russell Weigley produced a thought-provoking study 
entitled The American Way o f  War, Believing that there was something about the 
American approach that made it unique, Weigley reviewed five discrete periods in 
American history:
• 1775-1815, when America fought with limited resources.
• 1815-1890, in which the still youthful America, having only recently emerged 
from combat against Great Britain with the status quo ante bel him successfully 
preserved, set out its policy for deterrence and defence.
• 1890-1941, when America repeatedly undertook warfare outside its homeland.
• 1941-1945, which saw America triumphant on two fronts located at opposite ends 
o f the world.
• 1945-1973: America’s atomic legacy.
Weigley concluded that America did indeed have a unique approach to warfare. He 
based this deduction both on prim a facie  evidence and on the "assumption that what we 
believe and what we do today is governed at least as much by the habits o f mind we 
formed in the relatively remote past as by what we did and thought yesterday”."™ 
Although many of the characteristics which Weigley assessed were evident in other 
national models o f warfare, he reasoned that what made the American model different 
was its overt aggression and directness, coupled with its seemingly visceral desire to 
achieve decisive and overwhelming victory on the battlefield. Crucially, Weigley 
observed that "in the Indian wars, the Civil War, and then climactically in World War II. 
American strategists sought in actuality the object that Clausewitz viewed the ideal type 
o f war, war in the abstract: ‘...the destruction o f the enemy’s armed forces, amongst all
K iszely. Op Cit, p 198.
K iszely, Op Cit, p 199. Bagnall is also credited with introducing the British Army to the Operational 
Level: see John K eeegan at http://ww w.nm bva.co.uk  
Ibid.
Russell F W eigley, The A m erican  W ay o f  War: A H istory  o f  U nited States M ilitary  S tra tegy  a n d  P o licy  
M acm illan, 1973, p xx.
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the objects which can be pursued in War, always appears as the one which overrules all 
others'
This is an interesting detail, because prior to 1873 the standard West Point text on warfare 
was Captain J M Oconnor’s translation o f S F Gay de Vernon's Treatise on the Science o f  
War and Fortification. This, as its title suggests, emphasised the engineering facets of 
warfare, albeit for balance it included a brief summary o f Jomini's strategic precepts.
Thus for many years Jomini rather than Clausewitz was America's principal interpreter of 
Napoleonic strategy. That said, in common with Clausewatz, one o f Jomini's key 
strategic tenets was to maximise force against the decisive point in the theatre o f 
operations, and ideally when the enemy had the inferior part o f his strength there."" 
American theorists took this principle to heart - so much so in fact that Weigley deems it 
one o f the classic features o f the American way of war.
But whilst in some respects America’s operational mindset mirrored those o f other 
nations, at the strategic level it was truly unique. Typically, European nations, with many 
hundreds of years’ experience o f bloody conflict behind them, took into account the 
complex matter o f how best to convert military victory into strategic success. But the 
American model did not do this. Indeed by placing such a heavy emphasis on destroying 
the enemy's fielded forces, by definition it placed less emphasis on the aftermath of war 
per se. Consequently, planning for the aftermath tended to occur when the warfighting 
stage was nearing its conclusion.
Weigley identified several highly influential strategic thinkers who shaped the American 
approach. These included Union General Ulysses S Grant, whose strategy o f living off 
the land during his drive to Jackson, Mississippi, was described by Major General J F C 
Fuller as one o f the boldest steps ever taken in w arfare;'" and the profoundly influential 
naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan. So influential were these thinkers for Weigley, that 
in the 1941 -1945 section o f his book he attributed success in the European War to the 
strategic tradition o f Grant, and success in the Pacific War largely to that o f Mahan. 
Looking at more recent strategists, Thomas C Schelling featured as another key influence. 
In Arms and Influence, a book considered by Weigley to be the most significant strategic 
thinkpiece of the 1960s, Schelling’s opined that “to seek out and destroy the enemy's 
military force, to achieve a crushing victory over enemy armies, was still the avowed 
purpose and central aim of American strategy in both world wars. Military action was 
thus seen as an alternative to bargaining, not a process o f bargaining”."^ For Weigley 
this captured the essence o f the American way o f war prior to the advent o f nuclear 
weapons. Weigley broadened this observation by citing Rear Admiral J C W ylie's claim 
that:
"War for a nonaggressor nation is actually a near complete collapse 
o f policy. Once war comes, then nearly all pre-war policy is utterly 
invalid because the setting in which it was designed to function no
108 Ibid. W eig ley ’s C lausew itz quotation taken from Carl von C lausew itz, On War, tr. Col J J Graham, N ew
York, Barnes and N ob le, 1968, p 86.l(W
' Baron de Jomini, P recis  de  l ’A r t de  la  G uerre, Paris, 1838, p ! 73-174 and 472-473; cited at Ibid p 83.
' ' ' Robert M Citino, Op Cit, p 227.11:
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longer corresponds with the facts o f reality. When war comes, we 
at once move into a radically different world”.'
A Wav of War or a Wav of Battle?
At this point it is pertinent to ask whether W eigley’s way of war is in fact a way of battle. 
The difference between these two models is stark. A way of war views the conflict 
process holistically. This starts /?re-war with the setting o f strategic and operational 
objectives, and finishespo5/“War when those objectives have been accomplished, and the 
necessary conditions for peace have been established. In contrast, a way of battle seeks to 
defeat the enemy militarily, the process being considered complete when the enemy has 
been defeated on the battlefield. Using these criteria, Schelling's quotation encapsulates 
perfectly a way o f battle.
Indeed this was one o f the conclusions proffered in Toward an American Way o fW a i\ a 
Strategic Studies Institute monograph that examined W eigley's claim s."'' Drawing 
attention to Max Boot’s Savage Wars o f  Peace, which contends that “many o f Americas 
small wars did not involve the complete overthrow of the enemy",' Toward an 
American Way o f  War suggests that the American way o f battle has yet to mature into a 
recognisable way of war. It notes that even today, the American way tends to “shy away 
from thinking about the complicated process o f turning military triumphs, whether on the 
scale o f major campaigns or small-unit actions, into strategic successes”."^’
Echevarria then quotes retired US Marine General Anthony Zinni’s observation that the 
US military is “becoming more efficient at killing and breaking, but that only wins 
battles, not wars”."^  Echevarria reinforces the point by suggesting that due consideration 
is not given to the processes and capabilities needed to convert battlefield success into 
strategic success: “the recent campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq...are examples o f 
remarkable military victories [which] have not yet culminated in strategic successes"."" 
He adds that much of today’s American defence literature emphasises firepower, 
precision, psychological operations. Special Forces, and jointness, rather than the use of 
overwhelming force. For Echevarria these characteristics are uncannily similar to
the “speed, jointness, knowledge, and precision that reflect today's Office o f Force 
Transformation (OFT) and OSD models o f warfare”."^ He then adds grist to the mill by 
citing Victor Davis Hanson’s Carnage and Culture, which postulates the existence o f a
J C W ylie, M ilitary S trategy: A G en era l Theory o f  P o w er C ontrol, Rutgers University Press. 1967, p 80, 
quoted in Ibid p 476,
' See T ow ard  an A m erican  W ay o f  War, A ntulio J Echevarria 11, Strategic Studies Institute o f  the US 
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Western, rather than an American, way of warfare,'^'' within which “warfare serves as a 
means o f doing what politics cannot”. ’^ '
THE ROOTS OF AM ERICA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE
Turning to the roots o f American strategic culture, in Strategy in the Nuclear Age: The 
United States, 1945-1991 Colin S Gray identifies five key strands:
• A mastery o f  logistics. Gray attributes this to the vast landmass o f the USA and 
the national approach o f having to cope with such geography.
• The Experience o f  the M oving Frontier. Conquering the wilderness required 
technological solutions and pragmatism. This has translated into a love of 
technology and a concomitant belief that technological solutions will prevail (but 
see overleaf).
• Overwhelming size in all relevant measures o f power. This allowed America to 
conduct two geostrategically distinct wars half a world apart between 1941 and 
1945. No other country could have done this.
• A model o f  world governance which follows the precepts o f American liberal 
democracy.
• Success: an American aspiration that applies as much to the individual as to the 
country as a whole.
In noting that the environment exerts a strong influence on American thinking. Gray 
surmises that “Americans do not wage, or plan to wage, limited war: rather they plan to 
fight on land, at sea, in the air, or in and for space. The environments largely determine 
the technologies, the tactics, and the character o f the operational goals” . H e  also 
comments on “the American propensity for reducing strategic problems into manageable
See H anson's earlier work The W estern W ay o f  War: The Infantry B attles in A ncien t Greece, o f  the West 
1500-1800. N ew  York, Cam bridge University Press, 1996.
Victor Davis Hanson, C arnage a n d  Culture: Landm ark B attles in the Ri.se o f  W estern flow er. N ew  York, 
D oubleday. 2001 , p 22. Quoted at Ibid, p 3.
Colin S Gray. Stra tegy  in the N u clear A ge: The U n ited  States. 1 9 4 5-1991, in The M aking o fS tra teg y-  
Rulers. S ta tes a n d  War, Ed W illiam son Murray, M acG regor Knox, and A lvin Bernstein, Cambridge 
University Press, 1994, p 590.
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equations."*' Delving deeper into detail, he identifies seven additional elements of 
strategic culture which in his view are almost as influential as the previous five:'“'^
• American indifference to history, which results in minimal baggage and a natural 
predilection for avoiding sacred cows.
• An engineering style that owes more to Jomini than to Clausewitz. It reflects 
Jomini's obsession “to reduce ... the complex and ambiguous to a few apparently 
simple procedures”. This point amplifies Gray’s Experience o f  the Moving 
Frontier and lends credence to the American conviction that ‘know-how' always 
delivers solutions.
• Impatience', a low tolerance for lengthy investment with distant payoffs.
• Blindness to cultural differences: the result o f US isolation and repeated success 
against weaker opposition.
• Continental Weltanschauung. Because o f its size, its historical experience of
success, and the impatient temper o f its people, the American way o f war has been 
quintessentially continentalist. Americans have favoured the quest for swift 
victory through the hazards o f decisive battle rather than the slower approach of 
maritime encirclement.
• Indifference to strategy. Gray concludes that traditionally it has been the
American way to reduce war and strategy to narrow military undertakings, a
proclivity as evident in the Gulf in 1991 as it had been in Europe in 1945.
Weigley supports this assertion in noting “the American tendency ...to seek refuge 
in technology from hard problems o f strategy and policy''.'^*’
• Belated but massive resort to force. Weigley concurs, citing General George C 
Marshall’s conviction that “a democracy cannot fight a 7 year war”.'^^
In melding these with his original five considerations. Gray surmises that:
“From...Sherman’s 1863 observation that ‘Madam...war is 
cruelty...the crueller it is, the sooner it will be over’, to the US 
Navy captain who reflected in 1954 that SAC’s war plan would 
reduce the USSR to a smoking radiating ruin at the end o f 2 hours, 
to the air campaign against Iraq in 1991, the exercise o f maximum 
violence for swift results has been the American way".'^"
Whilst this is a key deduction, it is not universally supported. Indeed in Contemporary
Military Strategy, Martin H Halperin traces several very different American strategies.'""'
Ibid, p 588. The original Pentagon references are R -266 (April 1954) and N -2526-A F  (June 1988) 
respectively.
Ibid, p 592-596.
W eighley. Op Cit, p 416.
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These range from Eisenhower’s ‘New Look’ o f 1953 to the Kennedy / McNamara era of 
civil advisors and think tanks; the 1967 reversal o f N A TO’s strategy to take into account 
Flexible Response; Johnson’s 1968 decision partially to halt bombing in Vietnam; the 
1969 budget reduction o f several billions o f dollars; and the Nixon Doctrine o f the same 
year, in which Nixon announced that US forces would no longer deal with subversion and 
guerrilla warfare. Halperin is supported by Robert M Citino, who states that:
“At various times in its history and in various places, the United 
States has emphasised a maritime strategy, a joint (naval-land) 
strategy, and a nuclear strategy based first on strategic bombers, 
then one based on a triad of bombers, submarines and Inter 
Continental Ballistic Missiles. In terms o f land operations it has a 
strong tradition o f manoeuver-based warfare dating back to the 
Revolutionary War and the Mexican War; it has an equally strong 
tradition o f firepower-based attrition war. The country’s formative 
military experience, the Civil War, saw a tremendous amount of 
both types. In fact, one might argue that it is precisely this 
fiexibility o f means that has been the principal characteristic of 
American war making over the years, rather than rigid adherence to 
one specific operational doctrine”.'^''
Paradoxically, the fact that W eigley’s position is not universally accepted strengthens the 
argument that in order to understand the context behind to US input to EBW, America's 
remote past must be studied in some detail.
US INPUT TO THE M ODERN EFFECTS PARADIGM  
Bovd’s QQDA Loop
Turning to the contemporary model o f EBW, USAF Colonel John Boyd might justifiably 
be thought o f as one o f its founding fathers. For US Vice President Dick Cheney, his 
influence was “clearly a factor” " '  in the success o f Operation Desert Shield. For General 
Charles Krulak, Commandant o f the US Marine Corps from 1995 to 1999, this praise falls 
well short of the mark. He dubbed Boyd “the architect o f America’s victory in the 
GliIF’'^ ,^ and believed that not only did that victory belong to Boyd, but that victory in the 
future would also belong to him.'^^ Boyd’s contribution to EBW was significant, even 
though much of it took place before the current effects paradigm emerged. Boyd noted 
that during the Korean War, US F-86 Sabres had a vastly superior kill ratio (ten to one) 
compared to Soviet-built M i G - 1 5 s . H e  concluded that the better visibility o f the F-86 
allowed US pilots to observe their opponents better, orientate themselves more quickly, 
decide what to do, and then act accordingly. He labelled this process the 'OODA loop'.
Robert M Citino, Op Cit, p 227. Chapter 7 is particularly informative. 
' Coram, Robert, John B oyd: A rch itec t o f  M odern Warfare. 
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Observe
Act Orientate
Decide
Figure 3 -  Boyd’s OODA Loop 
For Boyd, all rational human behaviour followed this process. Accordingly he applied 
his findings outside the cockpit, and in doing so he surmised that the enemy could be 
rendered powerless at any level o f warfare by denying him time to cope with a rapidly 
changing situation. The OODA loop is therefore a relational construct: it can be 
tightened (made quicker) by reducing friction within one’s own processes, or expanded 
(so that the decision-making process slows down) by increasing friction within the 
enemy’s processes.
From an effects perspective, Boyd’s work is significant in that it did not specify physical 
destruction. Rather, it targeted the enemy’s cognitive abilities, and it achieved its ends by 
exploiting the fourth dimension: time. Colin Gray notes that Boyd’s thinking:
“...can apply to the operational, strategic, and political levels o f war, 
as well as to tactics for aerial dogfights. The OODA loop may 
appear too humble to merit categorization as a grand theory, but that 
is what it is. It has an elegant simplicity, an extensive domain of 
applicability, and contains a high quality o f insight about strategic 
essentials, such that its author well merits honourable mention as an 
outstanding general theorist o f  strategy” .
It is highly likely that Boyd, a pragmatist by nature, would not have welcomed the label, 
but nonetheless he merits consideration as one o f the founding fathers o f the modern 
effects school.
The Systems Approach: Warden And Deptula
Boyd’s work paved the way for the next phase o f effects thinking. This took the form of 
systems framework analysis. In itself this is not a new development; indeed it first 
emerged in 1917, when Major Lord Tiverton advocated that decisive military, industrial
Colin S Gray, M odern S tra tegy, p 91.
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and transportation targets should be selectively bombed from the air.'^^ A modern 
version o f this model was used to telling effect during Operation Desert Storm. Credit for 
this belongs largely to two USAF airmen: Colonel John Warden, one o f the architects of 
the Gulf War air campaign; and M ajor General David A Deptula, Together they 
developed a systems approach to targeting which today forms the bedrock o f EBW 
thinking.
Warden viewed adversary states as systems of systems. He represented the systems of 
state (leadership, system essentials, country infrastructure, population, and fielded Forces) 
pictorially as a series o f concentric circles (Figure 4 ). Leadership is at the centre, 
surrounded and protected by the remaining rings, which in the normal course of war are 
attacked from the outside inwards in a predictable sequence. Leadership, the strategic 
prize, is usually the most difficult ring to access, whilst conversely fielded forces are 
usually attacked first, as they form the physical barrier to the remaining rings.
LEADERSHIP ^
FIELDED
SYSTEM
ESSENTIAL;
Figure 4 -  W arden’s Five Ring Model
Warden suggested that by the late 20th Century this ‘outside-inwards’ view had become 
redundant due to developments in air power. He postulated that this traditionally linear 
approach to warfare could now be circumvented, as the most critical - and indeed the 
most difficult to access - ring o f the enemy system, leadership, could now be targeted 
directly due to improvements in technology and precision. Consequently leadership 
could now be attacked physically from the outset o f the campaign rather than towards its 
end.'^^
Deptula developed the concept. He concluded that the days o f what he called 'sequential 
warfare’ were finally over, and that a new age - o f ‘parallel warfare’ - had emerged. 
Unlike its predecessor, the new model could achieve effective control over the systems 
which adversaries relied upon for power and influence: leadership, population, essential
' B oog, H, in C ox, Sebastian, ed, Sir A rthur H arris - D espa tch  on W ar O perations, London, ! 995 , p xl. 
' ”  T w elve years later on. Operation Iraqi Freedom  com m enced with two F -1 17 strike m issions against a 
senior Iraqi leadership com pound in Baghdad, where Saddam Hussein and other top regim e leaders were  
believed to be staying. Had this strike been successfu l, Iraqi Freedom would clearly have assumed a 
different course.
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industries, transportation and distribution, and forces."" Within Deptula’s model, each 
ring could be targeted simultaneously. The advantages o f this approach were clear: 
namely that enemy leadership could now be shocked into strategic paralysis at an early 
stage o f the war, and that fielded forces need not necessarily be attacked in great 
numbers, if at all. As a result, aircraft which previously would have been assigned 
against fielded forces could now be assigned to other tasks, such as applying more 
pressure to enemy leadership. This was a win-win situation. Not only did it capitalise on 
Boyd’s emphasis on time, but it followed every key tenet o f Manoeuvre Warfare. This 
was a defining moment in modern warfare, as from this point onwards timescales could 
be compressed as never before.
But for its architects there was a sting in the tail. Like Boyd, both Warden and Deptula 
were airmen; and these developments were viewed as products o f air thinking, and 
therefore air-centric in their outlook. Whilst Warden and Deptula intuitively understood 
the full significance of their work - the elastication o f time within a warfighting context - 
many non-airmen considered this development as no more than a question o f target 
prioritisation. Consequently they fundamentally misunderstood the leveraging effects 
that could now be achieved. As Deptula pithily observed:
“On February 15, 1991 the Iraq target planning cell received a 
report from the Central Command intelligence staff on the progress 
of the air campaign in accomplishing the electric target set 
objectives. The report stated that because all the individual
targets... were not destroyed or damaged to a specific 
percentage...the objective had not been met. In fact, the electrical 
system was not operating in Baghdad” "^....
Even though the required effect - no electricity in Baghdad - had been achieved, the 
prevailing culture demanded that targets be repeatedly attacked until all the extant 
damage criteria had been met. In this instance Deptula was able to overturn this decision 
and allocate aircraft to more pressing missions, but only after considerable effort on his 
part.
Crucially, this intervention was one o f the first documented examples o f modern EBW in 
action. It shows that even in the late 20th Century, target allocation was sub-optimal."'* 
Deptula continues:
“The effect desired by the air campaign planners...was not the 
destruction o f each o f the electrical sites; it was to stop temporarily 
the production o f electricity in certain areas o f Iraq...The 
determinant o f whether to act (with lethal or non-lethal means) to 
affect an individual site was whether the electrical system was 
operating in the area o f interest, not the level of damage, or lack
David A Deptula, ‘Effects B ased Operations: Change in three Nature o t  W arfare’, A erospace  E ducation  
Eoundation, Virginia, 2002 , p 6.
’ David A Deptula, ‘Effects B ased Operations: A  US P erspective’,/le r a sy m ’c E ducation /•'oundation. 
Virginia, 2002 , p 39.
In K osovo several targets were attacked repeatedly, in som e cases after they had already been reduced to 
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tliereof, to an individual site. During the war some Iraqi plant 
managers shut down their electrical plants to avoid targeting 
thereby creating our desired effect without exposing Coalition 
members to danger, and freeing up air resources for another task - 
Sun Tzu’s dictum fulfilled” .’'"
The coalition now had an unprecedented ability to deliver considerable amounts of 
ordnance very quickly - indeed more targets were attacked during the opening 24 hours of 
Desert Storm than by the 8th US Army Air Corps in its entirety during the years 1942 and 
1943 combined.’'’^  As a result, coalition forces could deliver effects across the full 
spectrum of operations in a manner previously deemed impossible. During the first 
ninety minutes o f Desert Storm more than fifty targets were attacked throughout Iraq. 
These targets involved all levels o f the military, from communications nodes and fighter 
bases in central Iraq, to command leadership bunkers north of Baghdad, communications 
exchanges inside Baghdad, and interceptor operations centres located as far away as 
K uw ait."’ This development heralded a new facet o f warfare: the simultaneous 
application o f force (the time dimension); across every level of war (exemplified by the 
variety o f targets attacked); without geographical restraint (the environment). This was 
parallel warfare in action, with time and space now being exploited in terms o\'effects 
rather than as media for enabling physical destruction.
One important by-product o f this approach was that fewer target sets now needed to be 
destroyed, and as a consequence less damage might now occur on the ground."'* Indeed 
by articulating his intent in terms o f effects, Deptula reduced the number o f bombs 
dropped against Iraqi Sector Operations Centres on the first night o f the war from eight to 
two. This action yielded the effects he sought, and at the same time it freed up 
significant firepower for use against other targets."^ This was another key step in the 
development o f EBW.
Completing the Circle: The Network
Deptula’s operational thinking dovetailed neatly with the US Department of Defense's 
embryonic vision for Network Centric Warfare (NCW). NOW promised a shift away 
from attrition-based warfare to a model that was characterised by self-synchronisation (in 
which forces organise themselves from the bottom up to meet commander's intent) and 
speed o f command (which would be facilitated by Information Superiority).*'"’ One o f the 
NCW ’s principal strengths lay in the fact that nations thus configured could articulate 
their objectives in terms o f massing effects rather than forces}'^^ Platforms would still be 
important, o f course, but the temptation to ‘bean count’ platforms - and their attendant 
capabilities - would reduce accordingly.
' " Deptula, ‘Effects Based Operations: A U S Perspective’, Op Cit.
Ibid, p 38.
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NCW and its UK equivalent, NEC, share much in common. But they are not identical, 
and it would be wrong to view them as such. In NCW the network is at the centre o f the 
process, whereas in NEC the network is merely an enabler; so whereas NCW signifies a 
fundamental shift in outlook - from platform-centric to network-centric warfare - the 
same holds true to a far lesser extent in NEC. In Cause or Effect? Professor Chris 
Bellamy notes that “ ...US authorities see EBOs as crucially dependent on Network- 
Enabled Capability. In other words, what is new is the networking that permits the results 
o f an attack on any target to be predicted and traced throughout the direct, indirect and 
cascading consequences that follow”."" He contrasts this with the British attitude to 
EBOs, which “ ...stresses the wider aspects o f the approach and, inevitably, leads to the 
conclusion that ...the new aspect which technology facilitates is the application o f effects 
to a wider audience”."^ Another difference between these two models is that NCW will 
by its very nature depend heavily on state o f the art technology, whereas N EC's cost 
burden will be of a lower order, as less technology is involved.
CONCLUSION
The methodology of balancing recent American thinking at the operational and tactical 
levels against America’s historical approach to warfare has unearthed a long and at times 
convoluted audit trail o f inputs to the EBW model. Some milestones are readily apparent: 
the contribution o f theorists such as Boyd, Warden and Deptula; the pivotal work of 
TRADOC; and Lind’s nudging o f the tiller in critical areas. However, other milestones 
are more obscure: the relevance o f DePuy, and M acNamara's flawed (but at the time 
widely accepted) mindset o f body counting. Yet without DePuy there would have been 
no revision of doctrine under Starry; and without MacNamara, the need for meaningful 
measurements o f effects would not have been so readily apparent. Accordingly, one of 
the key conclusions o f this chapter is that doctrine does not necessarily evolve, as Starry 
took great pains to start afresh and introduce originality wherever possible. This adds 
credence to Foucault’s claims, and hence it reinforces the possibility that, in similar vein, 
EBW might also be more than the sum o f previous experience.
The language o f effects entered the military lexicon during the 1991 Gulf War. and even 
before the lighting was over the media had begun to use it. Some military objectives 
were framed in terms o f effects, and media reports naturally mimicked this language. In 
similar vein, the nature o f the coalition - and in particular, America’s dominant role - was 
such that the new lexicon was swiftly embraced by coalition partners. This ensured that 
effects thinking would in due course permeate throughout NATO’s military forces, a 
process that continues to this day.
However, none o f these recent events take into account the role of Am erica's remote past. 
In this regard Weigley’s context provides much food for thought. The American Way o f  
War leaves little room for doubt that the US desire to seek overwhelming victory on the 
battlefield was never matched by a concomitant desire to set appropriate conditions for 
peace. For Weigley, this was a defining feature o f the American approach. And whilst 
Gray and Halperin disagree with him in some areas, ultimately they too strengthen the 
notion that America’s approach to warfare is truly unique. A deeper understanding o f 
America's historical legacy was thus useful in helping to set the context for America's 
wider contribution to EBW.
See Bellam y, Chris, ‘Cause or E ffect’, D efence D irector. Sept 2004, p 5. 
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A further important feature was unearthed by Eschevarria, who asserts that the American 
approach to war is, in fact, a way o f battle. This insightful revelation suggests that 
America's traditional view o f military action as an alternative to bargaining - rather than 
as a part o f  the bargaining process - is likely to continue unchecked unless conscious 
efforts are made to change it. Clearly this has implications for EBW, because if no 
change is forthcoming, future inputs to the model will necessarily be limited in their 
scope and significance. Indeed it is even possible that some previous inputs might 
become redundant. If  so, it is equally possible that EBW ’s survival could depend on 
America's willingness to transform its way of battle into a way of warfare.
CHAPTER 3: UK ORIGINS
‘'There are 2000 years o f  experience to tell us that the 
only thing harder than setting a new idea into the 
military mind is to get the old one out "
Sir Basil Liddell Hart 1895 - 1970
INTRODUCTION
This chapter assesses the UK input to EBW by analysing a series o f governmental papers. 
This approach reveals that with each successive paper, EBW development increased in 
some form. By the time the final paper referred to in this thesis was written - Just Eve 
years after the original one - EBW had coalesced around the concept o f EBA, an holistic 
approach to warfare unique to the UK.
The chapter opens with ‘The Origins o f EBA’, which assesses (from an efleets 
perspective) the 1999 UK Government White Paper Modernising Government.
This made explicit the government’s aspiration that henceforth departments would work 
more closely together in ‘the new electronic information age'. This requirement was a 
precondition for EBA, as departments which acted in isolation could not support a 
coherent pan-governmental approach to conflict. Therefore - albeit unknowingly - 
Modernising Government presaged EBA’s germination, partly as a result o f its emphasis 
on outcomes rather than on process. Next is a review o f the Nev' Chapter to the 1998 
Strategic Defence Review, Prompted by the terrorist attacks of 9 /11, this demanded even 
more coherence across all government departments. Importantly, it stated that military 
options would in the future be framed in terms o f desired effects; and from this point 
onwards EBA moved forwards substantively. The next section, 'Network Centric 
Capability (NCC)’, shows how an effects model was predicated with a robust network at
M odern ising G overnm ent, HM  Governm ent W hite Paper, Cm 4310 , 'the Stationery O ffice. 1999.
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ils core. Thereafter, ‘the network’ would be a defining feature o f the paradigm. NCC is 
not analysed further, however, as its development is outside the scope o f this thesis.
The chapter then addresses ‘EBA Consolidation’. This started in July 2002 with the issue 
of a supporting adjunct to the New Chapter, which added detail to five previously 
identified strategic effects and showed their linkage to knowledge superiority and 
downstream effects. This is followed by a brief review of Delivering Securily in a 
Changing World, issued in December 2003, which used the term ‘effects based 
operations and planning’ for the first time; hence this key paper clarified the 
government's effects vision. During this period some o f the UK's most influential 
conceptual work took place on the effects model. The chapter ends with a warning, 
noting that the EBA model is incomplete because the government has yet to develop an 
overarching national philosophy that applies to all government departments. 
Consequently, whilst the UK model might appear to be sound conceptually, nonetheless it 
suffers from an identifiable weakness in process. Paradoxically, this was the very area 
that the government sought to address in the original Paper. Finally, it should be noted 
that combined UK / US inputs to EBW are outside the scope of this chapter, as is the 
operational level model, EBO, a product o f US thinking.
THE ORIGINS OF EBA
The mindset which underpins EBA can be traced back to the 1999 UK Government 
White Paper entitled Modernising Government. In the introduction, Jack Cunningham 
MP stated that:
"...we need all parts o f government to work together better. We need 
Joined-up government. We need integrated government. And we need to 
make sure that government services are brought forward using the best 
and most modern techniques...which link in to a range o f government 
Departments and especially electronic information-age services”.
His message was frank. If government departments worked better together, government 
could make life better for everyone. The accrued benefits would apply at all levels, 
ranging from day to day practices at police stations and local councils at one end o f the 
spectrum, to the delivery o f national strategic objectives at the other end. Greater 
coherence and integration would inevitably ensue, and Britain would thus witness "joined 
up government in action”."" Modernising Government noted that whilst ‘‘many policies 
are rightly developed and pursued by a single part o f government, a focus on outcomes 
[would] encourage Departments to work together...” .'"'* Henceforth outcomes as opposed 
to process would form a pillar o f pan-governmental business, with policy being designed 
"around shared goals and carefully defined results, not around organisational structures or 
existing functions”.'""
Government departments were quick to pick up on these messages. The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) Departmental Report for 2001 noted that ‘‘success depends
Delivering Security in a  C hanging W orld, Cm 6041-1, The Stationery O ffice, July 2004. 
M odern ising G overnm ent, Intro.
)51
i ? - l
Ibid, Executive Summary. 
Ibid, Section 2.
Ibid.
51
on working closely together with other Government Departments and non-Government 
actors, both in the UK and abroad” .""  By the time this report was published, the FCO, 
together with the Department for International Development (DflD) and the MOD, had 
set up two joint conflict prevention funds: one for Africa, and the other for the rest of the 
w o r l d .W h i l s t  this initiative cannot be traced back directly to Modernising 
Government, nonetheless it occurred shortly afterwards. Given the level o f pan- 
governmental liaison that was taking place at this time, it is extremely unlikely that this 
work was conducted within a vacuum.
From an effects perspective Modernising Government merits scrutiny for three reasons. 
First, it identified that government departments had not always worked as closely together 
as they could have done. The Labour Party had noted this weakness prior to its landslide 
victory in 1997, and it had resolved to tighten the working relationship between 
departments as soon as possible after the election. Second, the emphasis on outcomes 
signified a fundamental shift in outlook. The full implications o f this shift were not 
appreciated at the time, but they became increasingly evident shortly afterwards. Third, 
the paper clarified the linkages between strategic planning and outcomes. This soon 
became one o f the central tenets o f both the new ‘electronic information age' and the 
‘effects thinking’ mindset that followed the report. Accordingly, Modernising 
Government subtly - and almost unnoticed - presaged the effects model o f holistic 
decision-making.
The “New Chapter”
The catalyst for embracing this new methodology took the form of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks in New York and Washington. In the aftermath of these attacks the UK Secretary 
o f State for Defence drew up et New Chapter to the 1998 Strategic Defence Review 
(SDR). This work, published in July 2002, analysed the UK's defence posture in light of 
the revised security situation. It sought to ensure that the government had "...the right 
concepts, the right capabilities and the right forces to meet the additional challenges we 
now face”.'"" And it made explicit the fact that the MOD was not working in isolation, 
and that its Endings would apply to all government departments.
The New Chapter covered four themes. Two in particular contributed directly to the 
nascent EBA. The first was that “political, diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, 
financial, intelligence and law enforcement, as well as military, measures” should become 
more coherent in the future."^ The second was that military options would henceforth be 
framed in terms o f desired effects, rather than in terms of capabilities or platforms. This 
was a radical departure from previous practice, and it marked the genesis o f the UK's 
EBA mindset. The New Chapter proffered four conclusions, two of which were 
particularly relevant to EBA:
• “We must aim for ‘knowledge superiority’ over international terrorists to anticipate 
their plans and ensure the most effective combination of effects to counter their 
attacks;
FCO Departmental Report 2001, Chapter 14.
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• The main sorts o f military effect we can bring to bear are to prevent, deter, coerce, 
disrupt or destroy our opponents” ,""
Network Centric Capability (NCC)
The first conclusion linked knowledge superiority directly to EBA. In future, knowledge 
would be garnered through a Network-Centric Capability (NCC) which would "...collect, 
fuse and disseminate accurate, timely and relevant information with much greater rapidity 
(sometimes in a matter o f only minutes, or even in ‘real time") to help provide a common 
understanding among commanders at all levels”.'" ' NCC would tie together the disparate 
elements that were needed to support the delivery o f precise and controlled military 
effects. In order to do this it would comprise three strands: "...sensors (to gather 
information); a network (to fuse, communicate and exploit the information); and strike 
assets to deliver military effect”.'"'  ^ No deadline was set for N C C 's implementation, but it 
soon became clear that the concept might be able to improve operational capability.
But not everyone was convinced. For some, the rapid growth o f new acronyms was in 
itself enough to cause confusion, especially when they were misused; this happened a lot 
during this early, acronym-rich period. For others, NCC belonged to the realms of 
science fiction. They viewed it as an aspiration too far, believing that it presupposed 
advances in technology that would not be achievable for many years.
These concerns were not without precedent. Indeed at that time the UK Arm y's 
BOWMAN project was experiencing significant birthing pains. Designed to bring 
internet-style communications to the battlefield, BOWMAN, like NCC, demanded highly 
advanced technology. Unlike NCC, however, it needed that technology immediately, and 
this was proving to be an insurmountable challenge. In July 2001, already some 9 years 
behind schedule, the £1.9 billion contract was taken away from the original contractors 
(Archer, led by the BAe Consortium) and awarded to Computing Devices Canada, an arm 
of US-based General Dynamics.'"" BOWMAN officially entered service in March 2004. 
The saga continues, however. On 5 January 2005, Brigadier Jamie Balfour, the Army's 
Director o f Infantry, advised his troops that “ it is as bad as you've heard. But we have 
been told that, politically, we have got to make it work. Now you guys will have to go 
out and find a way o f making it work.” His briefing concluded with the words "hang on 
to your cellphones.” '"'' With this in mind, similar reservations about NCC were not 
necessarily wholly misplaced.'""
Mindful o f similar criticisms, the New Chapter noted that it would be “...less useful to try 
to measure eombat power in crude terms o f numbers o f platforms and people than in 
terms of our ability to deliver specific effects, with a robust network at the core, linking
Ibid para 11.
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key capabilities and enabling force multipliers” . ’^ '^ This comment reinforced M OD's 
intent to shift the emphasis away from platform-CQnivxo, warfare towards EBA. and at the 
same time it confirmed that ‘the network’ would be a key element within the wider 
effects paradigm.
NCC was subsequently re-branded Network Enabled Capability (NEC). This remains the 
extant term. Its outputs are expected to be greater precision in the application offeree, 
and greater rapidity o f effect (by shortening the time required to assimilate information, 
take decisions, and then act upon them). NEC is a complex topic, and it merits study in 
its own right. And whilst its role within EBA is self-evident, there is not space within this 
thesis to delve further into matters o f detail. However, this ought not detract from the 
central issue: namely that NEC it is an integral part o f EBA.
EBA CONSOLIDATION
In .luly 2002. a supporting adjunct added detail to the New ( hapter. Entitled The 
Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter Supporting Informal ion & Analysis}^^^ it 
highlighted the international terrorist threat in the round, and offered a brief overview of 
extant UK doctrine and concepts. It also suggested a conceptual framework for a military
contribution to “the Campaign Against International Terrorism A b r o a d " .s h o w n  below.
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This matrix was based on lessons learned as well as on theoretical knowledge, and it 
served as a foundation for the work that would shortly follow. In particular, it added 
detail to the live strategic effects originally outlined in the Chapter, and it showed 
their linkages to knowledge superiority (at the input end o f the process) and downstream 
elTects (at the output end). Moreover, it postulated that knowledge superiority comprised 
three strands: detect (such as the emergence o f terrorist organisations); understand (for 
example, the nature o f the threat in terms o f value sets); and influence (maintaining public 
support and sharing knowledge with allies and partners). Its central message was clear, 
direct and unambiguous: that ‘effects thinking’ was different from the model it was about 
to replace, and that it was here to stay.
A further White Paper was published in December 2003. Entitled Delivering Security in 
a Changing World, it stated that the UK would “continue to develop effects based 
operations and planning, [thereby] maximising the combined contributions o f our 
available capabilities to achieving decisive military effect” . ’ Picking up one o f the 
Modernising Government thxQd^ds, it noted that the MOD would “work with other 
government departments, particularly the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the 
Department for International Development,_to ensure that military effects-based planning 
complements wider strategic planning and the cross-government effort on crisis 
prevention and management” .’™ It also noted that:
“ Effects-Based Operations is a new phrase, but it describes an approach to 
the use of force that is well established - that military force exists to serve 
political or strategic ends. We need a new way o f thinking about this that is 
more relevant to today’s strategic environment. Strategic effects are 
designed to deliver the military contribution to a wider cross-governmental 
strategy and are focused on desired outcomes. Our conventional military 
superiority now allows us more choice in how we deliver the effect we wish 
to achieve. We have begun to develop our military capabilities so that we 
can provide as wide as possible a range o f options to fulfil operational 
objectives without necessarily resorting to traditional atlritional warfare.
Some effects can also be delivered entirely outside the context o f active 
operations, for example through Defence Diplomacy activities as part of 
long-term conflict prevention”.
This statement clarified the effects vision, albeit on the back o f two dubious assumptions: 
that the UK has conventional military superiority (line 8);*™ and that warfare is 
traditionally attritional (line 13). That said, its wider implications were not lost on non­
domestic audiences. In 2004, at a Command and Control Search and Technology 
Symposium on The Power o f  Information Age Concepts and Technologies, Australia’s 
Defence Science and Technology Organisation noted that EBA:
“ ...has implications for operations other than war, and for National and 
Military strategy. At the strategic level, the effects-based approach is o f
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as much relevance to “winning the peace” as it is to winning wars, in 
fact the effects-based approach is a concept that may impact on National 
security and National prosperity in profound and challenging ways”.’^^
Shortly before this symposium took place, the UK MOD added a further three strategic 
elTects to the original five: stabilise (by setting secure and stable conditions appropriate to 
subsequent political and economic action); contain (by limiting or restraining the spread, 
duration or influence of an adversary or crisis); and defeat (by reducing the effectiveness 
o f an adversary so that he is no longer able to conduct combat operations).'™ In March 
2004, these were further outlined in Joint Doctrine Publication 01 Joint Operations, 
together with the caveat that “ ...the 8 strategic effects... are not intended to be 
exclusive."'™ Thus, rather than being prescriptive, their purpose was twofold: to bring 
clarity to potential military tasks, and to guide those involved in the planning processes.
In July 2004, a further pamphlet was issued: Delivering Security in a Changing World - 
Future Capabilities. This commented on “ ...the need to strike the right balance of 
capabilities for expeditionary operations to meet the demand of our eight strategic 
effects” .'™ Stressing “the importance o f the continued transformation of our forces to 
concentrate on the characteristies o f speed, precision, agility, deployability, reach and 
sustainability”, it made it clear that NEC would be at the heart of this transformation: 
“ ...Key to this is our ability to exploit the benefits o f Network Enabled Capability, 
precision munitions and the development o f effects based planning and operations”.’™ 
The full scope of NEC was revealed as comprising:
“...the coherent integration o f sensors, decision-makers and weapon 
systems along with support capabilities. NEC will enable us to operate 
more effectively in the future strategic environment through the more 
efficient sharing and exploitation o f information within the UK Armed 
Forces and with our coalition partners. This will lead to better situational 
awareness across the board, facilitating improved decision-making, and 
bringing to bear the right military capabilities at the right time to achieve 
the desired military effect. This enhanced capability is about more than 
equipment; we will exploit the benefits to be obtained from transformed 
doctrine and training, and optimised command and control structures.
The ability to respond more quickly and precisely will act as a force 
multiplier enabling our forces to achieve the desired effect through a 
smaller number o f more capable linked assets”.'™
This was a timely and useful statement. Less useful, however - at least to those who 
wished to preserve the scale o f the UK ’s Armed Forces - was the sting in the tail: that 
because EBA could deliver greater effect, it would need fewer resources to do so.
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Codifying The ‘Effects Pyram id’
The next logical step in the formalisation process would have been to define the pinnacle 
o f the effects pyramid - for example, by creating an overarching national philosophy that 
would apply equally to all governmental departments. EBA would be represented at the 
next level, converting theory into practice, and below this would be EBO, the military 
strand, together with its non-military equivalents. These strands could then cascade into 
their constituent elements: Effects Based Planning, Effects Based Targeting, and so on. 
This methodology would have resulted in an audit trail tying the top o f the pyramid to the 
bottom, and vice-versa; thus completing the ‘effects loop’. Yet, surprisingly, no such 
codification has taken place. Indeed almost nothing has been written about EBA other 
than by military sources. Consequently the top two tiers o f the effects pyramid comprise 
a single compressed stratum. This realisation raises four important questions regarding 
responsibility and process. First, who is responsible for co-ordinating EBA at the 
governmental level? Second, who is responsible for managing national strategy on a day- 
to-day basis during conflict? Third, who is responsible for managing the day-to-day 
strategic effect o f stabilising (setting secure and stable conditions appropriate to 
subsequent political and economic action)? And finally, what mechanism will ensure that 
the effects process is adhered to by all who are expected to participate? At present there 
are no answers to these questions. This exposes a fundamental weakness within the 
paradigm, which, if left untended, has the potential to negate much that has been achieved 
thus far.
CONCLUSION
Several important conclusions emerge from this study. The first is that EBA is an 
original, holistic approach to warfare that is unique to the UK. Unlike most earlier 
models, it was predicated upon the notion o f Joined up government. This condition did 
not exist prior to New Labour’s election. Ft ad it done so, the new government would not 
have wasted so much effort on producing White Papers which called for greater 
coherence at the pan-governmental level. M odernising Government was therefore, albeit 
unwittingly, instrumental in setting the conditions for EBA to take root.
It is also clear that this UK input to EBW began only relatively recently. The same White 
Paper which called for joined up government also emphasised the need for a coherent 
approach regarding outcomes as opposed to process. Tempting as it is to trivialise this 
shift in outlook, this change was indeed significant; because in seeking how best to 
articulate outcomes, embracing a lexicon of effects was but a short step away. This step 
was removed with the publication o f the Wew Chapter, which demanded that military 
options should henceforth be framed in terms o f desired effects. Indeed by defining five 
specific effects at the strategic level - prevent, deter, coerce, disrupt and destroy - the New 
Chapter marked the formal genesis o f an effects mindset. From this point onwards, the 
emergence o f UK effects doctrine began in earnest.
Equally noteworthy is the fact that the New Chapter linked knowledge superiority to 
EBA. It did this by stating that EBA could only work if commanders at all levels shared 
a common understanding. During Total W ar this might happen as a matter o f routine, but 
at most other times this was simply not the case. NCC would remedy this omission. 
Hence the new paradigm, with a robust network at its core, sought to deliver effects by 
linking capabilities to enabling activities. From this point onwards, counting numbers of
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platforms - the standard military method o f gauging strength - gave way to an approach 
within which capabilities would deliver effects.
This was a fundamental shift in outlook, and it had profound implications for the UK 's 
armed forces. These only became appreciated in full when the UK found itself engaged 
simultaneously in Iraq and Afghanistan, and calls o f ‘overstretch' increased at all levels 
within the military. By this point, however, the attendant reductions in platform numbers 
were irreversible. One is left to ponder on the extent to which the desire to embrace 
EBA’s capabilities over the usual measure o f platforms played a role in reducing the 
UK's military forces. If  so, this would indeed be ironic, given the Delivering Security in 
a Changing World - Future Capabilities “ ...need to strike the right balance o f capabilities 
for expeditionary operations to meet the demand of our ...strategic effects”.
The .luly 2002 supporting adjunct to the New Chapter was another key document, in that 
it made clear that EBA was the model o f choice, and that it was here to stay. This left no 
room for doubt among dissenters, and it is no coincidence that during this period the 
military began vigorously to support the concept. The fact that the military responded to 
these governmental papers, rather than the government responding to military calls for a 
new model o f warfare, shows that EBA was not driven by the military. This realisation 
comes as something o f a surprise. Within the UK, EBA is one of the few models of 
warfare that did not stem directly from military sources.
There are two more important eonclusions, however. The first was expressed in 2004 by 
Australia's Defence Science and Technology Organisation, which noted that “the effects- 
based approach is a concept that may impact on National security and National prosperity 
in profound and challenging ways”. This telling observation hints at the magnitude o f the 
UK’s input to EBW. The second conclusion is far more recent: that EBA is unlikely to 
achieve its potential if flaws are allowed to remain within the model. The fact that no 
overarching national philosophy applies to all governmental departments - even today - 
suggests that EBA on paper is likely to be a very different entity to EBA in actuality.
If EBA is to succeed, this matter must be addressed. Finessing this requirement could 
prove to be as significant an input as any which have taken place thus far within the UK.
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CHAPTER 4: OPERATIONAL CASE STUDIES
"The human story does not always unfold like a mathematical calculation on the principle 
that tM>o and two make four. Sometimes in life they make five or minus three; 
and sometimes the blackboard topples down in the middle o f  the sum and leaves 
the class in disorder and the pedagogue with a black eye'’.
Winston Spencer Churchill (1874-1965)
INTRODUCTION
This chapter adds substance to the conceptual elements of the thesis by analysing four 
historical case studies. From an EBW perspective these involve increasing levels of 
complexity. They are: Operation Chastise, the Dambusters raid o f 16/17 May 1943; 
Operation Black Buck, the Vulcan bombing raids conducted against Port Stanley airfield 
from 1 May to 12 June 1982; Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, NATO’s final act of 
warfare in the 20"’ Century; and Operation Phantom Fury, the coalition forces' 2004 
assault on Fallujah. These studies are viewed retrospectively, mindful that some details 
known today were not known at the time; and that attitudes and culture change 
constantly, hence today’s interpretation o f events may differ significantly from those in 
the past. The studies are serutinised in increasing detail, with each one serving as a 
springboard for analysing the next study. The purpose of this section is not to critique 
these operations per se, nor to seek specific weaknesses within the underlying planning 
methodologies; but rather to use them as frameworks for analysis so that pertinent EBW 
themes may be identified.
Operations Chastise and Black Buck achieved strategic effects in locations previously 
considered to be relatively safe from attack. Both examples were predicated upon the use 
o f air power, but it is important to note that in each case the attendant secondary and 
tertiary effects were not sought purely to make the ongoing air task significantly easier. 
Indeed these operations were conducted mindful o f the potential benefits to all three 
services. That said, some of the effects that occurred were not as predicted. This 
realisation highlights a potential flaw within the contemporary EBW model: that despite
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best intelligence and cultural awareness, and an unprecedented level o f computer power, 
the effects envisaged during the planning process cannot be guaranteed. These two 
examples illustrate, using relatively simple scenarios, the linkage between primary, 
secondary and tertiary effects. They also reveal linkage between the tactical, operational 
and strategic levels o f warfare, showing how effects at one level can impact upon the 
other levels.
Operation Allied Force is another example o f air power in action, but on this occasion the 
nascent effects model was in place. Nonetheless, despite significant damage on the 
ground, the picture that emerges in one in which Milosevic clearly failed to understand 
the nature of the campaign that was being waged against him. He capitulated in just 78 
days, but had he understood NA TO’s abilities and intentions earlier, it is possible that he 
would have capitulated sooner. Had he done so, the overall level o f humanitarian 
suffering would have reduced accordingly. This stark realisation suggests that Operation 
Allied Force was not effects-driven.
The focus then shifts to Fallujah. This example was picked because it is the most recent, 
complete coalition operation conducted to date. Fought against the backdrop of an 
increasingly mature EBW model, it provides telling insights into how battles are fought in 
the early part of the 2 0 ’ Century. In effects terms it therefore heralds a likely way ahead 
for operations in the immediate future. Unlike the previous three examples, this was truly 
joint. Consequently it provides a degree o f balance to counter any suspicions that the 
previous air examples might, by their very nature, only reveal partial truths about the 
utility of EBW.
HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES 
OPERATION CHASTISE
Operation Chastise sought to deprive the German arms industry o f water supplies 
in order to cause a “disaster o f the first magnitude”.’™ Its primary effect was almost 
instantaneous. Yet the dams were soon repaired, and ultimately the disaster was o f a 
lesser magnitude than had originally been intended. In purely physical terms the 
Germans recovered from the primary effects o f the raid relatively swiftly. But the raid's 
cognitive effects were more enduring. In Britain the mission received significant and 
prolonged media coverage, due both to the heady cocktail of its precision and sheer 
audacity, and to the technical and scientific acumen o f ‘backroom boffins’ such as Barnes 
Wallis.
The positive morale effects soon spilled into occupied Europe. This was aided by an air­
dropped leaflet campaign showing ‘before and after’ photographs o f the Mohne and Eder 
dams, and explaining the significance o f the raid. The underlying message was clear: that 
although Britain had in fact had little opportunity to fight back thus far, its resolve to 
prevail in the face o f extremely poor odds was beyond question. In modern effects 
parlance this message targeted six distinct cognitive domains: the British people, Britain's 
allies, neutrals, the enemy civilian population, enemy military forces, and enemy 
leadership.
A ccording to Barnes W allis. See http://www.nationalarchives.gov.iik/danibusters/ldea.htm
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The effects on German morale were more difficult to quantify, but what was readily 
apparent was that the psychological effect o f the raids permeated all levels o f Germany's 
political, economic, social and military infrastructures. It had been known from the outset 
that the Germans would need to divert significant manpower to the dams in order to 
repair them; and indeed after the raid some 20 000 men were transferred from the Atlantic 
Wall and tasked with completing the job before the autumn rains began. A further 10 000 
German troops were also diverted from their primary tasks in order to guard the dams. 
I ’hey were to remain in place throughout the war.™'
Operation Chastise would probably have taken plaee whether all these details had been 
known in advance or not. However, the point o f this example is to show that whilst the 
raids' primary effects were limited in duration, the wider effects lasted throughout the war 
- and indeed in some cases for many years afterwards. If all o f the effects are mapped 
out, the following structure emerges. Physical temporary (first order - breaching the 
dams; second order - damage to industry; need to rebuild dams; third order - work 
delayed on Atlantic Wall); physical permanent (10 000 guards transferred until the final 
stages o f the war to protect the dams); cognitive enemy (vulnerability o f dams / high value 
targets irrespective o f location; need to reinforce them for the remainder o f the war;
British scientific and technical know-how; existence o f a new and highly specialised RAF 
night-time precision capability; British resolve); cognitive neutral (same as cognitive 
enemy); cognitive friendly  (as above, plus bolster to morale). These were all desirable 
effects. O f course there were also undesirable effects, the most obvious being crew 
losses; but these had been considered in advance, and when viewed in terms of plusses 
versus minuses, the mission was deemed an acceptable risk.
Chastise is best known today for the primary physical effects it achieved. Less well 
known, however, were the many attendant psychological effects that the planners sought. 
In the event, the full web o f effects was wider than had been anticipated. This is the first 
key conclusion that emerges from these studies.
OPERATION BLACK BUCK
Moving forwards by four decades, in many respects Operation Black Buck was the 
Chastise o f its day. Vast distances were involved (3900 miles each way); exceptional 
demands were placed on the participants, with each bombing flight lasting for 
approximately 16 hours; and many of the assoeiated teehnological and logistic challenges 
were unprecedented.'™
The first raid placed a bomb on the centre o f the runway. The primary effect of this was 
to stop the Argentineans from using the airfield until essential repairs had been carried 
out. However, the most significant and enduring effects were felt at the strategic and 
operational levels - and these were all secondary and tertiary effects. At the strategic 
level, the UK proved that it had the ability to strike deep inside Argentina. This sent a 
powerful message to the enemy leadership as well as to the Argentine population. For 
neutrals this mission was tantamount to a UK declaration of war, and this was clearly 
understood by the international community. Within the UK the raid forced those still 
uncommitted to ‘get off the fence'. Ultimately it generated overwhelming support for the 
British Prime Minister.
' ^  ' ww w.nationalarchives.gov.uk/dam busters/legacy.htm
For a more com plete analysis o f  the raids see http://www.raf.m od.uk/falklands/bb.htm l
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Al the operational level, Argentine aircraft were unable to use the airfield in the short 
term. More importantly, though, the sole Dassault Mirage 111 squadron based on the 
Islands was quickly withdrawn to Argentina to protect the mainland. This directly 
increased the operational freedom o f the UK Task Force. Within the UK, the raid 
bolstered the credibility o f the long-range force projection concept, which at that time was 
still largely unproven.
At the tactical level the raid undermined the morale o f the conscripts who experienced it 
at first hand, for they had no reason to believe that they would not be targeted again in the 
future (and indeed they were, on another five occasions). This undermining o f morale 
spilled over to other conscripts based on the Islands, and it reinforced the point that what 
had previously been thought o f as something o f a jape in Argentina was being treated 
with the complete sincerity by the British,™
The raid also affected the morale o f UK forces, but in this case morale was strengthened 
because it was now clear that Air Power would not be one-sided when the ground fighting 
began. And the fact that the raid had been unopposed and successful, despite the 
tremendous difficulties involved in mounting it, gave the RAF the confidence to continue 
with another five Black Buck missions.
Black Buck was conceived o f and executed using an effects mindset, albeit the language 
of the time did not replicate the effects language o f today.™'* An effects schematic for the 
initial raid is shown below.™^ Effects on the Argentineans are shown in bold; for neutrals 
they are in italics; and for the UK they are in ordinary typeface. The positive column 
indicates desired effeets from the UK perspective.
r  BLACK BUCK Raid
Prim aiy Effects
Cognitive Physical
+ - +
Vulnerability o f Nil Runway Nil
airfield to____________  Cratered
TiiïW ifAl^*i^i*àtefuI to numerous Falklands veterans for providing this information.
R ead^fW K king further detail should read Admiral Sand^W%G@%tRI*IPP^$onal account o f  the
cam paign, O ne H undred D ays: The M em oirs o f  the FalklaniJafB& tëiïQyüilfitfAmnum der, London, Harper
Collins, 1992, and in particular Chapter 7; and Freedman, Sir Lawrence, The O fficial H istory  o f  the
h a lk la n d  Islands C am paign Volume One: The O rigins o f  the Falklands l ia r .  Routledge, London, 2005.
This is drawn from many first hand accounts g iven  by officers attending the UK M ilitary’s Advanced
Command and S ta ff Course a t  Shrivenliaiu., , „  , _  - r r r  ,Figure 6 - Black Buck Primary Effects
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Secondary Effects
Cognitive
i i
Physical
+
1
Vulnerability of Nil Withdrawal of
mainland to air M irage III
attack squadron to protect
mainland
Vulnerability of
troops to air attack Preparations to
counter further
Lower morale o f raids
conscripts
Logistic disruption
UK ‘déclaration o f expected
War ’
Greater operational
freedom for Task
Force
Increased morale o f
UK Forces
Increased Support for
UK Prime Minister
Nil
Figure 7 - Black Buck Secondary Effects
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Tertiary Effects
Cognitive Physical
+ +
Bolster concept o f 
long-range force 
projection
Demonstrate Air 
Power availability 
during lighting 
phase
Acceptable risk in 
mounting additional 
BLACK BUCK 
missions
Nil Loss o f local Air Superiority around 
Falklands
Gain in local Air 
Superiority around 
Falklands Islands
Nil
Figure 8 - Black Buck Tertiary Effects
The effects shown above are positive from the UK perspeetive. Effects that would have 
benefited the Argentineans would have appeared in the negative columns. However, in 
this example no negative effects were perceived.
The Black Buck example show how effects cascade into progressively smaller elements. 
Thus, although individual effects should be assessed on their own merits, it is equally 
important that the wider effect cascade be assessed as an entity in itself. This step would 
then allow all relevant findings to be considered in relation to the overall strategic picture. 
This is the second key conclusion o f this chapter.
KOSOVO CASE STUDY: OPERATION ALLIED FORCE
Operation Allied Force, NA TO’s final act o f 20"' Century warfare, provides much fertile 
ground with respect to EBW. For those who claim that military operations have always 
been fought for effect - and hence there is no requirement to codify effects thinking - this 
example proves conclusively that whilst there is an element of truth in this assertion, the 
effects that are delivered are not necessarily those that were envisaged during planning. 
This omission is something that the modern effects paradigm seeks to address.
The military objective declared to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 15 April 
1999 by William S. Cohen, the US Secretary o f Defence, was to:
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“ ...degrade and damage the military and security structure that President 
Milosevic (Yugoslav President) has used to depopulate and destroy the 
Albanian majority in Kosovo” .*™
Cohen's Focus was thus on the physical domain, with particular emphasis on destruction. 
This was echoed by General Wes Clark, who described the goals o f the NATO air 
campaign as being “to ‘disrupt, degrade, devastate, and ultimately destroy' Yugoslav 
military forces as well as the facilities and infrastructure that supported them”. 
Interestingly, when speaking to the House o f Commons on this matter, the UK's Defence 
Secretary, Geoffrey Robertson, framed his emphasis somewhat differently: “our military 
objective - our clear, simple military objective - will be to reduce the Serbs' capacity to 
repress the Albanian population and thus to avert a humanitarian disaster” .’***
Milosevic capitulated to NATO after 78 days o f intense air activity, mindful of the 
increasing potential for a ground invasion. The following statistics, taken at the end of 
the campaign, reveal how Cohen’s military objective was delivered:
• Belgrade was largely without electric power.
• 30% of all military and civilian radio relay networks were damaged.
• 70% of all road and 50% o f rail bridges across the Danube were down.
• Petroleum refining facilities were 100% destroyed.
• Explosive production capacity was 50% destroyed or damaged.
Ammunitions production was 65% destroyed or damaged.
• Aviation and armoured vehicle repair was 70% and 40% respectively destroyed or 
damaged.
At the end of the campaign, General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs o f 
Staff, stated that he did not “ ...believe that Milosevic ever understood the level o f damage 
that an expertly executed air eampaign could achieve” .*™ This conclusion begs several 
key questions, such as: would Milosevic have reacted differently had he understood from 
the outset the level o f damage that he faced? Why was his understanding o f NA TO's 
potential so poor - was it a failure on his part or on NA TO’s? Had he understood 
N A TO 's abilities and intent sooner, would he have capitulated sooner - and if so, could 
the humanitarian suffering that occurred during the later stages o f the conflict have been 
reduced?'™ How would any (or all) o f the foregoing have impacted upon the physical.
Statement o f  the Honourable W illiam  S Cohen. See http://w w w .fas.0rg/m an/c0ngress/l 999 /99-04- 
15cohen.htm (Federation o f  Am erican Scientists).
Cited in Ivo H, D aa ld erN  and O ’Hanlon, ME: W inning Ugly: N A TO 's W ar to Save K osovo, 
W ashington, Brookings Institution Press, 2000 , p 116.
Ibid.
'Cohen, Siielton Say N A T O 's Patience, Precision Paid O f f .  
http ://w w w .defenselink .m il/new s/Junl999/n06111999 9906113.htm l
This is particularly relevant in light o f  R obinson’s com m ent to the H ouse o f  Com m ons. The answer o f  
course is ‘y e s ’ because M ilosev ic  inflicted suffering in K osovo throughout the war. During this period 
nearly one m illion K osovar ethnic Albanians w ere displaced and thousands were killed.
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economic and psychological costs o f rebuilding Kosovo? And finally, and this is perhaps 
the key question form an EBW perspective, would the conflict have taken a different 
course had Milosevic’s cognitive domain been better targeted?
Cohen’s military objective was couched in terms o f damage and degradation. It did not 
specify ‘soft effects’ like influence, deterrence, coercion, or persuasion. Considerable 
damage ensued as the war progressed, and this impacted upon Yugoslavia’s military and 
security structures - its primary targets - exactly as intended. But it also impacted on the 
wider populace, and it influenced the opinion o f neutral parties - although in truth, by this 
stage o f the conflict the depravity o f Serbia’s conduct had all but alienated most all of 
M ilosevic's external support.
The key question is surely ‘what made Milosevic concede’? According to the M OD's 
Kosovo Lessons From the Crisis document, “we will probably never know exactly, but it 
is clear that the effective application o f military pressure was fundamental to the 
achievement o f our objectives. The following factors are likely to have been those most 
influential:
• The continuing solidarity o f the Alliance, and M ilosevic's inability to divide the 
Allies, despite repeated attempts;
• The determination o f the international community, including the states of the 
region and, crucially, Russia, to force him to accept a negotiated solution;
• The continued increase in tempo o f the air operations, and the damage and 
disruption they had caused, and were likely to continue to cause if operations 
continued, to the command and control and operations of his security forces;
• His indictment by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
and the indictment o f four other key members o f his regime, which would have 
added to the pressure on him and those around him;
• And the build-up o f ground forces in the region, the confirmation at the NATO 
Summit that all options remained under review, and the suggestions from the UK 
and other Allies that an opposed ground entry operation could not be ruled ouf'.''^^
All o f the above factors bar one were soft effects: solidarity of the Alliance; 
determination o f the international community; damage and disruption likely to ensue; 
increased pressure on Milosevic and those around him; the build-up o f  ground forces 
(coercion). In other words, not one effect arose out of Cohen's stated military objective. 
If one assumes that they did not occur fortuitously - and this is not an unreasonable 
assumption - NATO’s underlying planning methodology would appear to be somewhat 
suspect. Moreover, post-conflict reports make little mention of the Yugoslavian populace 
applying pressure to Milosevic; yet many o f Yugoslavia’s elite had considerable financial 
interests in the industrial and economic targets that NATO was bombing, and it is 
inconceivable that at least some of these highly influential figures would not have sought 
actively to prevent the erosion o f their powerbases once they realised that NATO 
intended fully to increase its bombing campaign until Milosevic conceded. Indeed had it 
chosen to do so, NATO could with relative ease have applied pressure to these key 
f'igures; and had this elite group had been persuaded o f NATO’s intentions early on.
R A N D  Research Brief, Operation Allied Force: Lessons for the Future^ 2001. 
w w w.rand.org/piiblications/R B/R B75
As outlined in Chapter 3 o f  Kosovo Lessons From the Crisis, Presented to Parliament by the Secretary o f  
State for D efence by Com m and o f  Her M ajesty, UK  M O D , June 2000, Cm 4724.
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perhaps they would have nudged Milosevic towards conceding early on. In time NATO 
learned this important lesson, but in the interim many more lives were lost as Milosevic 
continued his policy of his ethnic cleansing. However, this is not to say that Milosevic’s 
cognitive domain was completely ignored. Kosovo Lessons From the Crisis notes that 
“ information was also important in our campaign against Milosevic. In many ways 
getting our messages across in the broadcast and written media was as crucial as the 
military campaign”.
If one now produced a basic Kosovo effects schematic, and superimposed onto it the 
statistics listed on the preceding pages, the statistics at page 66 would equate to first order 
effects. Second order effects would include traffic not reaching its destination; limited 
access to fuel; disruption to industry; disruption to the populace; and the like. Tertiary 
effects would includeincreased husbanding o f physical resources; disruption to the wider 
economy; and increasing discontent with - and within - M ilosevic's regime. If the factors 
from Kosovo Lessons From the Crisis are added to this, the resulting schematic would 
show both the cognitive and the physical effects o f the campaign.
O f course it is relatively easy to do such an exercise after the event, but the utility of 
EBW hinges upon its potential to deliver this sort o f information before the event - in 
other words, during the planning stages. Whether or not this will ever be achievable in 
practise is subject to conjecture, but the following real world example suggests that, given 
the right mindset, it is indeed possible.
In January 1995, General Rupert Smith replaced General Michael Rose at Bosnia High 
Command (Forward) in Sarajevo. One o f Smith’s first tasks was to consider how best to 
target the cognitive domains o f Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, respectively the 
political and military Bosnian Serb leaders, in order to break the Bosnian Serb Army 
stranglehold around Sarajevo. Smith and General Mike Ryan, NATO’s Air Commander, 
agreed upon three target sets. It fell to Ryan to select the air defence targets, with Smith, 
with his better feel for the situation on the ground, selected the remaining targets. One 
such target was a military facility in the village o f Kalinovic, where coincidentally 
Mladic’s parents were buried. This target was attacked repeatedly, with one o f Smith's 
intentions being to show those in the area that Mladic could not protect the bones of his 
ancestors. To increase the pressure on Mladic still further. Smith kept the Bosniac press 
abreast o f events as they unfolded.
At first sight these actions appear to be somewhat bizarre to the Western mind; yet within 
M ladic’s culture, failure to protect the bones o f one’s ancestors is seen as being a gross 
dereliction o f duty. In the words o f Milos Stankovic, who served as a UN translator for 
both Rose and Smith:
“The first thing you’ve got to understand about the Balkans is that the 
dead are more important than the living...that’s the basis of that 
particular side o f their mentality. They’re obsessed with their dead.
The logic seems to be that territory belongs to he who is buried there.
You'd often hear Mladic or Karadzic banging on about Serb territory 
and then justifying it by quoting some church and who was buried 
there...that’s one part o f the logic. The other is deliberately
Ibid Chapter 6, para 6.22.
Interviews with General Rupert Smith, March 2004  and February 2005.
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generated vindictiveness. Dig up the bodies and scatter the remains 
about. It was a kind o f primitive rape o f the dead; to the victor the 
bones...it became a national sport. In war they just went that one step 
further and dug up the bodies for good measure”.
Tellingly, Stankovic adds that;
“When Ilidza and Grbavica were ceded to the Muslims...the Serbs 
just packed up and left, but not before they’d got the heavy plant and 
cranes in and dug up their nearest and dearest, whom they took with 
them. That’s what 1 mean about obsession with the dead".’^ ^
Smith understood this obsession well, and clearly his targeting o f Kalinovic was aimed to 
a large degree at both M ladic’s, and his supporters’ cognitive domains. If Mladic was 
unable to protect the bones o f his own relatives, what hope would his supporters have o f 
Mladic protecting the bones o f their relatives? This is a telling example of EBW in 
practise, and it indicates the degree o f granularity to which EBW can aspire. When 
considered alongside the statistics culled from the Kosovo example, it presents our third 
key conclusion: that not only do effects cascade into progressively smaller elements, but 
that the resultant dynamic needs to be taken fully into account by effects planners.
Where the Kosovo example failed in this respect, Smith did not make the same mistake.
FALLUJAH: OPERATION PHANTOM FURY
Fought against the backdrop o f an increasingly mature EBW model, the 2004 assault on 
Fallujah (Operation Phantom Fury, later renamed Operation Al-Fajr - Arabic for ‘Dawn' - 
by the Iraqi Defence Minister)*^^ offers unique insights into how battles are conducted by 
Western militaries in the early part o f the 21^ *^  Century. Consequently this is a particularly 
important case study.
The Manoeuvrist Paradigm focuses on shattering enemy cohesion and will, in order to 
secure military victory in the shortest possible timescale. Longer term negative effects 
might occur - possibly after the warfighting stage has finished - but if this happens, so be 
it; the real prize is to secure victory in the here and now. Using this logic, the aftermath 
o f victory is often viewed as an adjunct to the main event. In practise, therefore, it should 
come as no surprise that it may (and indeed often is) planned separately from the actual 
warfighting operation.
The assault on Fallujah sought to oust insurgents from the city before Iraq’s national 
elections o f January 2005. Prior to the operation, Fallujah’s population stood at around 
300 000 civilians, between 70% and 90% o f whom fled before the operation 
c o m m e n c e d .T h e  intent was to take the town as quickly as possible. The primary
Stankovic, M ilos, T rusted M ole: A S o ld ie r ’s Journey into B osn ia's H eart o f  D arkness, London, Harper 
C ollins, 2000, p 275.
This is an interesting point. The U S  favours nam ing operations so that one in no doubt as to tlie purpose 
o f  the campaign: Desert Shield to shield Kuwait, Desert Storm to cover tlie fight to Iraq, and Iraq Freedom  
to free the people o f  Iraq. In contrast, nam es selected  by the UK often appear to be m eaningless - as indeed  
is the intention. Operation Granby covered both D esert Shield and Desert Storm, w hilst Operation Telic  
equated to Iraqi Freedom.
http://ww w.globalsecurity.org/m ilitary/ops/oif-phantom -fury-fallujah.htm
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effect was to rid the town o f insurgents; but note the emphasis on ‘tow n’. This was a 
lesser objective than eradicating the wider terrorist problem in Iraq.
This approach was questionable from the outset, as it ignored the fact that terrorists 
operating around Fallujah would naturally coalesce elsewhere if presented with 
opportunities to do so. In the event, this is precisely what happened. Many terrorists 
escaped even before the operation c o m m e n c e d w ith  Mosul, a city five times the size o f 
Fallujah, absorbing a substantial influx o f te r ro r is ts .A c c o rd in g  to the then head of 
CENTCOM, General George W. Casey Jr, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi - the leader of the 
insurgent faction in Fallujah - was believed to have fled the city on 9 November 2004, the 
day after Phantom Fury commenced.^°°
Looking back on the operation, retired US Marine Corps General Bernard Trainor 
believed that from a strategic standpoint “Fallujah is not going to be much o f a plus at 
all” . He notes that “ ...we've knocked the hell out o f this city, and the only insurgents we 
really got were the nut-cases and zealots” . I f  he is correct, the city and its inhabitants 
paid a high price for what in his view  appears to have been such a shallow victory; in 
which case, future historians are unlikely to deem,Fallujah an example o f strategic 
success. But from the manoeuvrist perspective the operation was entirely successful: the 
town was taken, and quickly too. Indeed according to contemporary media reports, the 
operation achieved all that was expected o f it.
Let us now consider Fallujah through an effects lens. Among Trainor’s insurgents not 
‘neutralised' at the time were individuals who joined ‘the cause' after the event. This 
pool o f unknown size represents one o f the unintended effects o f Fallujah. There is no 
way of knowing the precise role or impact o f these new insurgents, but nonetheless they 
added to the equation, not least because they might require ‘neutralising’ in the months or 
years to come. One cannot assume that they were all recruited locally, or even in the 
affected country. This dimension complicates an already challenging conundrum.
In fact even before Phantom Fury commenced, a succession of tactical level actions took 
place within Fallujah that caused widespread resentment throughout Iraq and also in 
many other Muslim countries. The wider effects o f these acts will never be known, but 
media footage at the time indicated significant disillusionment with America's approach 
towards Iraq in the wake o f Saddam Hussein’s unseating. For example, actions against 
mosques included a helicopter attack on the Abdel-Aziz al-Samarrai mosque on April 7, 
2004 the shelling o f Hadret Mohammediya, Fallujah’s seeond largest mosque, on 
April 15, 2004"®^; the shelling o f yet another mosque by thirty 155mm high-explosive 
howitzer shells on November 9, 2004^ *^ "^ ; and one o f the enduring images of the ‘Battle for 
Fallujah', the fatal shooting o f a man in a mosque by a U.S. Marine in mid-November 
2004. This incident was caught on screen by Kevin Sites of NBC News, who reported to 
the world that the man who had been shot did not appear to be armed, or even threatening
Tills was com m ented on w idely  at the tim e in a variety o f  media sources.
According to correspondent Patrick Cockbiirn. A s quoted in W illiam S Lind’s ‘Fallujah: Little 
Stalingrad', Decem ber 22 , 2004. See w w w .antiw ar.coni/lind/?articleid=4201 
Ibid.
Pound Fallujah, Joseph Farah, W o rld m t D aily, April 6, 2004.
US Bom bs Fallujah M osque; M ore Than 40 W orshippers K illed, Bassem  Mroue and Abdul-Qader 
Saadi, A sso c ia ted  Press, April 7, 2004.
‘Fallujah m osque sh elled ’, N ew s24 .com , April 15, 2004.
Toby Ham den, The D a ily  Telegraph, N ovem ber 11, 2004.
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in any way. In fact Sites did not see a single weapon inside the mosque other than those 
that belonged to the marines.
Soon after Sites’ report, Fox News reported a reaction that was described at the time as 
being typical, that o f a shopkeeper in Baghdad who witnessed Sites’ video imagery 
shortly after the shooting:
“ ...the troops not only violated our mosques with their sins and their 
boots but they stepped on our brothers’ blood...they are criminals and 
mercenaries. I feel guilty standing here and not doing anything” .^ *^^
Yet the sensitivity o f mosques was well known at the time; indeed for this very reason, 
authorisation to proceed against them routinely took longer than for non-religious targets. 
Nonetheless, the manoeuvrist imperative for quick results meant that mosques were 
always going to be targets, because therein lay the quickest path to securing the military 
endstate: ridding the town o f  insurgents. It comes as some surprise to note that the wider 
ramifications o f targeting mosques were either not fully appreciated at the time, or for 
reasons that are not yet in the public domain, they were dismissed. Either way, the 
mosques needed to be isolated. According to the New York Times the Muhammadia 
Mosque held strategic significance because insurgents were using it as a command centre 
and bunker, and it was also known that other mosques were housing wounded 
insurgents.^"'’ That said, physical destruction o f mosques was not the only option 
available to Fallujah’s planners.
Let us now consider Fallujah from the perspective of the effects planner. To make sense 
of this 1 shall use the Centre o f Gravity (CoG) analysis model pioneered by Dr Joe 
Strange o f the Marine Corps War College, Quantico, Virginia, which de fines Centres 
of Gravity as the “primary sources o f moral or physical strength, power and 
resistance".“"^  CoGs have critical capabilities. These are the abilities that make them a 
CoG. These abilities have critical requirements: the conditions, resources and /or means 
that make the critical capabilities effective. But CoGs also have deficiencies or 
weaknesses. These are known as critical vulnerabilities.
The objective of the Fallujah operation was to rid the town of insurgents. For the sake o f 
simplieity, the focus - and hence our opponents’ CoG - is the insurgents themselves, the 
“primary source o f moral or physical strength, power and resistance” that prevent the 
mission from being achieved. What makes the insurgents a CoG is their ability to attack 
coalition forces seemingly at will. This is their critical capability. To do this, however, 
they need freedom o f movement, ammunition, food, local strongholds, and logistics 
bases. These are their critical requirements. Turning to their vulnerabilities, insurgents 
are, to paraphrase Mao Tse -Tung, the fishes that swim in the water. Without the water 
the fishes will die - and in this case the water is the local populace, because without them 
and their support the insurgents cannot succeed. Neither can they move at will or support 
themselves logistically if the Americans know their movements and locations. Taking all 
o f this into account, the following CoG analysis emerges:
‘Military Probes Prisoner Sh ootin g’, F oxnew s, N ovem ber 17, 2004.
Ibid.
See Dr Joe Strange, P ersp ectives On W arfighting N um ber Four, S eco n d  lùiition: C enters o f  C ra v ity  a n d  
C ritica l Vulnerabilities, M arine Corps University Foundation, Quantico, Virai nia, 1996.
Ibid, p 42.
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Centre of Gravity:
Insurgents
Critical Capabilities:
Ability to attack US forces at will
Critical Requirements:
Freedom of movement, food, 
Ammunition, local strongholds, bases
Critical Vulnerabilities:
Popular support
Figure 9 - Fallujah CoG Analysis
This matrix shows that from  an effects perspective the optimum way to defeat the 
insurgents is to target their popular support. One could of course target any or all of their 
critical requirements; but even if everything in the critical requirements column were to 
be destroyed, those critical requirements could soon be replaced with relative ease. For 
example, if one stronghold - a mosque - became unusable, another mosque could take its 
place. But what cannot be replaced, however - at least not with such ease - is the 
insurgents' popular support.
The next step in the effects process is to map out the effects o f each o f these options. We 
have already seen the primary effect o f targeting the critical requirements, and noted that 
in each case these effects would be transient at best. If we now consider second order 
effects, it is not unreasonable to assume that if destruction occurred to local strongholds 
and bases, resentment would accrue on the part o f the townsfolk; after all, it is they rather 
than itinerant insurgents who own the real estate. It is not unreasonable to assume, 
therefore, that lasting damage to this real estate would translate into lasting resentment 
against those who caused the damage. By extension o f this logic, minor damage to 
property could be expected to result in smaller scale resentment on the part o f the owners.
Turning to tertiary effects, with the foregoing in mind it is easy to see how resentment on 
the part o f the townsfolk could easily translate into support for the insurgents. This would 
be a ‘double whammy’, however, because not only would the insurgents gain support, but 
the coalition would lose it. To compound matters further, there would almost certainly be 
some additional tertiary effects, such as increased recruitment to the insurgent cause. 
Experience suggests that the likelihood o f this happening increases in proportion to the 
scale o f devastation that occurs and the number o f civilians that die during the 
operation. 20Q
Let us now consider the actual outcome. When US Deputy Secretary o f State Robert B. 
Zoellick paid a surprise visit to Fallujah on 13 April 2005, several weeks after democratic 
elections were held in Iraq, he was strongly advised by US military commanders to stay
inside his armoured Humvee due to the prevailing security situation;^'" and when he met 
with Fallujah's recently elected leaders, he did so in a heavily guarded US Marine 
enclave rather than more openly in the town.^' * These examples suggest that either the
' A s previously noted, although up to 90%  o f  the population w as estimated to have fled prior to the 
operation, the city originally numbered 300 000  people. H ence even if  only 10% remained in situ  som e
30 000 people would still have been present. This is a sizeable population by any standard. 
Tn Fallujah, U .S. E nvoy Greeted by Com plaints’, G lenn K essler, W ashington Post, April 14, 2005.
Ibid.
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town was par!tally purged o f its insurgents, or it was fully purged but new insurgents 
subsequently appeared. Clearly, neither outcomes was desired or predicted.
It would also appear to be the case that some second and third order effects were more 
lasting than the primary effect from which they stemmed. In the words o f Simon Jenkins, 
reporting in The Times on 17 November 2004:
“ ...In Vietnam the Americans destroyed the village to save it. In Iraq we 
destroy the city to save it.... Nothing in Iraq has so illumined the folly of 
this occupation as the now completed suppression o f Fallujah.... As for 
the repopulation o f the city from which 90 per cent of citizens are said to 
have fled - this will bring back the guerrillas and put the Americans 
under renewed attack. This is the opposite of what Fallujah was 
supposed to achieve.”
Fallujah was deemed a manoeuvrist success. It was conducted swiftly and effectively, 
and in general terms it progressed according to plan. It remains to be seen whether 
Trainor’s fears are ever realised, but either way it reveals another key insight: that on 
occasion, second and third order effects can at times be more important and enduring than 
the primary effects from which they were derived. Planning for this phenomenon is one 
o f the principal considerations that set apart EBW from its predecessors.
CONCLUSION
This chapter reveals one o f the key dilemmas at the heart of EBW, namely that in seeking 
to tease out ever-increasing amounts o f detail, a level of complexity can arise which may 
render the paradigm unmanageable in practise.
The Chastise example showed that the ‘effects w eb’ is, by its very nature, invariably 
wider - and hence less predictable - than planners anticipate. The broader primary effects 
associated with the dams raids could be derived with relative ease, but it should be 
remembered that this operation had limited aims and occurred on a single night. 
Moreover, British mores at that stage o f the war allowed considerable latitude in terms of 
effects spillover. This may continue to be the case during wars o f national survival, but it 
is unlikely to be a characteristic o f warfare in the immediate future. Nonetheless, the first 
conclusion stands: that during war, the full web of potential effects is likely to be 
somewhat wider than originally envisaged.
Black Buck hinted at the degree o f expansion that is possible within an ‘effects w eb’, 
even in a relatively simple scenario. This phenomenon creates a 'double whammy' in 
that not only does the web as an entity get larger (and hence more difficult to manage and 
interpret) but each additional strand produces its own cascade o f effects - each o f which 
adds further to the burden. Thus not only does ‘cause and effect' need to be pondered for 
the web as a whole, but also for each discrete area. For a ‘one shot’ operation such as 
Chastise this task is challenging enough, but manageable in the right circumstances. 
However, for an extended operation the task becomes truly daunting. Black Buck 
comprised 6 missions, yet the web would have changed to some degree with every 
mission. This is where the real significance o f the ‘effects web' begins to emerge from a 
management perspective.
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Building upon this theme, the Allied Force example revealed the third key conclusion: 
that not only do effects cascade into progressively smaller elements, but that the resultant 
dynamic needs to be taken fully into account by effects planners. However, this is 
extremely d iff  cult to do - especially when different coalition members view the task 
through different filters. We saw that Cohen’s military objective was couched in terms of 
damage and degradation, and that it did not specify ‘soft effects' such as influence, 
deterrence, coercion, or persuasion; yet according to the UK's Kosovo Lessons From the 
Crisis, all o f the successful factors bar one in the operation were soft effects: solidarity of 
the Alliance, determination o f the international community, damage and disruption likely 
to ensue, increased pressure on Milosevic and those around him, and coercion. In other 
words, not one effect arose out o f Cohen’s stated military objective. This is most 
revealing, but it suggests little more than the need to plan together and to harmonise 
objectives - two lessons that are constantly relearned no matter how often they have been 
captured in the past. In fact the bigger lesson is that the process of cascading effects 
causes a dynamic that needs to be constantly monitored, because an effect that is evolving 
can impact upon another effect even though the two effects appear to be unconnected.
One obvious example in this case study would have been the direct psychological 
targeting o f Milosevic’s confidants, which if  successful might have reduced the need for 
further physical damage to, say, bridges. Albeit this is a straightforward example, the 
challenge for EBW practitioners will be to establish relationships where at lirst sight none 
seems to exist. Smith made this connection in the case o f Kalinovic; not only can it be 
done, but if EBW is to pass scrutiny it must be done.
The Fallujah example teased out all o f  the above conclusions within a contemporary 
setting. In doing so, it expanded the thorny matter o f unintended ~ actions that
mean one thing to one side but can mean something entirely different to the opposing 
party; and also actions that lead to downstream effects not originally considered by the 
planners. This lead to our fourth conclusion; that in some cases, second and third order 
effects can be more important and enduring than the primary effects from which they 
were derived. In many respects this turns conventional military logic on its head, as 
practitioners favour quick solutions. Yet if Fallujah reveals anything, it is surely that the 
quick answer is not necessarily the most effective one, even if the planning is carried out 
with effects in mind. Perhaps in time the real paradox of Fallujah will be that much o f the 
damage that occurred could have been avoided if the planning had been better directed 
towards negating the insurgents’ support.
It is possible to view these case studies in isolation, but to do so would be to miss the 
mark by some distance. Individually they allow pertinent EBW themes to be collated.
But taken together they present a picture o f ever-increasing complexity - and this in itself 
is a further strand that sets EBW apart from its predecessors.
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CHAPTER 5: TIME FOR CHANGE? THE EARLY 21^' CENTURY
“7 cannot say whether things mùU get better i f  we change; 
what I  can say is they must change i f  they are to get better
Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742 - 1799) 
INTRODUCTION
This chapter considers some o f the challenges that Western militaries face in the early 2C ‘ 
Century. It opens with an overview of Today’s Strategic Realities, which notes that 
threats have changed significantly since the collapse o f the Berlin Wall. Some of these, 
such as A1 Qaeda, are new. However, others are still evolving - and there is no way of 
predicting which, or how many, additional threats might emerge in the immediate future. 
Against this background, this section considers whether the W est's extant model of 
warfare meets today’s strategic realities. This is an important question, because as was 
outlined in Chapter 1, the current model is clearly the product of a bygone era. And 
whilst in itself this does not mean necessarily that it is outmoded, this question cannot be 
answered until today’s challenges are analysed in some detail. Rather than focusing on 
purely military issues, however. Today’s Strategic Realities considers the impact of 
globalisation on the wider security environment. It then looks at the influence of the 
ubiquitous media. Attention then turns to the re-emergence o f humanitarian ism and its 
implications in terms o f security.
The next section covers Further Challenges. This accepts that the W est’s armed forces 
have adapted since the collapse o f the Berlin Wall with great skill and considerable effort. 
Yet this accomplishment only goes part way towards addressing the wider security 
concerns. If they are to be addressed comprehensively, an fuller understanding of culture 
is needed. This includes the need to understand adversaries' cultures as well as one's 
own and those o f allies. Equally, rationality also needs to be understood. This complex 
topic is explored in some detail because understanding the cognitive domain is a core 
requirement o f EBW. Within this section the rational, analytical and deductive processes 
play second fiddle to understanding better the human mind. Attention then turns to the 
topic o f behaviour, noting that in shaping it the use of physical force is but one option.
The chapter concludes by considering The 2 f ‘ Century Aftermath. One o f the underlying 
contentions within this thesis is that the aftermath o f warfare now needs to be considered 
as never before. This matter is therefore analysed, alongside the related issue o f whether 
warfighting and post-warfighting activities should be planned separately (as happens at 
within the current model o f warfare) or concurrently (an EBW requirement).
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TODAY’S STRATEGIC REALITIES
Now that Western militaries have taken their first tentative steps around the battlefields of 
the early 21 Century, they are realising how much warfare has changed since the 
collapse o f the Berlin Wall. During the last two decades threats have changed 
immeasurably. Some are still evolving; others have only recently emerged. Some feature 
regularly in the media, whereas others are barely mentioned. In the post- 9/1 1 world, 
Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Intelligence are now firmly in the ascendant. Moreover, 
there is fresh impetus to resolve conflicts meaningfully, rather than declaring them 
'mission accomplished’ as soon as the warfighting stage ends. In the near- to mid-term 
there will be many more threats, some o f which we cannot even envisage at present. But 
together they are likely to shape this century’s strategic realities.
This realisation poses many challenges. At the strategic and operational levels two in 
particular stand out. First, how (if at all) should the West reconfigure its military 
capabilities? And second, is the W est’s conceptual approach to warfare consistent with 
these new realities? Analysing the former challenge falls outside the scope o f this thesis, 
other than to note that nations routinely ponder future such scenarios so that they may 
procure equipment best suited to their needs. Many of their findings are freely available 
on government internet sites, and they make for interesting reading.
But reconfiguring the Western mindset is an altogether different matter. That said, few 
military practitioners see any requirement for change, as they believe that the West 
already has at hand everything it needs, at least in conceptual terms, to engineer the 
downfall of its opponents. In some scenarios they are undoubtedly correct. In other 
scenarios, however, nothing could be further from the truth. Paradoxically, such 
complacency is eminently understandable - and indeed within the UK it follows a rich 
military tradition.^'^ In today’s case this stems from recent success at the joint 
operational level in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and in Iraq. Those who opine 
that there is no need for conceptual change cite these examples, the underlying premise 
being that where concepts worked well in the past, they will work equally well in the 
future. Yet this conclusion is deeply flawed, and history is replete with examples wherein 
for each new paradigm introduced by Player A, a superior response is generated by Player 
B.^'^
But this does not always happen. Indeed the military response to 9/11 illustrates the 
point, as it failed to take into account the strategic realities o f the day. By attacking 
countries that harboured terrorists or their allies, the military solution addressed the 
symptoms - the terrorists, supported by governments unfriendly to the West - rather than 
the problem itself: the appeal o f terrorist ideology to potential recruits. Consequently the 
actions that occurred in the wake o f 9/11 were never going to tackle the problem per se. 
Certainly many insurgents have died, yet the overall number of deaths is irrelevant if each
According to Major-General John K iszely , during the 1950s “ ...the British Army had a strong antipathy 
for doctrine...w ithin each arm, each regim ent believed  that it w as the best, and that it w as the best becatise 
o f  the special and different w ay it did things”. M any in the RAF would agree that this characteristic 
transcends the colour o f  o n e ’s uniform. See K isze ly ’s The Briti.sh Army and Approaches to Warfare since 
1945, in Military Power: Land Warfare in Theoty and Practice, ed Brian Holden Reid, Frank Cass, 
London, 1977, p 185.
■' ’ Ludendorff noted this in 1931 : “Surely w e know  by now  that the appearance o f  every new weapon o f  
offence is follow ed by its defensive counterpart or by effective  measures o f  protection?” Ludendorff, E, 
The Comitig War, Faber & Faber, London, 1931, p 80.
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is lb I lowed by a further recruit to the cause. The problem is compounded when for each 
individual death there are multiple recruits to the cause.
What worked well in security terms in previous centuries can no longer necessarily be 
relied upon in the i f f  Century. To understand why this is so. today’s strategic realities 
must be considered in some detail.
Globalisation and the W ider Security Environment
People are now sufficiently familiar with the globalisation processes that they barely 
notice how much, and indeed how quickly, the world is changing. They might feel the 
impact o f globalisation when a domestic service such as a telephone answering facility is 
relocated to another country, and there might be a feeling that this process is likely to 
continue as long as labour is cheaper elsewhere. But in most respects globalisation has 
little bearing on the average individual. In micro terms, globalisation seems little 
changed from the processes originally set in train by the industrial revolution, and 
consequently many view it as merely another rung on the evolutionary ladder. Yet the 
same is not true in macro terms. In January 2002, Prime Minister Blair set out his vision 
for Britain's role in the post-9/11 world. Cotnmenting on the emergence o f a new 
“modern foreign policy”^ h e  noted that Britain would henceforth act with others “to 
make sense o f this global interdependence and make it a force for good, for our own 
nation and the wider world”. '^^ He did not say (as was later popularly supposed) that 
Britain would be a ‘Force for Good’; rather he made the point that global 
interdependence would become a ‘Force for Good’. This, then, is the official UK view o f 
globalisation.
However, for each upside there is usually an attendant downside. Globalisation by its 
very nature imposes constraints on countries to act as freely as they did in the past, 
because the linkages that exist between them is steadily rising, and hence their freedom to 
act unilaterally is thus diminishing. But these constraints do not apply across the board. 
Organised crime now launders money in ways previously undreamed of, often at the 
touch o f a button, due to improvements in global electronic transfer technology.
Similarly, terrorists can now communicate in novel ways, using encryption that did not 
exist even a few years ago. In both o f these examples the fault lines generated within the 
globalisation process are open to ruthless exploitation. This is especially true o f A1 
Qaeda: witness the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon; the 
bombing o f three railway stations near-simultaneously during the Madrid rush hour on 11 
March 2004;“'" and the London attack o f 7 July 2005. This new form o f terrorism, with 
its trademark generation o f shock effected through massive numbers o f casualties, has 
added a new dimension to warfare.
The Ubiquitous Media
Another new dimension exists in the form of instantaneous media, which now exerts 
global infiuence as never before. The electronic information-age has truly come of age. 
This is impacting directly, and in near-real time, upon military operations. Anyone with a 
camera-equipped mobile phone can send photos (and often video footage) from their 
location direct to international media hubs in real time. Rapid analysis can take place in
For the context o f  his remarks see  http://new s.bbc.co.U k/l/hl/uk_poH tics/i 743 9 8 5 .stm 
Ibid.
This was a significant act o f  terror; 190 lives w ere lost.
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situ at the hub and a credible news report (with pictures) can appear on television later 
that day: witness how quickly the Boxing Day Tsunami of 2004 was transmitted across 
the woiid.“'  ^ More recently, mobile phones captured graphic video imagery o f the 
London bombings o f 7 July 2005, showing passengers grimly exiting the remains o f a 
London Underground carriage shortly after it had been blown up.
The mobile phone has become the latest media adjunct and many of its users are willing 
cameramen. Wherever civilians exist so too does the mobile phone. Consequently 
mobile phone imagery has become a feature o f 2 Century warfare. Wartime reports 
can now reach domestic audiences in near-real time. Ironically, many people believe that 
in less developed nations, TV lacks the same impact as it does in the West. However, this 
does not survive scrutiny. There may only be one TV in the village, but at times the 
whole village will watch it. Indeed the TV owner in his cafe can increase his custom 
during power outages, thanks to his g en era to r;^an d  as long as he benefits the 
community, the community will ensure that the generator will run.
Media affects everyone, and it does so in ways that did not exist a decade ago, largely by 
dint o f speed o f transmission. One Abu Graib picture - be it official or unofficial - sends 
the same message to all who view it, be they are friendly, enemy or neutral. The West no 
longer has the luxury o f considering only friendly and enemy actors. In the 21 Century 
it must pay attention to neutral players as never before.
In similar vein today’s media demands detail as never before. During Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, albeit the UK’s politicians were keen to ‘move on' after the war had finished, 
the subject refused to disappear from TV screens until the media, rather than the 
politicians, decided it was yesterday’s news. This would have been inconceivable during 
the Falklands invasion. Indeed even in the aftermath of Iraq's expulsion from Kuwait, 
politicians cited ‘national security’ to avoid answering embarrassing questions. This 
mechanism no longer exists, however. The demand for accountability has raised the 
media stakes, and this is another challenge that now influences national conduct during 
warfare.
Another change regarding the media in its broadest sense was the arrival of the internet. 
Web traffic, when used as a vehicle for recruiting to a cause, poses significant security 
challenges. This threat did not exist much more than a decade ago. As recently as mid- 
1993 a mere 130 web sites e x is te d .^ W ith in  six months this number had grown to 
650 000. This expansion shows no sign o f abating. Between 2000 and 2004, European 
internet use rose by 124%. Yet during the same period it grew by 227.8% in the Middle 
East, making this the world’s highest region o f growth. However, the region with the 
highest usage in 2004 was neither Europe nor America, with 31.6% and 68.3% of their 
populations respectively. It was Asia, with a mere 7.1% of the population using the 
internet at that time. This adds a further dimension to the contemporary security 
panorama.
M ost o f  the early imagery w as from tourists w ho w ere already In place, rather than from reporters who  
needed to be flow n in from outside.
Source: author. Serving in B osn ia during the so-called ‘Siege o f  Sarajevo' in 1994, it w as evident that 
local TV stations and radios continued to transmit even during power outages, and the few  co ffee  shops that 
had working TVs and /  or radios w ere often busier than those that did not.
Source for all internet statistics: M atthew Gray o f  the M assachusetts Institute o f  Technology, 
http://ww w.m it.edu/people/m kgray/net
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The Humanitarian Dimension
Another strategic reality concerns the Humanitarian Dimension, According to Hikaru 
Yamashita, an expert on humanitarian matters, the 1990s was the decade in which 
“humanitarian rights became an influential discourse in international affairs”."^ "
Certainly it was the decade in which human rights assumed visibility due to events in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Dormant since the fall o f  Srebrenica and Zepa in 1995, it re- 
emerged in the shortly after 9/11 with the US providing $187 million in aid to 
Afghanistan.^”' Thus humanitarianism and human rights clearly influence today's 
security environment. However, these two issues should not be confused. Human Rights 
law eoncerns the relationship between states and their citizens, whereas “humanitarian 
law is focused on conflict situations and is concerned with treatment by a state of the 
citizens o f its enemy states” It is this latter strand that is likely to impact upon military 
activities.
FURTHER CHALLENGES
In light o f the above it may be seen that the world is steadily changing. In fact many of 
today's challenges are markedly different from those of the Cold War and, importantly, 
its immediate aftermath. Recognising this, the W est’s armed forces have adapted with 
great skill, and they now have impressive expeditionary capabilities. This was a 
significant achievement, but it only goes part way towards addressing today’s strategic 
realities. The boundaries between military and civil action are becoming increasingly 
blurred through, for example, organised crime, drug cartels, warlord ism, and 
humanitarian intervention, and each o f these dimensions becomes more complex when 
non-governmental agencies are involved - particularly during conflict. Understanding 
and addressing these issues is a core requirement for EBW, However, it is not the only 
one; another important requirement is the ability to take into account the cultural element.
The Cultural Equation
In Fighting fo r  the Future: Will America Triumph? Ralph Peters notes that “ in most of 
our recent deployments, no one weapon system, no matter how expensive and 
technologically mature, has been as valuable as a single culturally competent foreign 
affairs ofllcer".^^^ This is an enduring lesson o f warfare, but only recently has it featured 
at the outset o f operations. For example, David G Marr, the first Vietnamese-speaking 
US Marine sent to Vietnam, notes that while studying at the Monterey Army Language 
School in 1961 he;
“ ...soon discovered that almost all o f the vocabulary was military and, 
worse yet, Vietnamese instructors were being forced to coin entirely 
new words to conform with a set of technical English terms...not
Hikaru Yamashita, H um anitarian Space a n d  In terven tion  P olitics: The C reation  o f  Safe A reas, National 
Institute for D efence Studies, Japan, A shgate, A ldershot, 2004.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ralph Peters, l ig h tin g  f o r  the Future: W ill A m erica  Triumph? Stackpole Books, M echaniesburg PA. 
1999, p 21.
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surprisingly, when tried out in Vietnam such words received nothing but 
stares, and were promptly forgotten.
When he arrived in theatre:
"My colonel simply wanted to know if ‘the enemy' was located in 
village 'A ’ or village ‘B ’, whether he had weapons larger than 30 calibre 
that would force us to fly above 1500 feet, and what the weather was 
going to be like tomorrow. The colonel cared not a wink about the local 
political ‘infrastructure’ [or] the relationship o f the "insurgents’ to the 
local population” .^ ^^
Understanding culture is vital. This demands expertise in two specific areas: first, know 
the enemy - how he thinks, how he behaves, and what motivates him. Second, know the 
“non enemy': own country, allies, and neutrals. These cognitive domains are very 
different.
In Strategy^ and Ethnocentrism  Ken Booth observes that “culture shapes the ends which 
create the problem to which rational thinking has to be addressed”. H e  offers the 
example of Kamikaze pilots during World War Two. Not only did Western cultures fail 
to understand this expression o f Japanese culture, but they could not explain its 
significance to the Japanese population. In similar vein, North Vietnam’s preparedness to 
absorb huge fatalities was equally difficult for the Western mindset to fathom. This facet 
o f cultural awareness is well recognised, but there is another aspect to the equation: the 
need to understand our own cultures at more than a superficial level.
Dr Karen Carr, Director o f Future Systems at BAe Human Resources, suggests that even 
the process o f (hinking takes different forms between different cultures. She believes 
that, for example, thinking tends to be more process-driven in the US than in the UK; 
and that it is not uncommon for allies to have different institutional, as well as national, 
approaches to subjects. To compound this problem further, language in itself provides a 
barrier - even when nations share a common language. Churchill’s comment about 
Britain and America being two nations ‘divided by a common tongue’ has resonance 
within this context. Thus the widely held assumption that allies generally think and 
communicate in similar ways is in fact erroneous - and potentially disastrous. Cultural 
differences ean lead to misunderstandings at all levels, from increased (and avoidable) 
friction at the tactical level, to outright mistrust between strategic partners.
Dr Carr also makes the point that people, rather than computers, are unequalled when it 
comes to understanding human behaviour. This observation raises a cautionary note, 
however, especially for those who believe that technological solutions can unlock their 
understanding o f other cultures. Moreover, intuition and experience have always had a
David G Marr. The Rise a n d  F all o f ‘‘C ounterinsurgency": 1 9 6 1 -1 9 6 4 ,\n I'ietnam an d  A m erica: The 
M ost C om prehensive D ocu m en ted  H is tory  o f  the Vietnam War, Gettleman, Marvin E; Franklin, Jane; 
Young, Marilyn B; and Franklin, Bruce (Eds), Grove Press, N ew  York, 1995.
Ibid.
Ken Booth, Stra tegy  a n d  E thnocentrism , Groom H elm , London, 1979. p 64.
Even this is an oversim plification. M ao Tse-Tung believed it imperative to understand not only the 
conditions o f  our own and enem y countries, but also friendly countries and indeed countries friendly to the 
enem y; the logic being that countries friendly to the enem y m ight prove useful for influencing the enem y, 
thus opening up a new  line o f  operation. M ao Tse-Tung, U nrehearsed Talks a n d  Letters: 1956-71, Ed 
Stuart R. Schram, London, 1974, p 128,
Dr Karen Carr. Interview, July 2005.
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key role to play in warfare. It follows, therefore, that if greater reliance is placed on 
artificial intelligence, less reliance will be placed on intuition and experience.
Culture and Rationality
Up to this point only rational actors have been considered. However, coherent decision­
making becomes increasingly difficult when irrational actors enter into the equation. 
Between the two poles o f rationality and irrationality exists an infinite assortment o f 
characteristics and personalities which, when combined together, complicate the task of 
understanding culture by an order o f magnitude.
Knowing what motivates an opponent is rarely as straightforward as it first appears. 
Knowing how an opponent will think and act - especially when he or she is under duress 
and their behaviour changes - is notoriously difficult to predict. Indeed very few people 
behave consistently. Surprising though this may seem, it is also true that no-one applies 
identical reasoning from one day to the next.^^^ Rather, people change their responses 
and behaviour as the situation warrants. Moreover, the number o f variables that affect 
human behaviour is beyond calculation.
In Effect s-Based Operations, A  Grand Challenge fo r  the Analytical Community, Paul K 
Davis notes that during the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy and his Executive 
Committee were influenced “ ...by numerous factors such as the vividness o f certain facts 
or images, the order o f events, physical fatigue, and random events” .^ '^ " These factors 
apply in all wars, and they determine outcomes in many different ways. In similar vein. 
Person A 's rationality is extremely unlikely to mirror that of Person B. This is certainly 
true when two people come from the same background and are raised in similar 
circumstances - but it applies even more when they are from different cultures. In short, 
one can never assume that one’s enemies undertake the same thought processes, let alone 
cost/benefit analyses, as oneself or one’s allies.
Slobodan Milosevic famously stated that NATO was “not willing to sacrifice lives to 
achieve our surrender. But we are willing to die to defend our rights as an independent 
sovereign nation”.'^ '^ Clearly, whether or not he meant this at the time will never be 
known - but the point stands. Ho Chi M inh’s infamous warning to the US that "you can 
kill ten o f my men for every one I kill o f yours. But even at those odds, you will lose and 
I will win" was more than an idle boast.^^^ Saddam Hussein's rationality prior to 
Operation Iraqi Freedom was equally difficult for the Western mind to fathom. Indeed 
alter it was clear that there were no WMD in Iraq, many observers asked why he had not 
readily admitted to the fact, thereby negating at a single stroke the UK’s justification for 
invading Iraq. However, a very different picture emerges if matters are viewed from the 
perspective o f Saddam Hussein. How could he admit that he had no WMD when his 
entire regional powerbase relied not only on the belief that he had them, but that he was 
prepared to use them as he chose?
Understanding rationality is difficult enough when one’s opponent acts predictably, but it 
becomes much harder when one’s adversary seeks to exploit weaknesses in his
' Paul K Davis, Op Cit, p 21.
Ibid, p 22.
Interview with M ilosevic, U n ited  P ress  In ternational, April 30, 1999.
Cited in Bym an, DA  and W axm an, M C, ‘K osovo  and the Great Air Power D ebate’, In ternational 
Security , Spring 2000 , Vol 24, N o  4 , p 32.
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opponent's understanding. Mao Tse-Tung once observed that “a careless military man 
bases his military plans on his own wishful thinking [and therefore] his plans are fanciful 
and do not correspond with reality” .^ ^^  A clever opponent will always seek to mislead his 
enemy with a view to ensuring that the adversary no longer trusts his model of reality. 
This has always been the case in warfare, but what is different today is that intuition and 
experience are slowly being displaced by knowledge management systems which seek to 
predict behaviour and truly ‘know the enemy’. This perceived philosopher’s stone, of 
process-driven solutions available at the press o f a button, would be hard pressed to work 
even if the rationality o f every potential opponent was known in advance. However, add 
to this the fact that behaviour and rationality change in line with different circumstances, 
and the problems of unlocking an opponent’s cognitive domain compound accordingly.
The Cognitive Domain: Shaping Behaviour
Understanding the cognitive domain is important because physical force is not the only 
way to intluence an opponent’s behaviour. The mere threat o f violence (or some other 
form of sanction) may in itself be enough to achieve the required objective. The school 
bully does not need to hit someone with a stick for them both to know that it will hurt; 
seeing the bully with stick in hand can be enough to encourage potential victims to 
acquiesce to the bully’s demands. The same approach applies at the operational and 
strategic levels. US President Theodore Roosevelt understood this matter intuitively, 
apparently often quoting the African proverb “speak softly and carry a big stick: you will 
go far” . A natural leader and a highly capable soldier, Roosevelt amassed combat 
experience while commanding the Rough Riders during the Spanish-American War.^ "^ "^
By the time he assumed the Presidency in 1901, his understanding o f strategy and tactics 
were unusually well developed. For him, influencing perception and will were no less 
important than the use o f physical violence. He understood the cognitive domain well, 
and he exploited it ruthlessly.
The ability to manipulate the cognitive domain is one o f the enduring tenets of warfare. 
Sun Tzu advised: “know your enemy, know yourself [and] your victory will never be 
endangered".^^^ And even Clausewitz - so often viewed solely as a champion o f physical 
force - well understood this key requirement: “Destruction o f the enemy’s force is only a 
means to an end, a secondary matter. If  a mere demonstration is enough to cause the 
enemy to abandon his position, the objective has been achieved"”^ " He later added that 
“military activity is never directed against material force alone; it is always aimed 
simultaneously at the moral forces which give it life, and the two cannot be separated".”^^
The cognitive domain may be thought o f as a lever that links the military commander to 
the enemy's ‘moral forces’. And, as one o f the greatest moral forces is leadership, the 
ability to bend an enemy’s will in order to secure key objectives will always be a prized 
skill in conllict.^^^ For George S Patton, familiarity with Rommel’s book on Infanlry
Mao Tse Tung, S e lec ted  M ilita ry  W ritings, p 86.
He w as recom m ended for the C ongressional M edal o f  Honour for ‘conspicuous gallantry in leading one  
N T he charges’ at San Juan H ill on 1 July 1898. The award w as finally made in 2001.
Sun Tzu, The A rt o f  W ar (tr Sam uel B Griffith), N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1971, p 129.
“ Carl von C lausew itz On  War, ed and tr. Sir M ichael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton NJ, Princeton 
University Press, 1984, p 96.
Clausew itz, Op Cit, p l3 7 .
This is equally true in territorial wars, because i f  the enem y leadership accedes to territorial demands the 
strategic objective w ill have been achieved.
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Allacks allegedly helped him to beat Rommel in 1-943 at Tunis.""'" However, literary 
“silver bullets’ such as these are few and far between, and the modern commander must 
therefore turn to more reliable mechanisms if he is to defeat his opponents.
All models of warfare demand that opponents are studied closely before battle is joined, 
but in reality this rarely happens. Rather, wars begin with both sides knowing less about 
the opponent than is known at the end.^"^" Consequently assumptions are made and then 
adhered to, until it becomes apparent that the enemy is behaving differently to what was 
expected. When this happens, the early assumptions are revisited either until the cycle 
slops repeating itself or the war concludes. The Malayan Campaign o f 1948-1960 is 
often cited as being a success in terms o f knowing the enemy, and for good reason. Yet it 
was markedly less successful in the early stages than towards the end. As it was being 
fought, the British Forces and Malay Police continued to learn about the enemy; how the 
insurgents thought, what motivated them, and how they might be Turned’. One 
significant deduction was that the enemy’s link to civilian support contained key 
vulnerabilities. Once these were identified, a crossover point was reached and thereafter 
the path to victory became assured.
A similar approach was used by Ramon Magsaysay during the post-Second World War 
campaign against the Hukbalahaps in the Philippines. Magsaysay had to contend with 
poor morale within the military forces and cases o f graft and corruption.^'" But by 
delivering key land reforms he gave the populace everything that the insurgents had 
promised, and by doing this he removed at a single stroke the Hukbalahaps’ justification 
for fighting - and also the populace’s rationale for supporting them. According to 
Lawrence M Greenberg, M agsaysay’s in this regard greatest strength was:
““...his ability to see the Huk guerrilla movement as symptomatic of 
greater diseases that were threatening his country - poverty, rising social 
expectations, and an uncaring and corrupt central government. These 
were the targets that Magsaysay set his sights on. He combined military 
operations with civic-action projects to form his grand strategy, a 
strategy that, if successful, would improve Philippine living conditions 
and remove the base o f guerrilla strength - popular support. He 
demanded that each soldier, regardless o f rank, be dedicated first to the 
people, then to killing the guerrillas... The military and the government 
had first to win the respect o f the people before their anti-Huk campaign 
could ever produce tangible results”.
As in Malaya, the greatest resistor to M agsaysay’s objective was twofold: the enemy and 
the populace. If he lost the confidence o f the populace, the enemy would benefit: indeed 
the more he lost the populace, the more the enemy would benefit. Therefore he had to 
understand both the enemy and the populace equally. This he did supremely well. 
Ultimately the insurrection petered out, with bemused guerrillas surrendering piecemeal 
once they realised that they had lost their rationale to continue the fight. '^*^
■ " R om m el’s book, In fan teriegre ift an, w as first published in Germany in 1937.
Bin Laden, AI Qaeda, and the Taliban in Afghanistan all illustrate this point.
See Lawrence M. G reenberg’s The Hukbalahap Insurrection, A Case Study o f  A Successful Anti- 
Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955, U .S . Army Centre o f  M ilitary History. W ashington, 
D .C., 1987, p 83.
J'- Ibid, p 146.
Source: Dr Joe Strange o f  the U S Marine Corps War C ollege, interviewed in April 2003.
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The cognitive domain comprises three distinct target groupings - friend lies, neutrals and 
the enemy. Accordingly, Greenberg makes the point that if "American policy had been 
less complacent and more sensitive to the needs and aspirations o f the Filipino people, the 
Hukbalahap movement would simply have dried up and blown away after the [second 
world] war.""' '^^ In the event it ended a decade later.
THE 21^^ CENTURY AFTERMATH
Today's new strategic realities do not end here o f course, if only because the aftermath 
now needs to be considered as never before. ‘Getting it right' matters increasingly, and 
this means delivering an aftermath that is satisfactory to the international community.
Yet this is not something that extant model o f warfare is good at achieving, because it 
views the warfighting and post-warfighting stages as unrelated entities. Reflecting on 
Iraq, retired US General Thomas White, Secretary o f the Army from 2001 until April 
2003, stated on 12 August 2004 that:
"...there was kind o f this mind-set...that the postwar deal is kind of a 
lower form of life; it's kind o f a necessary evil... to do that portion o f the 
operation justice, you probably would have had to slow down the 
military operation itself...an enormous amount of planning would have 
had to go on, and none o f it went on. It was easier just to keep on the 
short track o f the logic o f the war: the imminent threat to the United 
States. Therefore we have to attack quickly, and oh, by the way, we'll 
just kind o f bumble along when the war's over, and hopefully it will turn 
out okay. And it didn’t” .
White is not alone in making such comments. Colonel Douglas Macgregor, US Army 
(retired) and currently a Senior Military Fellow at the Institute o f National Strategic 
Studies at the National Defence University, noted that prior to the war:
“'...all of the Iraqis we had worked with said: ‘Number one [priority]: 
civil order and security. Number two: power restoration. Number three: 
jobs'. They sang that particular song day in and day out for months.
From the time that we even got close to the border with Iraq, they said,
‘Those are your top three priorities’. If you address those early on; in 
other words, you arrive with a civil order, new rules o f engagement, psy- 
ops teams driving down the street, speaking Arabic, saying: ‘Go back to 
your homes. Police, stay on duty. If  you are seen on the streets and are 
carrying a weapon, you will be shot. If you loot or commit acts of 
criminality, you will be shot’. But for whatever reason, that didn't 
happen. The generals did not plan any o f that. And 1 think that it might 
be useful to ask them why they didn’t” . '^'"
Ibid, p 143.
See http://w w w .pbs.org/w gbh/pages/frontline/show s/pentagon/interview s/ for additional opinions. 
Several retired US generals were interviewed.
Ibid. interview  took place on 23 July 2004 . In D ecem ber 2000  M acgregor was advised by a 
representative o f  the Secretary o f  D efen se  that the U S  Arm y’s C h ief o f  Staff sought 560 000 troops for the 
com ing invasion. M acgregor’s response w as that less than 10% o f  that number - a mere 50 000 troops - 
w ould be required. The fo llow in g  month he w as sent by the W hite H ouse to discuss his proposals with  
General Tom m y Franks, who “generally signed up for that”.
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One does not need to ask any generals, however. In July 2003, shortly after the war 
ended, USA Today interviewed more than 30 current and former U.S. officials, analysts, 
Iraqi-Americans and other parties. This group included a cross-section o f officers who 
had been involved in the planning process. They identifled several reasons for the 
coalition's failure to generate ‘the aftermath we sought’:
"...a number o f pre-war decisions...helped create the current situation.
Hasty planning, rosy assumptions about Iraqi attitudes and a failure to 
foresee and forestall the disastrous effects o f looting and sabotage all 
contributed, they say. Most spoke on the, record, but a few in sensitive 
positions requested anonymity” .^ '^ ^
Six reasons were identified: deploying too few troops for the task;^ '*® commencing 
planning for the aftermath too late; '^*" underestimating the impact o f looting and the poor 
state o f local infrastructure;^^" making wrongful assumptions as a result o f the previous 
Gulf War experience; planning for crises that didn't happen; and failure to resolve inter­
agency conflicts, particularly between the State Department and the Pentagon's civilian 
leadership. James Fallows takes up the baton in Blind into Baghdadff^
“The military-civilian difference finally turned on the question of which 
would be harder: winning the war or maintaining the peace. According 
to Thomas White and several others, OSD [Office o f the Secretary of 
Defence] acted as if  the war itself would pose the real challenge. As 
White put it, “The planning assumptions were that the people would 
realize they were liberated, they would be happy that we were there, so 
it would take a much smaller force to secure the peace than it did to win 
the war. The resistance would principally be the remnants o f the Ba’ath 
Party, but they would go away fairly rapidly. And, critically, if we didn't 
damage the infrastructure in our military operation, as we didn't, the 
restart o f the country could be done fairly rapidly.” The first assumption 
was clearly expressed by Cheney three days before the war began, in an 
exchange with Tim Russert on M eet the Press:
RUSSERT: If your analysis is not correct, and we're not treated as 
liberators but as conquerors, and the Iraqis begin to resist, particularly in 
Baghdad, do you think the American people are prepared for a long, 
costly, and bloody battle with significant American casualties?
Barbara Siavin and D ave M oniz, ‘W ar in Iraq's Aftermath Hits Troops Hard’, USA Today, 21 July 2003.
Four years earlier, the War Gam e “D esert Crossing” had been conducted by Marine General Anthony 
Zinni, the then com mander o f  U .S . forces in Iraq and the surrounding region. It showed that a force o f  
400  000 troops w ould be needed to invade and stabilize Iraq. In the event, at the insistence o f  D efence  
Secretaiy Rum sfeld, ground forees in the March invasion were held to about 130 000 U S com bat troops and 
approxim ately 30 000 British troops.
■ ’ ’ The Pentagon's O ffice o f  Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (Q R H A ), tasked with initial post- 
Saddam political and econom ic work, did not exist until shortly before the war.
A ccording to retired US Army General Jay Garner, who headed the initial post-Saddam planning and 
reconstruction efforts, “our plan was to im m ediately stand up 20 o f  23 existing m inistries” . H owever, by 
the tim e the plan w as put into action “ ...17 o f  them  had been vaporized”. This is an excellent exam ple o f  
where considering effects in the round, rather than securing victory in the quickest possible tim escale, 
would have y ielded tangible results.
James Fallows, ‘Blind Into Baghdad’, The A tlan tic  M onthly. January/February 2004 , Vol 293, N o. I, 
p 53-74.
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CHENEY: Well, I don't think it's likely to unfold that way, Tim,
because I really do believe that we will be greeted as liberators ... the 
read we get on the people o f Iraq is there is no question but what they 
want to get rid o f Saddam Hussein and they will welcome as liberators 
the United States when we come to do that” .
On the matter o f force numbers required for the aftermath, Fallows notes that:
“They were very proud that they didn't have the kind o f numbers my 
plan had called for,” Zinni told me, referring to Rumsfeld and Cheney.
“The reason we had those two extra divisions was the security situation.
Revenge killings, crime, chaos - this was foreseeable."
Thomas White agrees. Because o f reasoning like Cheney’s “we went in 
with the minimum force to accomplish the military objectives, which 
was a straightforward task, never really in question," he told me. “And 
then we immediately found ourselves shorthanded in the aftermath. We 
sat there and watched people dismantle and run off with the country, 
basically.”
Fallows then draws attention to a US Army War College Draft Report entitled 
Recomtriicling Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions fo r  Military Forces in a Post- 
Conflict Scenario. He notes that:
"According to the standard military model, warfare unfolds through four 
phases: ‘deterrence and engagement,’ ‘seize the initiative,’ ‘decisive 
operations,’ and ‘post-conflict.’ Reality is never divided quite that 
neatly, o f course, but the War College report stressed that Phase IV 
‘post-conflict’ planning absolutely had to start as early as possible, well 
before Phase III ‘decisive operations’ - the war itself. But neither the 
Army nor the other services moved very far past Phase 111 thinking. “‘All 
the A-Team guys wanted to be in on Phase 111, and the B-team guys 
were put on Phase IV,” one man involved in Phase IV told me. 
Frederick Barton, o f the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 
who was involved in postwar efforts in Flaiti, Rwanda, and elsewhere, 
put it differently. “If  you went to the Pentagon before the war, all the 
concentration was on the war,” he said. “ If you went there during the 
war, all the concentration was on the war. And if you went there after 
the war, they'd say, 'That's Jerry Bremer's job.” Still, the War College 
report confirmed what the Army leadership already suspected: that its 
real challenges would begin when it took control of Baghdad”.
Clearly the West’s extant model o f warfare failed to avoid these pitfalls. It did not 
consider the warfighting and the aftermath stages concurrently, and it not consider both - 
even separately - during the early planning stages. But perhaps its greatest failure was its 
inability to comprehend that effects achieved during the warfighting stage inevitably 
shape the aftermath to some degree.
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CONCLUSION
For a variety o f reasons, warfare in the early Century is unlikely to mimic even its 
immediate predecessors. Naturally some aspects - the enduring fundamentals o f warfare - 
will undoubtedly remain much the same, but there will clearly be some changes largely 
because the wider security environment has itself undergone significant transformation. 
Many of today’s strategic realities are unprecedented. Indeed they could not have been 
predicted even two decades ago. One case in point is A1 Qaeda, which has had a huge 
impact on international security; so significant in fact that we are today witnessing a 
fundamental shift in Western mindset regarding the utility of “the warfighting stage' as a 
discrete activity. The adoption o f a ‘war on terror’ demonstrates this very point, because 
in the past wars were declared against nations, countries, or alliances, or perhaps against 
piracy, warlords or brigands. In each case the enemy was easily identifiable and could be 
defined in human terms. Today, however, the advent o f a ‘war on terror’ has changed 
this model, and in doing so it has added further complications to an already complex 
discourse.
The process of globalisation has also made its mark. The range o f options now available 
to countries to conduct warfare according to rules o f their choosing is steadily 
diminishing, because increasing global linkages translate into directly into nations' 
reduced freedom to operate unilaterally. Common motivation between allies dilutes when 
one o f them has economic links with an enemy who shortly before the conflict 
commenced was considered to be a friend. This is especially true when the post-war 
expectation o f all involved is a return to the status quo ante.
The increasing presence o f the media presents yet another challenge to Western 
militaries. As technology improves, so too does the media’s ability to transmit in real 
time, and with great clarity, from the front lines. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold 
War there was no indication that civilians would soon routinely become news cameramen 
- indeed today's ubiquitous mobile phone / camera combination did not exist even a few 
years ago. And whilst at present the military has yet to be called to account for every 
action it undertakes, this is sure to change as media coverage becomes all-encompassing.
The humanitarian dimension has returned to public consciousness by dint o f the suffering 
that occurred after the 2003 invasion o f Iraq, and operations against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. At first sight these examples appear to be very different, yet pressure on 
local civilians by armed gunmen is a feature that is common to both. The former example 
in particular has heightened awareness o f poor aftermath planning, and in light o f the 
current perceived stalemate in Iraq, demands for coherent aftermath planning are likely to 
increase in the future.
Finally, one o f the greatest challenges to EBW is also one o f the oldest: the need to 
understand the cognitive dimension. This demands a thorough understanding of the 
enemy, o f allies and o f friendly nations, and to be successful it must accept that human 
behaviour cannot be predicted with certainly; that one person's rationality is another's 
irrationality: and that effects must be viewed from the perspectives o f all involved.
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EFFECTS BASED WARFARE:
THE SUM OF PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE?
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis asked whether EBW is an original model of warfare or the sum o f previous 
experience. Tempting though it might be to dismiss this question as an irrelevance, the 
fact remains that the background to EBW has never been analysed at an appropriate level 
within an academic context. Consequently the wider purpose o f this thesis was to fill this 
vacuum, because this lack o f scrutiny has led to several fundamental misunderstandings 
about the model. Those seeking familiarity with it must be willing to invest time in 
understanding its minutiae, yet these extend well beyond the practicalities which separate 
it from the current model, to its earliest roots; to why it came into being, and crucially, to 
the manner in which it came into being. Unless these factors are considered in some 
depth, discussions concerning this complex and intricate topic are likely to occur in 
isolation from the context within which EBW arose. Therefore viewing selected facets of 
the model (as opposed to the wider model in the round) could lead to fundamental 
misunderstandings regarding the model’s potential. In the best case, this approach 
smacks o f ignorance. In the worst case, however, it is disingenuous; because context 
drove the model’s development, and when the significance o f this context is marginalised, 
the inevitable result is an unbalanced appreciation o f the model. The process o f seeking 
to eradicate these misunderstandings has produced several important conclusions, as 
outlined below. These bolster the original conclusions described within the body o f the 
study, which - for reasons o f brevity - are not developed further within this final section.
The first conclusion, alluded to above, concerns EBW ’s complexity. Whereas previous 
models o f warfare are relatively easy to grasp, at least in general terms, the same is not 
true for EBW. For example, attritional models require relatively little knowledge o f 
military matters; indeed in some cases all that is needed is a basic understanding of 
mathematics. Manoeuvre Warfare is a significantly more complicated construct, yet it 
too may be grasped in outline after only the briefest of introductions. This is also true of 
the nuclear models o f Flexible Response and Tripwire, the latter arguably being one of 
the simplest models o f warfare yet devised, and perhaps one o f the few to be understood 
at an intuitive level by the general public. But EBW does not fall into these moulds.
It cannot be grasped even in outline by scanning introductory articles on the subject, no 
matter how competently they are written. EBW is simply too big a topic, too 
multifaceted in its character, and too diverse in its underlying methodologies to be 
grasped in sufficient depth to have meaning. And herein lies one of its principal 
challenges: educating its participants. Because if this does not happen, those who will 
find themselves involved are highly likely to misunderstand the underlying minutiae, 
hence they will enter the process with fundamental misconceptions about both the 
paradigm and its potential.
EBW is predicated upon a sophisticated, and at times extremely subtle, approach to 
warfare in its widest sense. Many models focus on achieving victory on the battlefield, 
but EBW aspires towards an altogether higher aim: victory over the longer term.
Within this model, victory on the battlefield is implicit, together with the additional 
requirement for aftermaths acceptable to the international community; this is the second 
conclusion. Importantly, it does not imply that alternative models ignore the usual 
strategic desire for peace once the warfighting stage is over; indeed nothing could be 
further from the truth. The key difference, however, Is that whilst other models routinely
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plan in a linear and chronological fashion, EBW requires the totality o f effects to be taken 
into account across the full spectrum o f conflict, and - to the extent that this is possible - 
from the earliest planning stages to the establishment of conditions for a lasting peace. 
Consequently, within EBW, the effects that occur during the warfighting stage must be 
factored into the planning for the post-warfighting stage, and this is demonstrably not the 
case at present. Further, ‘effects that occur’ is very different to “effects that are sought', 
because it takes into account both undesired and unintentional effects, in addition to those 
that were sought in the first place; and again, this is rarely the case in the current model.
Ill fact this EBW requirement applies as much to those effects considered positive by the 
victors as to those considered negative by the losers - and also the wider international 
community. This demand will present a significant problem to military practitioners, as it 
will complicate the fighting equation by an order o f magnitude.
To elaborate further, whereas many models o f warfare focus on the operational level, 
EBW spans each level o f warfare, and it does so in a holistic manner. Thus it takes the 
roles o f non-military bodies, both governmental and otherwise, into account dining the 
inilUcvy planning process. This is a very different stance from the current model. 
Consequently the issue is not one o f semantics, as many profess, but one o f substance.
In truth, it probably represents the single greatest difference between EBW and its 
predecessor. To illustrate the point, the Kosovo Case Study revealed that after 78 days of 
air activity, 70% of all road and 50% of rail bridges across the Danube were down.
This, from a military perspective, tightened the ratchet on Milosevic precisely as 
intended. Yet it interfered greatly with the subsequent /7017-military rebuilding operation 
that was undertaken after the military endstate had been secured. Contrast this with the 
more enlightened approach o f Desert Storm - which took place before Kosovo - wherein 
electrical installations were spared from destruction because the underlying effect (no 
electricity in Baghdad) had been attained. The difference between these approaches is 
stark.
If EBW is the sum of previous experience, it is difficult to explain how or why the effects 
mindset demonstrated during Desert Storm regressed shortly afterwards during Kosovo, 
only to re-emerge three years later in the form of the UK’s EBA. This example, one of 
many referred to throughout this study, hints at the possibility that EBW may indeed be 
more than a mere evolutionary stage o f the current model. Crucially, factors exist within 
EBW which are wholly unrelated to the Manoeuvrist Paradigm. These factors cannot he 
linked directly to M anoeuvrist thinking  hence - ipso facto - they cannot have evolved 
from it.
It should also be noted that the Kosovo mentality still very much in evidence in the 
Fallujah Case Study. What this timeline reveals is that the two systems are (or were) 
operating in parallel. This observation does not undermine the evolutionary argument as 
such - indeed at first sight it seems to support it, by suggesting that EBW is a branch o f its 
predecessor rather than an entity in its own right. However, an alternative (and equally 
plausible) explanation is that EBW naturally built upon previous success rather than 
starting from scratch. Such an approach would be entirely reasonable, given the 
functionality and success o f the Manoeuvrist Paradigm in the late Century (for 
example, the 1982 Falkland Islands campaign. Desert Storm land operations in 1991, and 
the Non-Combatant Evacuation o f Sierra Leone in 2000). It is therefore not unreasonable 
to surmise that those at the heart o f effects development would have had neither the 
desire, nor seen the need, to abandon many o f the underlying principles o f the 
Manoeuvrist Paradigm. Indeed the very notion o f ‘starting with a completely clean sheet'
is anathema to the contemporary military mind, which prefers instead to compile “lessons 
learned’ from each new campaign and to modify its approach accordingly. The fact that 
two systems may have been operating in parallel is interesting in itself, but inconclusive. 
Equally interesting is the realisation that when ‘effects thinking' was first articulated 
during Desert Storm, it applied to the Air component rather than to the joint campaign 
plan as a whole. From this it may be deduced that not only is it possible for the two 
approaches to be used during the same period, but that they could indeed be used 
concurrently - and very effectively - during the same operation.
Unfortunately none o f the foregoing answers the question of evolution versus revolution. 
What does emerge, however, is the realisation that this matter cannot be resolved solely 
by studying historical examples. In this respect the timeline issue is highly relevant, 
because it calls into question Foucault’s brief but pivotal role within this study. His belief 
that on occasion sudden and unexpected changes can occur, served as a lens for analysing 
the manner in which EBW came into being. The contention that new eras produce their 
own mindsets has great relevance in the case o f EBW; because if EBW contains elements 
that are unrelated to the current model - hence they cannot have evolved from it - the 
headline question now becomes twofold: where did EBW came from, and why did it 
emerge in the first place?
The answers are outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, the US and UK origins o f EBW. In the 
case of the US, key personalities drove the earliest inputs to the model, with the 
contributions o f air power theorists - most notably Warden and Deptula - being largely 
self-evident. However, these airmen built upon the work of others, such as Boyd and 
Lind, Starry and DePuy, and it becomes necessary to query how far back one must delve 
in order to unearth EBW ’s earliest roots. The post-Vietnam catharsis clearly had a role to 
play, but this is hardly a surprise. Infinitely more revealing is the extent to which 
Am erica's remote past moulded the thinking o f modern US theorists, whether they knew 
this or not. Indeed America’s unique approach to warfare proved to be fertile ground for 
modern effects thinking. That said, the catalyst for contemporary action appears to have 
been the realisation that improvements in airpower equated to time compression on the 
battlefield - and from this awareness the nascent effects mindset began in earnest.
Targets no longer needed to be re-attacked repeatedly as long as the rationale fo r  
at lacking (hem in the fir s t place had been, and M>as continuing to be, met. From this point 
onwards, at least for the US Air Force, ongoing destruction became subservient to the 
selection o f meaningful metrics o f success.
Analysing the US input accounts for the roots o f the modern EBW paradigm, but it leaves 
many questions unanswered. One obvious example is that whilst EBW claims to be 
holistic, the US desire to seek overwhelming victory on the battlefield has never been 
matched by a concomitant desire to set appropriate conditions for peace - hence EBW 
cannot, by definition, be holistic. Yet there is an answer to this conundrum. Eschevarria 
notes that the American approach to war is in fact a way of battle rather than a mature 
model o f warfare, and this perhaps explains to some degree why there is no commonly 
agreed definition o f EBW. Holistic it might be from a UK perspective, but it does not 
appear to be so from a US perspective. In fact this missing element - the wider approach 
to warfare - is precisely what the UK delivered to the paradigm. This happened because 
whilst the US input focused predominantly on operational developments, the UK input 
was pitched at the operational / strategic interface. Once work in the UK began in 
earnest, the EBW model moved forwards in ways that were unlikely to have occurred had 
it remained under US custodianship.
89
Albeit unwittingly, Modernising Government provided the framework around which the 
UK’s holistic approach subsequently took shape. This it achieved by making explicit the 
aspiration that henceforth all departments would work more closely together than in the 
past. With hindsight this was an obvious precondition for EBA, the UK’s pan- 
governmental approach to warfare, but clearly this was not known at the time. 
Nonetheless, a mere two years after Modernising Government, the New Chapter to the 
1998 Strategic Defence Review  stated that future military options were to be framed in 
terms o f desired effects, and from this point onwards there would be no going back for 
the UK. Indeed the New Chapter spelled this out in no uncertain terms, by making it 
clear that not only was EBA the U K ’s model o f choice, but that it was here to stay.
The significance of the above was soon picked up outside the UK, with Australia's 
Defence Science and Technology Organisation noting in 2004 that “the effects-based 
approach is a concept that may impact on National security and National prosperity in 
profound and challenging ways” .^   ^ This comment hints at the potential of the new 
model, as well as at the scale o f progress that was achieved within such a short period of 
time. It may therefore be seen that that not only did the UK build substantively upon the 
earlier US work, but that in doing so it identified a key omission: EBW ’s potential as an 
holistic model o f warfare.
Two further conclusions remain. The first is that warfare in the early 2 f ‘ Century is not 
mimicking its predecessors. The contemporary security environment has changed. The 
rise in international terrorism has been a key factor, but so too have globalisation, the 
increased efficacy o f the media, the re-emergence o f humanitarianism, and the realisation 
that planning for today’s aftermaths currently lacks coherence. None o f these factors was 
significant when the W est’s extant approach first emerged during the Cold War.
The final conclusion is that EBW ’s viability is not known at present. The paradigm is 
largely conceptual. Certainly it claims to have codified and formalised the best o f today’s 
approach, and it aspires to future effects being consistent with those that were envisaged 
during the planning process. However, these are bold claims. And whilst they appear to 
be sound in theory, they cannot be quantified empirically until the model is used in 
earnest. Given EBW’s immaturity this is unlikely to happen in the short term; indeed the 
fact that no overarching UK national philosophy exists at government department level 
stands against EBW ’s use until this omission has been rectified. This is not the only 
frustration, however. Another fundamental problem is that no tool or mechanism exists, 
or seems likely to exist, that will predict accurately both individual and corporate human 
behaviour in the face o f individual effects. The span of possibilities is simply too great. 
Paradoxically, EBW’s thirst for greater cognitive understanding might prove to be its 
undoing.
With these caveats in mind, EBW ’s apparent attractions need to be carefully balanced 
against its likelihood of success. Ultimately it may prove to be an aspiration too far, and 
perhaps it will only ever deliver partial solutions. If this is the case, the key question 
becomes one o f whether the W est’s current approach - as exemplified in Iraq and 
Afghanistan - should be maintained, or whether a conscious shift in direction might yield 
better results in the future. One thing is certain, however: if the paradigm is to stand any 
chance o f success, it needs to be properly understood. This can only be achieved by 
understanding why and how it emerged in the first place. EBW is many things, but the 
sum of previous experience it is most certainly not.
Chapter 3. Op Cit.
90
BIBLIOGRAPHY  
PRIMARY SOURCES
HM Government
HM Government, FCO Departmental Report 200R  2001.
HM Government, White Paper; Delivering Security in a Changing World, Cm 6269, July 
2004.
HM Government, White Paper: M odernising Government, Cm 4310, 1999.
JDCC Draft Paper The Effects Based Approach, 041011, undated.
JDCC Paper The UK Military View o f  Effects - Definitions and Relationships, undated. 
JDCC UK Joint High Level Operational Concept, undated.
JDCC Presentation The UK Approach to the Planning, Execution and Assessment o f  
Effects-Based Operations, undated.
JDCC Joint Defence Publication 0-01, Edition 6, UK Glossary o f  Joint and Multinational 
Terms and Definitions, May 2004.
JDCC Joint Warfare Publication 0-01, British Defence Doctrine (SecondEdition), 
October 2001.
JDCC Joint Warfare Publiction 3-00 (Second Edition), Joint Operations Execution, 
March 2004.
JDCC Joint Warfare Publication 5-00, Joint Operations Planning, March 2004 Edition,
UK MOD. Joint Operations, Joint Doctrine Publication 01, March 2004.
UK MOD, Kosovo: Lessons From the Crisis, Cm 4724, June 2000.
UK MOD. The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, July 2002.
UK MOD, The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter Supporting Information & 
Analysis, Cm 5566 Vol II, July 2002.
Interviews
Butler, Colonel E. Deputy Director, Higher Command and Staff College, UK Defence 
Academy, September 2004.
Capewell, Colonel D, RM, UK Joint Force Headquarters, September 2004.
Carr. Karen. Director o f Future Systems at BAe Human Resources, July 2005.
91
Grant, Lieutenant Colonel D. Directing Staff, Joint Services Command And Staff 
College, UK Defence Academy, September 2004.
Neville-Jones, Dame Pauline. Former Chairman Joint Intelligence Committee. November 
2004.
Smith, General Sir Rupert. March 2004, February 2005.
Williams, Lieutenant Colonel R J E. Directing Staff, Joint Services Command And Staff 
College, UK Defence Academy, September 2004.
Presentations
Blix, Hans. Former UN Weapons Inspector in Iraq, Oxford University, September 2004.
Kissinger, Henry. Guest at the UK Higher Command and Staff College 03, February 
2003.
SECONDARY SOURCES 
Books
Alberts, David S and Hayes, Richard E, Power to the Edge: Command, Control in the 
Information Age, CCRP Publication Series, 2003.
Boot, Max. Savage Wars o f  Peace: Small Wars and the Rise o f  American Power, Basic 
Books, New York, 2002.
Booth, Ken, Strategy and Ethnocentrism, Croom Helm, London. 1979.
Churchill, Winston S, The World Crisis, Vol. 2, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.
1923.
Citino, Robert M, Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution o f  Operational Warfare, 
University Press o f Kansas, Kansas, 2004.
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, ed./trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 1976.
Clausewitz. Carl von. On War, tr. Colonel J J Graham, Barnes and Noble, New York, 
1968.
Cooper, Robert, The Breaking o f  Nations, Atlantic Books, London, 2004.
Cox, Sebastian, ed. Sir Arthur Harris - Despatch on War Operations, Frank Cass.
London, 1995.
Davis, Paul K, Effects Based Operations: A Grand Challenge fo r  the Analytical 
Community, RAND, Santa Monica, 2001.
92
Freedman, Sir Lawrence, The Official History o f  the Falkland Islands Campaign Volume 
One: The Origins o f  the Falklands War, Routledge, London, 2005.
Foucault, Michel, The Order o f  Things: An Archaeology o f  the Human Science, Vintage 
Books, New York, tr 1994.
Fuller, Major-General J F C, Armoured Warfare, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1943.
Gettleman, Marvin E; Franklin, Jane; Young, Marilyn B; and Franklin, Bruce (eds). 
Vietnam and America: The M ost Comprehensive Documented History o f  the Vietnam 
IVar, Grove Press, New York, 1995.
Gray, P, ed. Air Power 21: Challenges fo r  the Nev> Century, 11M Stationary Office. 
London, 2000.
Greenberg, Lawrence M, The Hukbalahap Insurrection, A Case Study o f  A Successful 
Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955, U.S. Army Center o f Military 
History, Washington, D.C., 1987.
Guevara, Che, Guerrilla Warfare, in Guerrilla Warfare, Cassell. London, 1961.
Halperin, Martin H, Contemporary M ilitary Strategy, Faber and Faber, London. 1972. 
Handel, Michael I, Masters o f  War: Classical Strategic Thought, Frank Cass. London. 
1992.
Hanson. Victor Davis, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise o f  Western 
Power, Doubleday, New York, 2001
Hanson, Victor Davis, The Western Way o f  War: The Infantry Battles in Ancient Greece, 
Knopf, New York, 1989.
Holden Reid, Brian, ed, M ilitary Power: Land Warfare in Theory and Practice, Frank 
Cass, London, 1977.
Holmes, Richard, ed, The Oxford Companion to Military History, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2001.
Howard, Michael, ed. The Theory and Practice o f  War: Essays Presented to Captain B H  
Liddell Hart on his Seventieth Birthday, Cassell, London, 1965.
Howard, Russell D, Sawyer, Reid L, and Downing, Wayne A, Defeating Terrorism: 
Shaping the New Security Environment, McGraw-Hill, Guildford, Connecticut, 2003.
Ivo H, Daalder N and O ’Hanlon, ME: Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo. 
Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 2000.
Kissinger, Henry, ‘American Strategic Doctrine and Diplomacy*, in The Theory and 
Practice o f  War, ed Michael Howard, Cassell, London, 1965.
Liddell Hart, Captain B H, The Revolution in Warfœe, Faber and Faber, London, 
undated.
93
Lindsay, Major-General G M, The War on the Civil and Military Fronts, Cambridge 
University Press, 1942.
Ludendorff, Erich, The Coming War, Faber & Faber, London. 1931.
Mann Colonel E; Endersby Lt Col G; and Searle, Thomas R, Thinking Effects: Effects- 
Based Methodology fo r  Joint Operations, Air University Press, Alabama, 2002.
Mao Tse-Tung, Selected M ilitary Writings o f  Mao Tse-Tung. Foreign Language Press, 
Peking, 1966.
Mao Tse-Tung, Unrehearsed Talks and Letters: 1956-71, Ed Stuart R. Schram. London, 
1974.
Mao Tse-Tung, Yu Chi Chan, Guerrilla Warfare, in Guerilla Warfare, Cassell, London, 
1961.
Martin, Laurence, The Reith Lectures 1981, in The Two-Edged Sword, Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, London, 1982.
Maynard, John, Bennett and the Pathfinders, Arms and Armour Press, London, 1996.
Murray, Williamson., Knox, MacGregor., and Bernstein, Alvin, eds: The Making o f  
Strateg}>~Rulers, States and War, Cambridge University Press, 1994.
Parker, Geoffrey, Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise o f  the West 1500- 
IHOO, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1996.
Peters, Ralph, Fighting fo r  the Future: Will America Triumph? Stackpole Books, 
Mechanicsburg PA, 1999.
Sawyer, Ralph D, tr The Seven Military Classics o f  Ancient China , Westview Press, 
Oxford, 1993.
Shelling, Thomas C, Arms and Influence, Yale University Press, 1966, p 34.
Smith, Edward R, Effects Based Operations: ApplyingNetM>ork Centric Warfare in 
Peace, Crisis and War, CCRP Information Age Transformation Series, 2002.
Stankovic, Milos, Trusted Mole: A Sold ier’s Journey into Bosnia's Heart o f  Darkness, 
HarperCollins, London, 2000.
Stoller, Mark A, George C Marshall: Soldier Statesman o f  the American Century, Simon 
& Schuster, New York, 1989.
Strange, Dr J, Pet^spectives On W arfightingNumber Four, Second Edition: Centers o f  
Gravity and Critical Vulnérabilités, Marine Corps University Foundation, Quantico. 
Virginia. 1996.
Weigley. Russell F, The American Way o f  War: A History o f  United States Military 
Strategy and Policy, Macmillan, 1973.
94
Woodward, Admiral Sandy, One Hundred Days: The Memoirs o f  the Falklands Battle 
Group Commander, HarperCollins, London, 1992.
Briefs; Journals; Periodicals; Reviews.
Barnett, Roger R, ‘Effects Based Operations: Applying Network-Centric Warfare in 
Peace’, Naval War College Review’, Washington, Spring 2004, Vol 57, Issue 2.
Bassford, Christopher, ‘John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz', 
War and History, November 1994, Vol 1, Number 3.
Batschelet. Allen W, ‘Effects-Based Operations for Joint W arfighters’, Field Artillery, 
Fort Sill, VIay/Jun 2003, Issue 3.
Bellamy, Chris, ‘Cause or Effect’, Defence Director, Sept 2004.
Bingham, Price T, ‘Transforming Warfare with Effects-Based Joint Operations'. 
Aerospace Power Journal, Maxwell AFB, Spring 2001, Vol 15, Issue 1.
Bingham, Price T, ‘Seeking Synergy: Joint Effects-Based Operations’, Joint Force 
Quarterly, Washington, Spring 2002, Issue 30.
Burridge, Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian, ‘Technical Development and Effects Based 
Operations'. 2004 Trenchard Memorial Lecture, RUSI Journal, London, October 2004, 
Vol 149, No 5.
Byman, Daniel L and Waxman, Matthew C, ‘Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate', 
International Security, Spring 2000, Vol 24, No 4.
Cebrowski, Vice Admiral Arthur K, and John J. Garstka, ‘Network-Centric Warfare: Its 
Origin and Future’, Proceedings, January 1998.
Covington, Stephen R, ‘Defensive Actions in a Strategic Soviet Offensive’, International 
Defence Review’, 1989, Number 2.
Crowder, Gary L, ‘Effects-Based Operations’, Military Technology, Bonn, June 2003, 
Vol 27, Issue 6.
Deptula, Major General David A, ‘Effects-Based Operations: A US Perspective', World 
Defence Systems, RUSI, London, August 2003.
Deptula, General David A, ‘Effects Based Operations: Change in the Nature of W arfare'. 
Aerospace Education Foundation, Virginia, 2002.
Echevarria. Antulio J, ‘Toward an American Way of W ar', Strategic Studies Institute o f  
the US Army War College, March 2004.
Fadok, David S, ‘John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power’s Quest for Strategic 
Paralysis'. Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, February 1995.
Farndale, General Sir Martin, ‘The Operational Level o f Command’, RUSI Journal, 
Autumn, 1988.
95
Herbert, Major Paul H, ‘Deciding what has to be done; General William E. DePuy and 
the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations’, Combat Studies Insliiute, Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas, 1988.
Kamps, Charles T, ‘Effects-Based Operations’, Air & Space Power Journal, Maxwell 
AFB, Summer 2004, Vol 18, Issue 2.
Kessler, Glenn, ‘In Fallujah, U.S. Envoy Greeted by Complaints', Washington Post, April 
14, 2005.
Lind, William S, ‘Some Doctrinal Questions for the US Army', Military Review, March 
1977, Number 3.
Linn, Brian M, ‘The American Way of War Revisited’, The Journal o f  Military History, 
April 2002, Vol 66, No 2.
Lowe, Donald and Ng, Simon, ‘Effects-based Operations: Language, Meaning and the 
Effects-Based Approach’, 2004 Command and Control Research and Technology 
Symposium: the Power o f  Information Age Concepts and Technologie, 2004.
Mann, Edward; Endersby, Gai'y; Searle, Tom; ‘Dominant Effects: Effects Based Joint 
Operations'. Aerospace Power Journal, Maxwell AFB, Fall 2001, Vol 15, Issue 3.
McNicholl, Air Vice Marshal Iain, ‘Effects Based Air Operations: Air Command and 
Control and the Nature o f the Emerging Battlespace’, RUSI Journal, London, June 2003, 
Vol 184, Issue 3.
Moscow Times, ‘Bargaining over Spoils in Iraq’, May 16, 2003.
Mroue, Bassem and Saadi, Abdul-Qader, ‘US Bombs Fallujah Mosque; More Than 40 
Worshippers YJiW^W, Associated Press, April 7, 2004.
O'Hanlon, Michael, & Lins de Albuquerque, Adriana, ‘Scoring the Iraq Aftermath', The 
National Interest, Winter 2003/04, Number 74.
Pendall, David W, ‘Effects Based Operations and the Exercise o f National Power', 
M ilitaiy Review’, Fort Leavenworth, Jan/Feb 2004, Vol 84, Issue 1.
Pengelley. Colonel Patrick, ‘Air Land Battle: A Hollow Charge?', Defence Attache, 1983, 
Number 3.
RAND Research Brief, Operation Allied Force: Lessons fo r  the Future, 2001.
Romjue, John L, ‘The Evolution o f the Airland Battle Concept'. Air University Review’. 
May-June 1984.
Slavin, Barbara and Moniz, Dave, ‘War in Iraq's Aftermath Hits Troops Hard'. USA 
Today, 21 July, 2003.
Tirpak, John A, ‘Go For Effects-Based Operations’, Air Force Magazine, Washington. 
December 2003, Vol 86, Issue 12.
96
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, M ilitary Operations: Operational Concepts for (he A ir la n d  
Battle and Corps Operation, 25 March 1981.
Zinni, General (Retired) Anthony, How Do We Overhaul The Nation's Defense to Win 
the Next War? Presentation to the US Naval Institute, September 4, 2003.
W eb Sites (September 2004 - August 2005)
hltp;//www.antiwar.com/lind/?articleid=4201:
Lind, William S, Fallujah: Little Stalingi^ad, December 22, 2004.
http://Archives.Obs-Us.Com/Obs/English/Books/Mcnamara/lr236.Htm:
Robert S. Mcnamara with Brian Vandemar. In Retrospect: The Tragedy And Lessons O f  
Vietnam.
http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/03/19/spij.irq.bush/index.html
http://www.gtalumni.org/StayInformed/magazine/fall02/article3.html 
Coram, KobeA, John Boyd: Architect o f  Modern Warfare.
http://news.independent.co.uk/worId/middle_east/story.jsp
http://ocw.mit.edu/.../Political-Science/17-40Fall-2004/AA23CB5F-A2DB-4321 -BF69- 
52F1BF2DC0B6/0/17 4 0 J e d  4_spol.pdf
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international/jan-june99/blair_doctrine4-23.html
www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/coldwar/huk
www.comw.org/pda/0202strangeves:
Strange Victory: A Critical Appraisal O f Operation Enduring Freedom And The 
Afghanistan War.
www.gdcanada.com/company_info
www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom
www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oif-phantom-fury-fallujah.htm
www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story
www.mit.edu/people/mkgray/net
www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/BAE-Nimrod
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/interviews
www.portaliraq.com/news:
Big Fish Set To Swallow’ Most Spoils O f Iraq War, November 24, 2003 
wwwM-af.mod.uk/falklands
97
v\/wwM-and.org
www.rdg.ac.uk: Newsome, Bruce, ‘ “Executive Summary” Mass-Casuaity Terrorism: 
Second Quarterly Forecast’, University o f  Reading Terrorist Forecasting Group, June 13, 
2003.
r
